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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal i s vested i n the Supreme 
Court • • State ot Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
2 ) wlii i c h i i t a L e s : 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any cour t of 
record, which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to the rn1*» mak i ng power of the Utah -Supreme Court 
this matter _may be designated as one to be heard by the Utah 
L 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by improperly shifting -
the n 
support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
standard of review -? - *=•.•* *v- ^^ iti before the court in the 
i
 appea2 j s ftnap to a summary judgment 
presents only issues of law, 1 - Appeals Coi :i i:t gi v es no deference 
t o t|ie trial court's conclusions, but reviews them for 
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, ; 88 P (T Ita ) 
(per curiam); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d ) 
(Utah 1993). 
2 Whether the trial court erred in granting the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment when there existed a 
1 
genuine dispute as to material facts which would preclude Summary 
Judgment. The standard of review as to this issue on appeal is 
that the Appeals Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment under a "correctness" standard. Daniels v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Assoc., 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). The Appeals Court accords no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not 
in dispute nor as to the court's legal conclusions based on these 
facts. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). When determining 
if summary judgment is proper, the Appeals Court views all 
relevant facts, including all inferences arising from the facts, 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P 2d 398, 399 (Utah 
1986) . 
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment because the Respondent 
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law for reasons that: 
(a) The Respondent had controverted Respondents proof of 
essential elements necessary to establish a contract between 
Respondent and Appellant and thus proof of the debt that was 
suggested by Respondent's pleadings. 
2 
(b) The Respondent fal d 
evidence, an unimpaired debt owed by Appellant to Respondent. 
The standard of review respect. Lnq this issue on appeal froit a 
summa? >i. HMIJ'UI i i t;y M M " I h" Appeal I'MIIII. view - -. :-\ • dence 
and a Li reasonable inferences i. i *> .\it->v-;\ therefrom i i o . \ .-.\w 
most favorable r + h- party upon which summary judgement is 
impo s ed. Hal-L Warrei. accord 
Blackhurst v, Transamerica Insurance Co,y 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1985) . It is only when the lads ,n<' \\\w\ i \\\ nil ed 
reasonable conclusion,, can be drawn therefrom that such issues 
become questions of law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co, , Ml"'l l» " I i "> ' ) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Interpretation of the following statutes and rules will be 
d e t er'in i.na11 v e n i 1 Iu • i t.sin>s pi <rii* *i11 fn 1: 
( I ) R u le 5f> | c )
 |P 111 ah Ru I os oi Civil Procedure which 
provides that: 
t* ^he record 
demonstrates that: 
| c) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning 
issues to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed 
3 
in a light favorable to the party opposing the summary 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(1) This case arose as a result of a contract contemplated 
between the parties with Appellee allegedly providing certain 
products and services to repair machinery for the Appellant who 
then allegedly, did not satisfy the debt or obligation whereupon 
Appellee brought an action in the Circuit Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah; 
(2) In chronological order the record of the court below 
discloses facts as follows: 
(a) A complaint was filed alleging that Appellant 
contacted Respondent and requested that Respondent provide 
certain products and services to repair machinery owned or 
used by "Plaintiff" (sic). Appellant responded by admitting 
the above paragraph. (See Amended Complaint at 15 and Answer 
to Amended Complaint at f4.) 
(b) Respondent allegedly provided said products and 
supplies during said period, as requested, and had performed 
all acts to be performed herein by Respondent. Appellant 
responded by denying the allegation and affirmatively 
alleging that in fact Respondent did not perform requested 
4 
repai i s ni |>i ov ide request <**! ni odiicf ^  ( So*-1 /Mivnded 
Complaint at 16 and Answer Amended Complaint at 15.) 
(c) Responder <-, * fou^ ij • ;;.r. *wp«- ,,s * refused 
a * n 
made, and currently owec :« Respondent 
$12
 r* together LLIA interest as specified by Utah Code 
A « L sea. from, June ] II 993 until 
collected > ~ incurred herein. Appellant 
responded by denyincj the above paragraph w i M'i \ he limitation 
of an admission . t-ho Appellant had refused and failed to 
pay Respondent Se\ Amended Complaint at 17 and Answer ~_ 
Amended 
(d) The pleading the Appellant set up affirmative 
defenses considerate:* ^ H n i ^ 1 consideration and 
i in.) I IM.> A p p e l I .in in I 
reserved * right ^s^rt additional affirmative 
defenses. (See Answer to Amended Complaint at 117,8,9,10.) 
( |)i« ; Ifi nrel iminary 
negotiations the Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
and alleged that: 
5 
(a) The Appellant contacted the Respondent and 
requested that Respondent inspect certain machinery to 
determine if the same needed a torque converter replacement. 
(b) Respondent next alleged that, in response to the 
order of the Appellant, traveled to the site where the 
machinery was located and determined that extensive repairs, 
albeit none being required with respect to the torque 
converter, would be required to put the machinery in order 
and secured the consent of some unspecified third person who 
was termed by Respondent as Appellant's "on-site 
representative". (Affidavit of Holt at 13,4,5.) 
(c) The response of Appellant was that this person was 
unknown to the Appellant and not employed by Appellant and 
did not have authority or apparent authority to enter into a 
novation. (Affidavit of Appellant at 14.) 
(d) Respondent failed to contact Appellant to confirm 
the questioned order even though five weeks elapsed between 
the initial inspection and the actual repair. (Affidavit of 
Appellant at 12.) 
(e) On authority of the unspecified bystander 
respondent provided repairs with a cost greatly in excess of 
6 
the limitation placed on his order by the Appellant, 
(Affidavit of Appellant at fl) 
(f) Appellant alleged that the actual value of the 
repairs provided by the Respondent was relatively minimal, 
Appellant already having in his possession the required 
replacement units which were ultimately required (ie: an oil 
cooler and radiator) for which he had paid $1,500, a fact 
which he would have related to Respondent if he had been 
contacted; Appellant contemplated making these repairs 
within his own organization. (Affidavit of Appellant at f4.) 
(g) Appellant alleged that the value of the machine 
upon which the repairs were accomplished is and was 
substantially less than the cost of the repairs claimed to 
have been made by the Respondent. (Affidavit of Appellant 
at 15.) 
(h) Appellant alleged that no on site representative 
of Appellant was in the area nor did Respondent deal with 
any agent of Appellant. (Affidavit of Appellant at 14) 
(4) After the filing a Motion for Summary Judgment together 
with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting 
affidavits which pleading was received by Appellants counsel on 
7 
the 10th day of March, 1995, the Appellant did, on March 21st, 
1995, file with the Circuit Court a Motion for Enlargement of 
Time without any supporting documentation. 
(5) The next day, on the 22nd day of March, 1995 Appellant 
filed with the circuit court a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities Resisting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
with a supporting affidavit, 
(6) Two months later, on the 23rd day of May, 1995 
Respondent filed an Objection to Appellant's Motion for 
Enlargement of Time, which in fact was not necessary as the 
pleadings had been timely filed with the court but which made it 
appear that Respondent had not the benefit of a response to his 
motion. 
(7) Appellant's counsel reviewed the file and noted that 
Respondent had not been served copies of the response to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and said deficiency was remedied by 
service of copies of all pleadings on Respondent on the 25th day 
of May, 1995 with a letter of apology. A copy of which appears 
in the addendum. 
(8) On the 26th day of May, 1995 Respondent filed a Notice 
to Submit for Decision. 
8 
(9) The Trial Court judge sustained the Objection to 
Enlargement of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment, and ordered 
Appellant to file a response within 10 days and a copy of the 
docket entry was sent by the clerk to each party. A copy of the 
said Docket is attached within the addendum. 
(10) Upon receipt of the docket entry, the Appellant 
confirmed that copies of all pleadings were on file with the 
court and counsel. 
(11) On the 8th day of June, 1995 the written Order 
Sustaining the Objection of Respondent was signed and entered 
into the docket. 
(12) On the 10th day of July, 1995 the Trial Court Judge 
granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and a copy of 
the docket entry was sent to each party. A copy of said Docket 
is within the addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellee, upon the record of this case is not entitled 
to a grant of Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellee, upon the facts of this case, is not entitled 
to a grant of Summary Judgment. 
9 
(1) It seems apparent that the court did not credit 
Appellants pleadings in response to the motion for summary 
judgment and Appellant wonders if the Trial Court may have 
granted summary judgment on the basis that Appellant had not 
responded to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at all, 
even though the court docket discloses that Appellant had 
responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the response had 
been in the court file since the 22nd day of March, 1995. (See 
Addendum at Page 34.) 
(2) Inasmuch as the Respondent was the movant for summary 
judgmentsaftiafjc^ud^mEBtibatthBsbaHdsatBiateAppBibiBtihfidrBDted 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
appellant. The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the case of 
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P 2d 614 (Utah 1985) 
observed: 
Issues [of negligence] ordinarily present questions of 
fact to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only 
when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues 
become questions of law. See also FMA Acceptance Co. 
v. Leatherby Insurance Co., (Supra at Page ) 
(3) The appellant opposed summary judgment at the trial 
level, contending that respondent had failed to meet the burden 
necessary to establish that the Respondent was entitled to 
10 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The question as to whether 
Rocky Mountain Machinery Company was required under the contract 
(See Affidavit of Appellant at fl) to clear any further charges 
with the Appellant as opposed the contention that a novation had 
occurred was an unresolved issue which should have been litigated 
on the merits. 
(4) The contract between the parties (Invoice and Letter 
submitted by Respondent in support of the motion for summary 
judgment) discloses that Respondent considered the repair order 
as limited by its own terms to $5,000.00; Appellant contends that 
the oral contract relied upon by respondent was conditioned by 
the term that appellant was to pay no more than $3,500.00 for 
repairs. (See Affidavit of Appellant at fl.) 
(5) To exceed that figure, Appellant contends that a 
novation must occur and to prove novation the Respondent would 
have been required, by a preponderance of the evidence presented 
at trial to prove the following: (a) A previous binding 
obligation; (b) which was extinguished by a new, valid contract ; 
(c) with the consent of all parties, Tannhauser v Shea 83 Mont 
562, 295 P 268, 74 ALR 1021 (1930). Upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment the Respondent, in order to prevail, should have been 
required to offer uncontroverted evidence as to each of those 
11 
elements while in fact the pleadings of Appellant controverted 
any such contentions. 
(6) What evidence the respondent did offer in connection 
with the Motion for Summary Judgment may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The repairman, upon diagnosing the problem, 
discussed the situation with a person who he concluded 
to be Appellant's on-site representative and received 
permission to complete the repairs. (Affidavit of Holt 
at f5.) 
2. At no time did Appellant or Appellant's on-site 
representative ask that rebuilt or remanufactured parts be 
used in making the repairs, nor did Appellant make any 
indication to Respondent that the costs of such repairs 
might cause Appellant to consider replacing the dozer. 
(Affidavit of Holt at 58.) 
(7) In response to that particular allegation appellant set 
up facts indicating the 
1. He had no idea who the person that the repairman 
spoke to in Oceola, Nevada but he suspected that it was one 
of the employees of a gold mine which was operating in that 
12 
area. Appellant further alleged that he could not justify 
repairs of that magnitude and that he had the means to make 
the needed repairs and that no novation had occurred in that 
the determination of Respondent to make the more extensive 
repair was never put to him. (Affidavit of Appellant at 14) 
CONCLUSION 
It seems apparent that there was no meeting of the minds of 
the parties as to what should have been repaired or how much 
should have been expended. The Appellant respectfully submits 
that the Respondent at the trial level, as a matter of law, 
failed to meet the burden necessary to enjoy a jgxant of Summary 
Judgment because there remained genuine issues pfl fact which 
should have been resolved by a f i n d ^ T of^act upoik a trial had on 
the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1995. 
B:\MATTIN.BRF(3) 
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ute, if the court determines that restitution 
is either appropriate or inappropriate, it 
shall make the reason for the decision "a 
part of its written order." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-3-201(3Xa) (1978 ed.) (Supp.1983). 
In the case before us, there is ample 
record evidence, from which the trial court 
could have found that restitution was prop-
er. Notwithstanding the mandate of the 
statute that the trial court's reasons be 
included as part of its order, we believe 
that the failure to do so in this case was 
harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw at-
tention to this requirement for future guid-
ance of the sentencing courts. 
Defendant's sentence is affirmed in all 
respects. 
(O f«YHUMM*SYST!M> 
APACHE TANK LINES, INC., a 
corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Thomas R. CHENEY, Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Clifford 
P. Cheney, Defendant and Appellant 
Thomas R. CHENEY, as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Clifford P. 
Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney and as 
Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad 
Litem of the minor children Signa Che-
ney and Keenan Cheney, Leslie Skel-
ton, as Co-Conservator and Co-Guardi-
an Ad Litem for Signa Cheney and 
Keenan Cheney, Counterclaimant and 
Cross-Claimant and Appellants, 
v. 
COWBOY OIL COMPANY and LeGrand 
B. Brunson, Cross-Claim Defendants 
and Respondent. 
No. 19573. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 20, 1985. 
Truck owner brought action for prop-
erty damage and loss of use of tractor and 
trailer against personal representative of 
estate of deceased occupants of automobile 
involved in collision with truck; latter eoun-
terclaimed for wrongful death and joined 
truck driver and his employer, who moved 
for summary judgment The Second Dis-
trict Court, Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer, 
J., granted the motion, and appeal was 
taken. The Supreme Court held that ques-
tions of fact as to whether truck driver was 
negligent in head-on collision accident with 
automobile precluded summary judgment 
on wrongful death counterclaim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgment «»180 
Summary judgment should be granted 
with great caution in negligence cases. 
2. Negligence <S=>136(9, 14) 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present 
questions of fact to be resolved by fact 
finder; it is only when facts are undisputed 
and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law. 
3. Negligence «=»136(25) 
Proximate cause is usually a factual 
issue and in most circumstances will not be 
resolved as a matter of law. 
4. Judgment e=>181(33) 
Questions of fact as to whether truck 
driver was negligent in head-on collision 
accident with automobile precluded summa-
ry judgment in favor of truck driver and 
his employer in a wrongful death action 
brought as a counterclaim on behalf of 
estate and heirs of deceased occupants of 
automobile. 
Carl E. Malouf, Logan, for appellant 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from a summary 
judgment in favor of LeGrand Brunson and 
APACHE TANK LINES, INC. v. CHENEY 
Cite aa 706 PJd 614 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 615 
his employer, Cowboy Oil Co., in a wrong-
ful death action brought as a counterclaim 
on behalf of the estates and heirs of Clif-
ford P. Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney, his 
wife. Brunson was the driver of a tank 
tractor and trailer that collided with the 
Cheneys' car, killing the Cheneys instantly. 
The trial court found Brunson not negli-
gent as a matter of law. We reverse and 
remand for a trial on the merits. 
On March 21, 1980, Brunson arose at 
6:00 a.m., had a bowl of cereal and coffee 
for breakfast, and went on duty at 11:00 
a.m. He drove a loaded tanker truck and 
trailer from Woods Cross, Utah, to Kem-
merer, Wyoming, stopping for a hamburg-
er and coffee between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. 
He proceeded to Nightengale, about three 
miles southwest of Rock Springs, Wyo-
ming, where the tanks were filled with 
8,820 gallons of drip gas condensate, bring-
ing the total weight of truck and trailer to 
80,000-84,000 lbs. Brunson began his re-
turn trip at 9:00 p.m., stopped at Evanston 
for a couple of beers, stopped at the port of 
entry to help a friend with truck repairs, 
and then began the last leg of his journey 
to Woods Cross. It started to rain and 
turned cold, and by the time Brunson left 
the canyon and turned onto Route 89, he 
knew he was on black ice, because it was 
"slicker than hell" and people passing him 
in the opposite direction had "hollered" at 
him over their CB that the roads were slick 
and icy. 
At around 1:30 a.m., as Brunson was 
ascending a long hill north of Layton, he 
accelerated to maintain a speed of his truck 
and went from sixth to seventh and then to 
eighth gear. The truck started to slip, and 
Brunson shifted down again to seventh to 
maintain a speed of about 40 m.p.h. It was 
at this point that he first noticed the head-
lights of Cheneys' oncoming car when it 
crested the hill ahead of him. 
Here the evidence becomes confusing. 
In his deposition, Brunson testified that the 
headlights of the car suddenly disappeared. 
Without slowing down, Brunson got over 
as far off to the right as he could -go, 
thinking he could get away from the car. 
He looked down at his speedometer, which 
read between 40 and 45 m.p.h., and when 
he next looked up, the headlights of the 
Cheney car were right in front of him. His 
truck crushed the car and its occupants 
inside. 
In the statement given to the police, 
Brunson stated the Cheney car made a 
U-turn and entered his lane, and he tried to 
miss i t He amended that statement the 
following morning and added: "Car looked 
like it was making U-turn. Lights were 
aimed towards me when first saw him, 
thought I wonder what he's going to do, 
then I lost lights and almost as quick he 
was in front of me and I hit him." 
Defendant was sued by Apache Tank 
Lines, owner of the Brunson truck, for 
property damage and loss of use of the 
tractor and trailer. Defendant counter-
claimed for wrongful death and joined 
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. in this suit. 
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. moved for 
summary judgment, claiming that undis-
puted facts established that Brunson was 
not negligent as a matter of law. Defend-
ant opposed the motion on the ground that 
the evidence before the court showed mate-
rial disputed facts from which a jury might 
find Brunson negligent 
[1-3] In an appeal from a summary 
judgment, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah, 632 
P.2d 848 (1981); accord Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., Utah, 699 
P.2d 688 (1985). Summary judgment 
should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases. Williams v. Melby, 
Utah, 699 P.2d 723 (1985). Issues of negli-
gence ordinarily present questions of fact 
to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only 
when the facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn there-
from that such issues become questions of 
law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). 
Likewise, proximate cause is usually a fac-
tual issue and in most circumstances will 
not be resolved as a matter of law. Uni-
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gard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 
Utah, 689 P.2d 1344 (1984). This case po-
s e s no exception. 
[ 4 ] Summary judgment is proper where 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment a s a matter of law. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c). In granting summary judg-
ment, the trial court based its ruling on the 
parties' memoranda, affidavits, pleadings, 
arguments of counsel, and all other infor-
mation contained in the court's file. The 
court found that there was no genuine is-
sue of material fact and that Brunson and 
Cowboy Oil Co. were entitled to summary 
judgment a s a matter of law. The trial 
court concluded that even "if Brunson had 
been a magician, he wouldn't have got out 
of the road of that car." Defendant con-
tends in his appeal before us that it was for 
the jury to decide whether Brunson and his 
employer were negl igent and that material 
fact issues precluded summary judgment 
3J3 Defendant introduced the affidavit of an 
CD expert witness whose credentials disclosed 
rn that he was a professor of engineering at 
PO Utah State University, had a masters de-
gree from M.I.T. in structural engineering 
and had a Ph.D. from Iowa State Universi-
ty. He worked as a consultant in recon-
struction of structural and mechanical fail-
ure and accidents. The affidavit stated 
that under one version of the facts as stat-
ed by Brunson, Brunson could have taken 
evasive action against the Cheney car trav-
eling towards him out of control. Under 
Branson's second version of facts, that the 
car was stopped or moving laterally, a 
speed in excess of 38 m.p.h. would not have 
permitted the truck to be stopped within 
the distance revealed by the low beam 
headlights under which Brunson claimed to 
have been driving. We think that affidavit 
was sufficient to controvert Branson's ver-
sions of the accident and raised an issue of 
fact of whether Brunson was negligent un-
der either version. )**>»-<* r 
The trial court had before it two addition-
al affidavits by one witness. The first one 
given by the witness to defendant on Sep-
tember 6, 1983, states that the car ap-
peared to be stopped, pointing west, and 
beginning to make the turn. It appeared 
to be trying to go up the hill to the south 
when it must have slipped and gone into 
the outside lane where the collision took 
place. The affidavit further states that 
there was no other traffic in the north or 
southbound lanes except for the car of the 
witness. Nine days later, that same wit-
ness signed an affidavit for Brunson and 
Cowboy Oil Co., stating that she did not 
know which direction the Cheneys had been 
traveling immediately prior to the accident, 
that the truck driven by Brunson appeared 
to be traveling at a speed appropriate to 
the icy conditions, that there was nothing 
whatever Brunson could have done to avoid 
the accident, and that several approaching 
vehicles lost control and slid off the road 
when attempting to avoid the accident 
Whereas the first affidavit describes the 
actions taken by the Cheney car sufficient-
ly to create evidentiary facts, the second is 
couched in unsubstantiated conclusions. 
Those two affidavits, standing alone, create 
a material fact issue in favor of defendant 
"A single sworn statement is sufficient to 
create an issue of fact Clearly, it is not 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess 
credibility." Webster v. Sill, Utah, 675 
P.2d 1170 (1983). 
Exhibits in the record show that tire 
marks left at the scene of the accident 
indicate no evasive action and belie Bran-
son's statement that there was no emer-
gency lane into which he could have 
swerved and that he went as far to the 
right as he could. 
There was evidence in the record that the 
maximum total shift time allowed by Cow-
boy Oil Co. was fourteen hours, which may 
have been surpassed by Brunson if it can 
be shown at trial that he went on duty at 
11:00 a.m. on March 21st There was evi-
dence in the record that the consumption of 
alcohol on the job was against company 
policy, which again has a direct bearing on 
Branson's alleged negligence. ' • t;H 
APACHE TANK LINES, INC. v. CHENEY Utah 617 
Cite u 706 PM 614 (Utah 19S5) 
of the Utah Traffic trial court, a jury could reasonably find Section 41-6-46 
Rules and Regulations commands: 
(1) N o person shall drive a vehicle at a 
speed greater than is reasonable and pru-
dent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing. Consistent with the fore-
going, every person shall drive at a safe 
and appropriate speed when approaching 
and crossing an intersection or a railroad 
grade crossing, when approaching and 
going around a curve, when approaching 
a hill crest, when traveling upon any 
narrow or winding roadway, and when 
special hazards exist with respect to pe-
destrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
Whether Brunson breached the conduct 
imposed by the statute was a question for 
the jury. From the evidence before the 
that Brunson was driving too fas t for exist-
ing hazardous conditions; that he was ov-
erdriving the area illuminated by his 
truck's two low beam headlights; and that 
he was fatigued, took no evasive action, 
and failed to keep a proper lookout The 
trial court invaded the province of the jury 
when it granted Brunson and Cowboy Oil 
Co. summary judgment 
The case is remanded for a trial on the 
merits. 
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erable. The case is remanded to the trial 
court to amend the judgment to award the 
buyers $7,054, less $1,000 awarded by the 
trial court to the sellers on their counter-
claim which is not challenged on this ap-
peal. No interest or attorney fees are 
awarded to either party inasmuch as the 
trial court awarded none and neither party 
has raised the issue on appeal. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DUR-
iAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring): 
I join the majority in its disposition of the 
various issues. However, the majority 
quotes from Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 
P.2d 559 (Utah 1985), to the effect that 
contractual provisions for liquidated dam-
ages will be enforced unless "the amount 
of liquidated damages bears no reasonable 
relationship to the actual damage or is so 
grossly excessive as to be entirely dispro-
portionate to any loss that might have been 
contemplated that it shocks the con-
science." The Court then finds that the 
amount of the liquidated damages provided 
for in the agreement is "excessive and dis-
proportionate" when compared to the actu-
al loss suffered by the sellers, thus imply-
ing that in the absence of a disparity as 
great as that which exists here (actual loss 
is approximately one-third of the penalty), 
the standard of Warner v. Rasmussen will 
not be satisfied. 
I think an examination of our cases 
should suggest to any thoughtful reader 
that, in application, the test stated in War-
ner is not nearly as accepting of liquidated 
damage provisions as the quoted language 
would suggest. In fact, I believe this 
Court routinely applies the alternative test 
of Warner—that the liquidated damages 
must bear some reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages—and that we carefully 
scrutinize liquidated damage awards. I 
think it necessary to say this lest the bar 
be misled by the rather loose language of 
Warner and its predecessors. 
BARLOW SOCIETY ,
 U t a h non-profit 
corporation, Plaintiff
 a n d Appellant, 
v. 
COMMERCIAL SECf/RixY BANK, a 
Utah corporation, **<i Edmund O. Bar-
low and John Do** i_10< Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 20155. 
Supreme Coun
 0f Utah. 
July 31, W86. 
Organization to w»licn property had 
been quitclaim deeded riled suit against 
judgment creditor to ^.validate execution 
sale and to quiet title \u organization. The 
Third District Court, i,%|t Lake County, 
Dean E. Conder, J.,
 M.„eted title in the 
judgment creditor. Ortmmz&tion appealed. 
The Supreme Court hel«i t.hat (1) the judg-
ment debtor had no ini*rest to convey by 
means of the quitclaim <loed where a war-
ranty deed had conveys
 an 0f ^e j u d g . 
ment debtors right, ui|p a n d interest to 
entire parcel to the purchasers and the 
quitclaim deed was e x i t e d before the 
purchasers reconveyed l,y warranty deed a 
poraon of the property,
 (2) the warranty 
deed to the purchasers was supported by 
consideration; and (3) th« judgment debtor 
was the fee simple own«r a t ^ time the 
creditors judgment lien attached. 
Affirmed. 
1. Deeds «=»121 
Judgment debtor's quitclaim deed to 
organization conveyed n„ interest to orga-
nization where quitclaim
 Hnd was executed 
after judgment debtor h«<i conveyed all of 
his right, title and interem to purchasers by 
warranty deed and quitct*jm deed was exe-
cuted before purchaser* reconveyed por-
tion of property to judgment debtor. 
U.OAJ953. 57-1-13. 
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Cite as 723 PJd 398 (Utah 1986) 
Grant G. Orton, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
2. Estoppel <3=>39 
Quitclaim deed does not convey after-
acquired title. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-13. 
3. Deeds «= 194(5) 
Presumption of valid delivery arises 
where deed has been executed and record-
ed. 
4. Deeds «=>194(5) 
Judgment debtor who alleged that 
warranty deed was void for lack of consid-
eration had to overcome, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, presumption of valid de-
livery arising where deed had been exe-
cuted and recorded. 
5. Deeds <S=192 
If valid on its face, presumption is that 
deed conveys fee title. 
6. Deeds «=77 
Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the 
like attributable to grantee, competent 
grantor will not be permitted to attack or 
impeach his own deed. 
7. Deeds «=»15 
As between parties, deed is good, with 
or without consideration. 
8. Deeds <s=17(2) 
Purchasers' payment of $17,500 and 
judgment debtor's willingness to convey 
entire parcel to purchasers, so that they 
could finance purchase of portion of parcel, 
constituted adequate consideration to sup-
port conveyance by warranty deed as be-
tween parties. 
9. Judgment <3=»793(1) 
Judgment debtor was fee simple abso-
lute titleholder both before conveyance of 
property to purchasers and after their re-
conveyance by warranty deed of portion of 
property and, therefore, judgment credi-
tor's lien which attached after reconvey-
ance in fee simple absolute and before 
judgment debtor quitclaimed his interest to 
organization was valid and title to quit-
claimed portion passed subject to lien. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff Barlow Society appeals from a 
summary judgment quieting title in Com-
mercial Security Bank (CSB) to property 
which plaintiff claims it owned free and 
clear of CSB's judgment lien. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, this 
Court will view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion 
and will allow the summary judgment to 
stand only if the movant is entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); 
Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 
Utah, 672 P.2d 746 (1983); Aird Insurance 
Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 
Utah, 612 P.2d 341 (1980). We hold that 
under the undisputed facts of this case, 
CSB was entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. 
On August 20, 1979, Edmund O. Barlow 
(Barlow) conveyed by warranty deed to 
Ballard and Midgley a fee simple absolute 
in a parcel of land owned by him. The 
conveyance included the northern portion 
of the parcel, which Ballard and Midgley 
were purchasing from Barlow, and the 
southern portion which was not to be sold 
to them. The parties agreed nonetheless 
that financing on the northern portion 
would be facilitated if the entire parcel 
were conveyed and that Ballard and Midg-
ley would subsequently reconvey to Barlow 
the southerly ninety-foot portion of land 
(the south portion) when financing had 
been obtained. 
On March 7, 1980, Barlow executed a 
quitclaim deed to the entire parcel to plain-
tiff. On November 28, 1980, Ballard and 
Midgley reconveyed to Barlow by warranty 
deed the south portion of the land as previ-
ously agreed. 
On May 7, 1982, CSB obtained a money 
judgment in the amount of $11,516.38 
against Barlow on an unrelated matter. 
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On June 23, 1982. Barlow executed a 
quitclaim deed to the south portion of the 
land to plaintiff as a correction deed. 
On November 7, 1982, CSB executed on 
its judgment against Barlow. On Decem-
ber 8, 1982. the south portion was sold at 
sheriffs sale in full satisfaction of the 
judgment. Neither Bariow nor plaintiff re-
deemed the property after the execution 
saie. 
Plaintiff thereafter sued CSB to invali-
date the sale and to quiet title in plaintiff. 
This appeal followed from the trial court's 
ruling in favor of CSB. The issues raised 
on appeal are < 1) did Barlow have any inter-
est in the south portion on the date CSB 
became his judgment creditor: »2) had title 
ever vested in Ballard and Midgiey because 
of lack of consideration: and i3) were the 
lien rights of CSB protected against real 
property to which Bariow purportedly held 
no more than a bare legal title. The under-
ying issue we must address s whether 
Bariow owned the south portion of the land 
when CSB obtained its judgment lien, and 
^j whether quiet title .n CSB was therefore 
i> oroDer. 
CD 
i 
[1] Plaintiff first contends that Barlow 
did not own the property when CSB's judg-
ment lien attached. The warranty deed of 
August 20, 1979, conveyed all of Barlow's 
right, title, and interest to the entire parcel 
to Ballard and Midgley. Bariow's quit-
claim deed of March 7. 1980, to plaintiff 
had the effect 4<of a conveyance of all 
rights, title, interest and estate of the 
grantor in and to the premises therein de-
scribed and all rights, privileges and ap-
purtenances thereunto belonging, at the 
date of such conveyance," U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 57-1-13 (emphasis added). As Barlow 
had nothing left to convey, the quitclaim 
deed conveyed no interest to plaintiff. A 
grantee under a quitclaim deed acquires 
only the interest of his grantor "be that 
interest what it may." Johnson v. Bell, 
Utah, 666 P.2d 308 (1983); Wallace v. 
Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 
(1965). 
[2] The warranty deed from Ballard 
and Midgley to Barlow reconveyed to him 
in fee simple absolute the south portion at 
issue here on November 28, 1980. Though 
the date of August 20. 1979, was typed in 
the deed, Midgley's unrebutted affidavit 
stated that he signed, executed, and deliv-
ered the deed on November 28, 1980, and 
the acknowledgment in the deed carries 
that date. A quitclaim deed does not con-
vey after-acquired title. Duncan v. Hem-
melwnght, 112 Utah 262. 186 P.2d 965 
(1947). Had Barlow conveyed all of his 
interest to the entire parcel to plaintiff by 
warranty deed, the subsequent reconvey-
ance by Ballard and Midgley to Barlow of 
the south portion would have immediately 
vested title to it in plaintiff. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 57-1-10. The antecedent quitclaim deed 
to plaintiff on the other hand could not and 
iid not divest Barlow of his subsequent fee 
simple iDsolute title to the south portion 
after reconveyance from Ballard and Midg-
.ey. Consequently, Bariow was the fee 
simple owner of the south portion on May 
7. 1982. when CSB became his judgment 
creditor. 
II 
[3-8] Plaintiff next assails the validity 
if the conveyance to Ballard and Midgley 
for lack of consideration. The warranty 
deed from Barlow to Ballard and Midgley 
describing the entire parcel was properly 
executed, acknowledged, and recorded on 
or about August 20, 1979. A presumption 
of valid delivery arises where the deed has 
been executed and recorded. Baker v. Pat-
tee, Utah, 684 P.2d 632 (1984). Plaintiff 
had to overcome that presumption of deliv-
ery by clear and convincing evidence. 
Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. Da-
vis, Utah, 611 P.2d 711 (1980); Bertoch v. 
Gailey, 116 Utah 101, 208 P.2d 953 (1949). 
Barlow's own affidavit shows that Ballard 
and Midgley paid a consideration of $17,500 
for the land refuting Barlow's claim that 
the conveyance was void for lack of consid-
eration. Plaintiffs claim that the convey-
ance of the entire parcel was intended by 
the parties merely to facilitate financing 
STATE v. FRAME 
Cite a« 723 P^d 401 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 401 
and was done to secure an obligation on the 
northern portion does not invalidate the 
conveyance. If valid on its face, the pre-
sumption is that the deed conveys fee title. 
Battistone v. American Land & Develop-
ment Co., Utah, 607 P.2d 837 (1980). Ab-
sent fraud, duress, mistake, or the like 
attributable to the grantee, a competent 
grantor will not be permitted to attack or 
impeach his own ieed. Desert Centers, 
Inc. v. Glen Canyon. Inc., 11 Utah 2d 166, 
356 P.2d 286 (1960). As between the par-
ties a deed is good, with or without consid-
eration. Brown v. Peterson Development 
Jo.. Utah. 822 P.2d 1175 (1980). Ballard 
and Midgley's pavment of $17,500 and Bar-
.ow's willingness to convey the entire par-
:el to them, so that they could finance the 
purchase of the north portion, constituted 
adequate consideration to support the 
transaction between the parties, and the 
conveyance was valid. 
Ill 
[91 Plaintiff claims that at best Barlow 
conveyed a bare legal title to Ballard and 
Midgley wnen he conveyed the entire par-
cel, and that CSB's lien could not have 
attached because Barlow had quitclaimed 
all of his remaining interest in the property 
to plaintiff. Lund v. Donihue. Utah. 674 
?.2d 107 <1983) (Per Curiam), Belnap ». 
Slain. Utah, 575 P.2d 696 (1978), and 
Kartchner v. State Tax Commission. 4 
Utah 2d 382. 294 P.2d 790 (1956), are cited 
in support. None of the cited cases deals 
with the issues here under review. Both in 
Lund and Kartchner, the judgment credi-
tor had attempted to place a lien against 
property of the judgment debtor's grantee 
after the debtor had conveyed to his grant-
ee. In Belnap, a judgment creditor was 
denied a judgment lien against land con-
veyed to the judgment debtor's grantee on 
the ground that the encumbrances on the 
conveyed land exceeded the fair market 
value of the land, and the judgment debtor 
thus owned merely a bare legal title. This 
Court reversed, because the party attack-
ing the validity of the lien had not present-
ed any evidence that he satisfied the defini-
tion of a bare legal titleholder. That con-
cept requires a lienee to be the trustee of 
an express, constructive, or resulting trust, 
or an agent, or mere conduit for the trans-
fer to the true owner. 
Plaintiff contends, of course, that Bal-
lard and Midgley were just that type of 
bare legal titlehoiders, that title was placed 
n them solely to enable them to procure a 
.oan. after which thev reconveyed to Bar-
low. Plaintiff then extends that argument, 
supported in dictum in Belnap, to arrive at 
the conclusion that Barlow upon reconvey-
ance became the bare legal titleholder and 
conduit to plaintiff. There is nothing m the 
record to support such tortuous reasoning. 
Barlow was the fee simple absolute title-
holder both oefore the conveyance to Bal-
;ard and Midgiey and after their reconvey-
ance to him. He was not a trustee >i an 
express, constructive, nr resulting trust tor 
olaintiff. or igent, )r mere conduit for the 
Transfer to piamtiff. He quitclaimed wnat-
^ver rights he had to the entire parcel "o 
oiamtiff after he had conveyed his fee sim-
ple title to 3allard and Midgiey. CSB's 
^udgment lien attacned after Ballard and 
Midgley had reconveyed the south portion 
to Bariow :n fee simpie absolute and before 
he quitclaimed that .nterest .o plaintiff. 
Title to the south portion therefore passed 
subject to the lien. 'J.C.A.. 1953. § 7S-22-
Affirmeo. 
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STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
v. 
Melvin Dean FRAME. Defendant and 
Appellant. (Two Cases). 
Nos. 21002. 21005. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 31, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Sev-
enth District Court, Uintah County, Rich-
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for writ of review challenging unemploy-
ment compensation award; a corporate liti-
gant must be represented by a licensed 
attorney. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(a), 78-51-25. 
78-51-40. 
Tracy-Burke Associates, pro se. 
X. Allan Zabel. Salt Lake City, for le-
fendants. 
PER CURIAM: 
This petition for .vnt of review chal-
lenges an unemployment compensation 
award under the 'equity and good con-
science ' clause of U.C.A.. 1953, § 35-4-
5(a). Without addressing the merits of 
oiaintiff s contentions, we are constrained 
"0 dismiss the petition due to plaintiff-cor-
poration's improper attempt :o represent 
tself. 
Throughout this case, plaintiff has oeen 
represented by Linda Tracv. Her status as 
i non-iawyer was lot questioned .n \ne 
proceedings oefore :he Industrial Commis-
sion, but when she filed for judicial review 
sne vas told that a corporation cannot ip-
-TJ pear pro se before this Court. She insisted 
2=» t h a t she could proceed , a s s e r t i n g t h a t .ner 
p-j bus iness func t ions not as a c o r p o r a t i o n ou t 
as " T r a c y »& B u r k e , " a p a r t n e r s h i p . With-
out a d d r e s s i n g t h e implicat ions of t h a t as-
ser t ion, it is c l ea r t h a t this d i s p u t e is oe-
tween ' T r a c y - B u r k e A s s o c i a t e s " a n d one 
of its f o r m e r e m p l o y e e s . T r a c y - B u r k e As-
socia tes is a viable corpora t ion r e g i s t e r e d 
.n this s t a t e , a fac t a d m i t t e d by Ms . T r a c y . 
A t a h e a r i n g be fo re the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law 
j u d g e , it w a s e s t ab l i shed t h a t Ms . T r a c y .s 
plaintiffs president and Carol Burke is its 
secretary-treasurer. Plaintiff in this action 
s clearly a corporation and not a partner-
ship. 
It has long been the law of this jurisdic-
tion that a corporate litigant must be repre-
sented in court by a licensed attorney. The 
rationale of this rule was explained in Tut-
tie v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, 
10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616 (1960). In 
1. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-51-25 and -40. 
that case, we quoted with approval the 
following language of Paradise v. Nowlin, 
86 Cal.App.2d 897, 195 P.2d 867 (1948): 
A composite of the ruie in the decided 
cases, overwhelmingly sustained by the 
authorities, may be thus stated: A natu-
ral person may represent himself and 
present his own case to the court al-
though he is not a licensed attorney. A 
corporation is not a natural person. It is 
an artificial entity created by law and as 
such it can neither practice law nor ap-
pear or act in person. Out of court it 
must act in its affairs through its agents 
and representatives and in matters in 
court it can act only through licensed 
attorneys. A corporation cannot appear 
in court by an officer who :s not an 
attorney and it cannot appear .n proDna 
persona. 
Citations omitted.) This is consistent with 
)ur statutes ' and with *he general >aw n 
other jurisdictions.-' 
3ecause plaintiff ;s a corporation not rep-
resented by a licensed attorney, its petition 
for writ of review must be dismissed. So 
ordered. 
J7\ 
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Robert L. BLACKHURST, as personal 
representative of the estates of Priscilla 
S. Blackhurst and Brigham Douglas 
Blackhurst, Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPA-
NY, a corporation, and Leila P. Shipp, 
an individual. Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
No. 18907. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 22, 1985. 
Son, as personal representative of the 
estates of his parents, brought action to 
2. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1073 (1968). 
BLACKHURST v. TRANSAMERICA INS. CO. 
Cite as 699 P.2d 688 (Utah I98S) 
"tah tf89 
enforce settlement agreements he had 
reached with insurer for compensation for 
injuries mother had suffered in automobile 
accident. The Third District Court. Salt 
Lake County, David B. Dee, J., held the 
agreement enforceable, although mother 
nad died prior to appointment of general 
guardian and approval of settlement by 
:ourt. and insurer appealed. The Supreme 
Court. Durham. J., held that: <1) son. and 
attorney who represented him. nad authori-
ty to compromise mother's claims: '2) in-
surer was estopped to deny that son had 
authority to enter into binding agreement: 
3) fact that agreement was completed pn-
)r to mother's death eliminated any possi-
bility that her death would terminate any 
'agency" son had to negotiate: (4) agree-
ment was not conditioned on appointment 
)f son as general guardian: and io) agree-
ment was not unenforceable aue to any 
nutuai mistake of fact. 
Affirmed. 
Howe. J., concurred :n the result and 
tiled opinion. 
Stewart. J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Mental Health 3=235 
Usually, only general guardians can 
compromise claims of an incompetent per-
son: however, this rule is for the protection 
of incompetent persons and 's not to bur-
den or hinder them in enforcing their rights 
nor confer any privilege or advantage on 
persons who claim adversely to them. 
2. Mental Health e=>235 
Son of elderly automobile accident vic-
tim, who had been rendered incompetent 
due to her injuries, and counsel hired by 
him, had authority to compromise her 
claims, although son had not been judicially 
appointed a general guardian, allowing en-
forcement of settlement he had reached 
with insurer. 
3. Estoppel <s=*52.15 
Elements of equitable estoppel are: 
conduct by one party which leads another, 
in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in detriment or damage if 
first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct. 
i. Mental Health «=235 
Representative of insurer vas 
estopped from arguing that son of victim 
of automobile accident lacked authority ~o 
compromise 'ier claims where he <new "ic-
tim was ^competent md that io general 
guardian had been appointed out iid not 
object to authority of ^on, or :ounsel le 
retained, and willingly entered nto settle-
ment agreement with son wmcn contem-
olated "hat son would be aDpointed as 
guardian at rhe time -hat court s aDproval 
of settlement agreement was sougnt. 
5. Mental Health 3=235 
Even if son of mtomooile iccident '*ic-
tim nad lacked authontv ro compromise her 
:iaim m absence of lis oeine: nopomtea 
general guardian, nis actions vere >uose-
]uently ratified oy mm after iis appoint-
ment as special administrator JI ms moth-
er s estate, relating oacK to the ".me vnen 
'he inauthonzed acts, f anv. vere lone. 
o. Parent and Child >=12 
Agreement between insurer ind son of 
automobile accident -lctim reacned five 
iays prior to victim s death vas not ren-
dered unenforceable on theory that ner 
death terminated any 'agencv" since "he 
contract had been comDieted ?nor to ner 
death. 
7. Insurance <5=>579.3 
Settlement between insurer ind son of 
automobile accident "lctim was not "condi-
tioned" on aDpointment of son as general 
guardian and court aDproval, although 'et-
ter confirming settlement agreement noted 
that son would be appointed guardian and 
release would be submitted to court, since 
neither confirmation letter nor *estimony 
indicated that contemplated occurrences 
were expressed or implied conditions and 
only indicated that payment was condi-
tioned on appointment of guardian. 
8. Insurance <s=>579.2 
Insurer was not entitled to rescind set-
tlement agreement reached with son of 
automobile accident victim, although it was 
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later learned that she had suffered from 
pneumonia at the time of negotiations 
which led to her death five days after 
agreement was reached, since at time of 
settlement both parties undertook a risk 
that resolution of the uncertainty as to her 
ieath might be anfavoraoie. 
9. Release 3=16 
An unknown consequence of known in-
jury does not provide reiief to a parr." to a 
release since party undertakes risk that 
resolution of uncertainty might be unfavor-
able. 
Wendail Bennett. Salt Lake City, for 
Shipp. 
Raymond M. 3errv. Robert Henderson. 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
ants. 
Stuart -H. Schuitz. Salt Lake "[tv. for 
Diaintiff and respondent. 
DURHAM. Justice: 
Plaintiff Robert 31acknurst brought this 
iction as personal reor^sentative for "he 
_^ estates of his parents, Pnsciila and 3ng-
7JE» ham Blackhurst. to enforce a settlement 
*55 agreement whereby the defendant insurer 
had agreed to pay 8150,000 to settle Mrs. 
^ 31ackhurst's personal injury claim against 
ts insured. Leila Shipp. The lower court in 
I summary judgment held the agreement 
enforceable although Mrs. 31ackhurst died 
prior to the appointment of a general 
guardian and approval of the settlement by 
the court. We affirm. 
Mrs. Blackhurst, a relativeiy healthy 32-
year-old, was struck by a car driven by 
Leila Shipp on August 21, 1980. Mrs. 
Blackhurst suffered brain injury as a re-
sult of the accident and was rendered in-
competent and unable to care for herself or 
her husband. Robert Blackhurst began ne-
gotiations with Rex Hess, a Transamerica 
agent, regarding his mother's personal in-
jury claim in October 1980. In December 
1980, he retained an attorney, Keith Nel-
son, to represent him. The insurer at all 
times knew of Mrs. Blackhurst's condition. 
Throughout February and March 1981. 
the parries were unable to come to an 
igreement. On March 23. 1981. Nelson 
personally delivered a summons and com-
plaint to Hess. It had not been filed with 
the court. The action, entitled Bnqham 
•ind Priscilla Blackhurst ••. Leila Shipp. 
Claimed 3500.000 m special damages for 
Mrs. Blackhurst. SI. 000.000 in general 
iamages. and .$500,000 for Mr. Blackhurst. 
The next day. March 24. Hess and Nelson 
orally agreed on a settlement figure of 
•SI50.000. Nelson confirmed the agreement 
oy letter, hand delivered that same lav. 
On or around Wednesday. March 25. Nel-
son prepared a petition for appointment A 
a :onservator for Mrs. Blackhurst and i 
release in accordance with his agreement 
vith Transamerica md submitted 'hem -o 
"he Third District Court of Salt Lake Coun-
ty. The presiding probate judge requested 
nat Xeison return >n Mondav Marcn .10. 
vr.en the pronate cierK wouid return fmm 
•acation and eouici lianole i i e filing ana 
>UDmission ti the petition. 
Mrs. BlacKhurst iieu on Sunday. Marcn 
J9. The "ause of ter ieath was "isteu is 
'severe brain damage aue to a remote n]u-
*y -even months, possible pneumonia. ' 
Rooert Blackhurst was appointed special 
administrator for his mother s estate m 
April 1. Later that same day. Nelson .n-
formed Hess that Mrs. Blackhurst nad 
died. Nelson was thereafter told that the 
insurance company did not intend to pay 
the amount named in the settlement doc-
uments. Mr. Blackhurst died shortly 
thereafter. 
The issue on appeal is whether the settle-
ment agreement can be enforced by the 
personal representative of Mrs. Black-
hurst's estate. In an appeal from a sum-
mary judgment, we view the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah, 
632 P.2d 848, 849 (1981). 
[1,2] We first address Transamerica's 
argument that neither Robert Blackhurst 
nor Keith Nelson had the authority to com-
promise the claims of Mrs. Blackhurst. 
BLACKHURST v. TRANSAMERICA INS. 
Cite as 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985) 
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Specifically, Transamerica argues that only 
general guardians can compromise the 
claims of an incompetent person. We ac-
knowledge this to be the general rule. See 
Hansen t\ Gossett, Utah, -590 P.2d 1258. 
1260 (1979). However, the rule requiring 
guardians for incompetent persons is for 
their protection. Morris >\ Russeil 120 
Utah 545. 553. 236 P.2d 451. 455 il95i). 
'Its purpose is not to burden nor hinder 
them in enforcing their rights; nor to con-
fer any privilege or advantage on persons 
who claim adversely to them or who may 
be trying to take advantage of them. ' Id. 
In the present case, the application of the 
rule wouid not benefit the incompetent per-
son or her estate, but rather would oenaiize 
ner estate. 
[31 Moreover, as plaintiff argues. 
Transamerica is estopped to deny that Nel-
son nad authority to enter into a oinding 
settlement agreement with Transamerica 
3n behaif of Mrs. Blackhurst. The ele-
ments of equitable estoppel are: ":onduct 
oy one party which leads another party, .n 
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of ac-
tion resulting in detriment or damage if the 
first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct." United American Life Insur-
mce Co. /». Zions First National Bank. 
Utah. 641 P.2d 158. 161 (1982) (footnote 
omitted). 
[4] In the present case, Hess. Trans-
america s representative, knew that Mrs. 
Blackhurst was incompetent to negotiate 
on her own behalf, and he likewise knew 
that no general guardian had yet been ap-
pointed. Hess nevertheless expressed no 
concern about dealing with Robert Black-
hurst and later Keith Nelson. No objec-
tions were raised with regard to Nelson s 
authority to negotiate or enter into an 
agreement. Hess willingly entered into a 
settlement agreement with Nelson on 
March 24 that was confirmed by the follow-
ing letter from Nelson, hand delivered that 
same day: 
This will confirm the settlement of this 
case on this date for $150,000, together 
with the PIP benefits for the remainder 
of the year. 
Robert Blackhurst will be appointed as 
guardian for Bngham and Priscilla 
Blackhurst. his parents. Once this ap-
pointment has been completed, we will 
present you with certified copies in ex-
change for the draft, and make arrange-
ments for the filing of the appropriate 
release. 
Thus. Transamerica s agent Hess contem-
olated all along that the appointment of 
Robert Blackhurst as guardian would occur 
it the time the court's approval of the 
settlement agreement was sought. To per-
mit Transamerica to repudiate the agree-
ment under those circumstances would de-
prive the Blackhursts" estates of the com-
pensation the parties agreed would satisfv 
Mrs. 31ackhurst's claims resulting from 
*he automoDile accident and would be pat-
ently unfair. Transamerica is therefore es-
topped from claiming Nelson acKed au-
thority :o negotiate as a means to avoid the 
settlement agreement. The Supreme 
^ourt of Wisconsin, inder facts similar to 
those in the present case, concluded that an 
nsurer was estopped from objecting to an 
ittorney s authority to negotiate a settle-
ment contract on behaif of an incompetent 
person where no oojection was raised at 
any time during the negotiations. Carey n. 
Dairyiana Mutual Insurance Co.. 41 
Wis.2d 107. 116-18. 163 N.W.2d 200. 205-
06 (1968). 
[5] Finally, even if Nelson's acts on 
Mrs. Blackhurst's behalf were unautho-
rized, as Transamerica now claims, they 
were subsequently ratified by Robert 
Blackhurst after he was appointed special 
administrator of his mother's estate. See 
Bradshaw v. McBride. Utah. 649 P.2d 74, 
"8 (1982). Since ratification relates back to 
the time when the unauthorized act was 
done, id., the March 24 agreement between 
Nelson and Hess is enforceable. 
[6] Transamerica also claims that, as-
suming Nelson had authority to act on Mrs. 
Blackhurst's behalf, her death caused such 
authority to be revoked. Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 120(1) (1958) is cited 
for the proposition that the death of the 
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principal terminates the authority of the 
agent In our view, the agreement reached 
by the parties on March 24, five days prior 
to Mrs. Blackhurst's death, was a complet-
ed contract and as such is valid and en-
forceable. See Lawrence Construction 
Co. v. Holmquist, Utah, 642 P.2d 382, 384 
(1982). " 'An accord is an agreement be-
tween parties, one to give or perform, the 
other to receive or accept, such agreed 
payment or performance in satisfaction of 
a claim.'" Id. (quoting Browning v. Eq-
uitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States, 94 Utah 532, 549, 72 P.2d 
1060,1068 (1937)). Therefore, whether any 
"agency" terminated on the death of Mrs. 
Blackhurst is irrelevant since the contract 
was completed prior to her death. 
[7] Nor may Transamerica be excused 
from performance on its theory that the 
settlement was "conditioned" on the ap-
pointment of a general guardian and court 
approval. Transamerica relies on Polygly-
coat Corp. v. Holcomb, Utah, 591 P.2d 449 
(1979), which held that a material breach by 
one party permits the other party to re-
scind a contract Id at 451. That case is 
inapposite here. The essential terms of the 
3> settlement contract were agreed to by 
jj]j Transamerica's representative. Nelson's 
letter confirming the settlement agreement 
^ noted that Robert Blackhurst would be ap-
pointed guardian and the release would be 
submitted to the court Neither the confir-
mation letter nor the deposition testimony 
of any of the parties indicates that these 
contemplated occurrences were express or 
implied conditions to the $150,000 settle-
ment agreement We have held previously 
that an enforceable accord was reached by 
the parties. The record also supports the 
conclusion that it was not the settlement 
agreement that was conditioned upon ap-
pointment of a guardian and court approv-
al. Rather, the appointment was a condi-
tion precedent to payment of the amount 
agreed on by the parties. The parties 
merely agreed that appointment and court 
1. Similar reasoning supports the rule that an 
unknown consequence of known Injury does 
not provide relief to a party to a release, Reyn-
approval would be undertaken before 
Transamerica delivered its draft for $150,-
000, at which time the contract would be 
fully performed. The equivalent of those 
acts occurred when Robert Blackhurst was 
appointed special administrator for his 
mother's estate and special conservator for 
his father and received court authorization 
to execute releases in favor of Trans-
america. 
[8,9] Finally, Transamerica argues that 
it is entitled to rescind because of a mutual 
mistake of fact since neither Transamerica 
nor Nelson knew that Mrs. Blackhurst had 
pneumonia, which Transamerica argues 
was the cause of her death. The trial court 
concluded "that there is no mistake as to a 
present or past fact of substantial nature 
and that there is no nullification of the 
agreement because of mistake." We 
agree. The parties were not mistaken as 
to Mrs. Blackhurst's brain injury resulting 
from the accident There was, of course, 
at the time of settlement negotiations, as in 
every personal injury case, a conscious un-
certainty regarding the medical outcome of 
the victim's case. At the time of settle-
ment both parties undertook a risk that 
the resolution of the uncertainty might be 
unfavorable. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 154(b) (1981).1 This Court will 
not nullify a settlement contract because 
one of the parties would have acted differ-
ently if all the future outcomes had been 
known at the time of agreement 
We conclude that the trial court was 
correct in granting summary judgment to 
plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. Costs to 
plaintiff. 
HALL, CJ., and HOMER F. WILKIN-
SON, District Judge, concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result reached by the 
majority opinion but do so on different 
grounds. 
otds v. MerriO, 23 Utah 2d 155, 156-57, 460 ?2d 
323, 324 (1969). Plaintiff argues that the Reyn-
olds reasoning is dispositive on this issue. 
BLACKHURST v. TRANSAMERICA INS. CO. 
Cite u 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985) 
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I view the offer made by Transamerica 
to settle the personal injury claim of Pris-
cilla Blackhurst as an option. Trans-
america promised payment of $150,000 if 
and when it received a legally binding re-
lease of her claim. Because Mrs. Black-
hurst was incompetent neither Robert 
Blackhurst nor Keith Nelson could give 
any return promise that he could furnish 
such a release since it did not lie wholly 
within his power, control, and authority to 
do so. Thus the transaction should be 
viewed by principles of unilateral, not bilat-
eral, contract 
After Transamerica made its offer, Nel-
son set about to perform the requested act 
ie.f obtain the release. He prepared and 
presented to the district court a petition for 
the appointment of a guardian for Mrs. 
Blackhurst and for an order approving the 
proposed settlement However, because 
the probate clerk was absent from work 
that day, the required appointment and ap-
proval could not be accomplished. None-
theless, Nelson had begun the invited per-
formance, with the result that the offer of 
Transamerica became a binding option con-
tract and could not thereafter be revoked. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 
(1981) states: 
§ 45. Option Contract Created by Part 
Performance or Tender 
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to 
accept by rendering a performance and 
does not invite a promissory acceptance, 
an option contract is created when the 
offeree tenders or begins the invited per-
formance or tenders a beginning of it 
(2) The offeror's duty of performance 
under any option contract so created is 
conditional on completion or tender of 
the invited performance in accordance 
with the terms of the offer. 
The foregoing rules were followed and 
applied in Marvel v. Dannemann, 490 
F.Supp. 170 (1980); Motel Services, Inc. v. 
Central Maine Power Co., Me., 894 A.2d 
786 (1978); Coffman Industries, Inc. v. 
Gorman-Taber Co., MoApp., 521 S.W.2d 
763 (1975); Sylvestre v. State, 298 Minn. 
142, 214 N.W.2d 658 (1973); Weather-Gard 
Industries, Inc. v. Fairfield Savings and 
Loan Association, 110 Ill.App.2d 13, 248 
N.E.2d 794 (1969); Marchiondo v. Scheck, 
78 N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 405 (1967). Coff-
man Industries, Inc. v. Gorman-Taber 
Co., supra, like the instant case, dealt with 
the acceptance of an offer of settlement 
There, an attorney for the bonding compa-
ny of a general contractor transmitted an 
offer to pay a subcontractor's claim if the 
latter would resolve a collateral claim made 
by one of his suppliers. The court held 
that the beginning of negotiations by the 
subcontractor to resolve the collateral 
claim and his forebearing to sue the con-
tractor were sufficient to create an option 
contract which rendered the offer irrev-
ocable. The court relied upon the principle 
of law enunciated in 1 A.L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 49 (1963): 
Where one party makes a promissory 
offer in such form that it can be accepted 
by the rendition of the performance that 
is requested in exchange, without any 
express return promise or notice of ac-
ceptance in words, the offeror is bound 
by a contract just as soon as the offeree 
has rendered a substantial part of that 
requested performance. 
Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts 
was also cited by the court in support of its 
holding. 
The death of Mrs. Blackhurst did not 
terminate the offer or give Transamerica 
grounds for revoking the offer. Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 48 (1981) 
states the general rule that an offeree's 
power of acceptance is terminated when 
the offeree or offeror dies but notes that 
this rule does not affect option contracts 
unless the death discharges the contractual 
duty of the offeror because of failure of 
consideration, frustration, impossibility, or 
failure of condition. 1 A.L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 54 (1963) is in accord, stat-
ing that if an offer was a binding option 
contract or has become so by the offeree's 
action before his death, and if the contract 
is not one that has become impossible of 
performance by reason of the death, the 
offeree's personal representatives can ac~ 
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cept the offer and consummate a contract 
Therefore, the death of Mrs. Blackhurst did 
not rob her estate of the right to complete 
the invited performance and did not justify 
Transamerica's attempted revocation. Nei-
ther Mrs. Blackhurst's personal involve-
ment nor services were necessary to the 
performance of the contract. 
Transamerica received everything that it 
had bargained for, viz., a full and complete 
release of all claims of Mr. and Mrs. Black-
hurst for her personal injury. It is true, as 
contended for by Transamerica, that Nel-
son contemplated that the settlement 
would have to be approved by the district 
court in a guardianship proceeding for Mrs. 
Blackhurst and that the release would be 
signed by her legal guardian. That was 
the proper procedure when she was alive. 
However, it is clear that what Trans-
america was bargaining for was a legally 
binding release of her personal injury 
claim, and the exact legal procedure by 
which that release would be obtained was 
not a material term of the settlement The 
protection afforded to Transamerica by the 
release which was actually given is not 
diminished by the fact that it was executed 
-Q by the personal representative of Mrs. 
3> Blackhurst's estate rather than by her 
m guardian. No claim is advanced by Trans-
america that enforcement of the settlement 
0 0
 will leave it exposed to further liability for 
Mrs. Blackhurst's personal injuries. 
Contrary to Transamerica's contention, 
there was no mutual mistake of fact which 
would provide legal grounds for rescission 
of the option contract Rex Hess, Trans-
america's agent, Robert Blackhurst, and 
Nelson knew of the precarious condition of 
Mrs. Blackhurst and that she could die any 
time or live for several years. 
STEWART, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent It is uncontested that attorney 
Keith Nelson had no authority to act for 
Mrs. Blackhurst She was incompetent 
and could not, therefore, enter into a con-
tract herself. Since neither Mr. Nelson nor 
anyone else was ever appointed guardian 
for her, a Contract between her and anyone 
else was void. While I have no doubt that 
Mr. Nelson acted out of legitimate motiva-
tions in looking after Mrs. Blackhurst's 
interests, Mr. Nelson was not, and could 
not be, her agent or attorney in settling her 
claim. Therefore, the agreement that Mr. 
Nelson negotiated with Transamerica was 
a complete nullity in the eyes of the law. 
Indeed, Mr. Nelson knew he lacked authori-
ty and represented to Transamerica that 
the settlement documents would be exe-
cuted by a person who had authority to 
sign for Mrs. Blackhurst 
Not content with simply one rationale for 
its conclusion, the majority advances three 
reasons to support its result* (1) the settle-
ment agreement is a valid contract because 
the reasons for requiring the appointment 
of a guardian were satisfied even though 
not complied with; (2) Transamerica is es-
topped to deny that Mr. Nelson had author-
ity to settle; and (3) even if Mr. Nelson had 
no authority initially, his acts were subse-
quently ratified by Mrs. Blackhurst's es-
tate. Since any one of the three, if valid, 
should be satisfactory, it appears that even 
the majority detects some flaw in each. 
The majority states that the rule requir-
ing appointment of a guardian was not 
designed to burden or hinder an incompe-
tent from enforcing his rights or to confer 
an advantage on one who tries to take 
advantage of an incompetent However, 
the majority also recognizes the general 
rule that only a general guardian can com-
promise the claims of an incompetent but 
argues that in this case, application of that 
rule "would not' benefit the incompetent 
person or her estate, but rather would pe-
nalize her estate." In truth, application of 
the rule does not penalize the estate. 
It is fundamental law that Mrs. Black-
hurst could not contract because she was 
incompetent It is equally fundamental 
that Mr. Nelson could not contract for her 
because he had no authority to do so. In-
deed, both orally and in its letter to Mr. 
Nelson accompanying the settlement agree-
ment Transamerica expressly conditioned 
the settlement agreement upon the appoint-
ment of a genera] guardian. Mr. Nelson 
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knew that the agreement was contingent 
The majority's statement that "[n]o objec-
tions were raised with regard to Nelson's 
authority to negotiate or enter into an 
agreement" is plainly wrong. Trans-
america's insistence upon the appointment 
of a guardian was founded on the elemen-
tary proposition, accepted by everyone in 
the case, that Mr. Nelson had no authority 
to act for Mrs. Blackhurst. Transamerica 
knew it could not settle with Mr. Nelson as 
an individual. Indeed, had Transamerica 
been so heedless of basic law, it could have 
been compelled to pay a second time to a 
duly authorized guardian. Furthermore, it 
was Mr. Nelson's responsibility to obtain 
the necessary judicially authorized authori-
ty. It was not the duty of Transamerica to 
object to his lack of authority. The majori-
ty's position that there was in fact a con-
tract with Transamerica simply turns the 
law of contracts on its head. 
To hold that Mr. Nelson entered into a 
contract binding on Mrs. Blackhurst or her 
guardian is fraught with far-reaching con-
sequences. If the agreement between Nel-
son and Transamerica is valid in the instant 
case, then it would have to be binding no 
matter how improvident the terms of the 
contract The law governing guardians 
and the contractual capacity of incompetent 
persons is designed to protect the incompe-
tent But how can an incompetent be pro-
tected if he can be bound by contracts 
made by interlopers who are not appointed 
by a court? I have no doubt that Mr. 
Nelson sought to protect Mrs. Blackhurst's 
interest with zeal and sound judgment in 
this particular case. But what if someone 
else had settled Mrs. Blackhurst's claim for 
one-half or one-tenth the amount? How 
and by whom would the incompetent's in-
terests then be protected? 
Furthermore, the majority fails to distin-
guish between two different jural entities 
1. In Morris v. Russet the plaintiff himself was 
the incompetent who brought a contract action 
for the value of services rendered. There, strict 
application of the rule would have indeed hin-
dered the plaintiff from enforcing his right In 
the instant case, the incompetent is not the 
plaintiff. She is deceased. Thus, Morris has no 
—Mrs. Blackhurst and her estate. A per-
sonal representative appointed to probate 
an estate has different duties and repre-
sents different interests than a guardian of 
an incompetent Each has a different legal 
status, and each has different legal author-
ity and power. It is quite true that the law 
requiring the appointment of a guardian 
should not be employed unfairly against an 
incompetent Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 
545, 236 P.2d 451 (1951), stands for that 
general statement as the majority points 
out, but that case is far different on its 
facts and hardly justifies overriding the 
clear intent of Transamerica and Mr. Nel-
son that a guardian should be appointed.1 
The majority's estoppel argument is also 
devoid of merit The plain fact is that Mr. 
Nelson, either as the putative guardian or 
as the representative of the estate, did not 
change his position because of any reliance 
on Transamerica's representations. On the 
contrary, it was Transamerica that relied 
on Mr. Nelson's obligation to obtain the 
requisite authority. That was an express 
condition of the compromise agreement 
The majority suggests that it would be 
"patently unfair" to hold in favor of Trans-
america because Mrs. Blackhurst's estate 
would be penalized if Transamerica were 
not held liable. The majority does not ex-
plain how that can possibly be; the facts 
indicate quite the opposite. The settlement 
was to provide Mrs. Blackhurst sufficient 
money to take care of her needs until she 
died. Before Mr. Nelson accepted the set-
tlement offer of $150,000, he proposed a 
settlement of $182,000 based on a yearly 
maintenance figure of $26,000 per year, 
assuming that Mrs. Blackhurst would live 
for seven years. Other settlement figures 
that Mr. Nelson proposed assumed a life 
expectancy of as long as eleven years. Ob-
viously the damage calculations were in-
tended to support Mrs. Blackhurst while 
application here. Indeed, the law, as applied, 
swallows the rule requiring the appointment of 
guardians and would allow an unauthorized 
person to compromise a claim against an In-
competent even if it is prejudicial to the incom-
petent. 
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she lived and not benefit her heirs. To 
give the estate the damages intended for 
Mrs. Blackhurst's living and medical ex-
penses, as well as her general damages, is 
not required by any notion of fairness with 
which I am familiar. The estate may well 
have had a wrongful death action for Mrs. 
Blackhurst's death, but that is an entirely 
different cause of action based on an en-
tirely different measure of damages. The 
short of it is that the majority's position 
that it would be "patently unfair" if Trans-
america were not held liable because the 
estate would be penalized is, I submit, 
plainly in error. Enforcement of the agree-
ment in this case simply results in a wind-
fall to the heirs of Mrs. Blackhurst 
I would reverse. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
JTIM> 
Lolita PENTECOST, Plaintiff 
_^ and Appellant, 
™ M.W. HARWARD and John Does I 
10 through III, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 19070. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 1, 1985. 
Tenant brought action against manag-
er and unknown owners arising out of her 
eviction. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., granted man-
ager's motion for summary judgment, and 
tenant appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that (1) genuine issues of 
fact existed with respect ^whether-inan-
ager was acting under a privilege of his 
principal and whether he could be held lia-
ble for conversion, precluding summary 
judgment, and (2) genuine issues of fact 
existed with respect to whether tenant sus-
tained intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, precluding summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result 
1. Judgment «=185.2(5) 
Verified complaint, sworn to upon per-
sonal knowledge, sufficed to controvert af-
fidavit filed by defendant in support of 
motion for summary judgment 
2. Judgment «=»185.1<1) 
Verified pleading, made under oath 
and meeting requirements of affidavits es-
tablished in summary judgment rule, can 
be considered equivalent of affidavit for 
purposes of motion for summary judgment 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). 
3. Judgment *=>185.1(8) 
Although neither verification in com-
plaint nor in affidavit submitted on motion 
for summary judgment stated that facts 
set forth in pleading were true and correct 
to personal knowledge of signer and both 
attempted to verify entire contents of 
pleading, not just factual assertion, where 
neither party objected to form or content of 
other's verified pleading and/or affidavit, 
any evidentiary objections were waived. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). 
4. Principal and Agent «= 159(2) 
If agent commits tort while acting on 
behalf of his principal, fact that he is an 
agent does not insulate him from liability 
to injured party. 
5. Landlord and Tenant <&=>274(2) 
Absent compliance with statutes gov-
erning landlord and tenant relationship, 
seizing tenant's property by self-help is a 
civil wrong and is actionable as a tort 
U.C.A.19#3, 38^3-1, 3&-3-4. 
6. Judgment *»181(6) 
In action brought by tenant against 
manager and unknown owners, genuine is-
sue of fact existe4"as to whether manager 
PENTECOST 
Cite as 699 PJd 
was acting under a privilege of his princi-
pal and could be held liable for conversion, 
precluding summary judgment 
7. Landlord and Tenant «=»24(1) 
Self-help is too likely to lead to breach 
of peace to be permitted, and contractual 
provisions in lease purporting to authorize 
it will be void as against public policy. 
8. Damages «=»49.10 
Landlord and Tenant «= 180(4) 
One who resorts to self-help is liable to 
evicted tenant for all damages proximately 
caused by eviction, including mental pain 
and suffering. 
9. Judgment «=>181(24) 
In action brought by tenant against 
manager and unknown owners arising out 
of eviction, genuine issue of fact existed as 
to whether tenant sustained intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, precluding 
summary judgment 
10. Damages *=»49.10 
One who intentionally causes severe 
emotional distress to another through ex-
treme and outrageous conduct is liable to 
that person for any resulting damages. 
Ronald E. Dalby, Provo, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
Jay Fitt, Provo, for defendants and re-
spondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
In this action, a tenant sued the manager 
and the unknown owners) of the apart-
ment in which she lived for forcibly evict-
ing her and her two children and for retain-
ing her furniture and personal possessions, 
all without resort to judicial process. De-
fendant Harward, the manager, filed a ver-
ified answer to plaintiffs verified com-
plaint and later moved for summary judg-
ment, supporting his motion with an affida-
vit Plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit, re-
1. Throughout the complaint, the word "defend-
ant" appears to have been used to refer to de-
fendant Harward, while the word "defendants" 
seems to refer to all defendants. 
v. HARWARD Utah 697 
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lying instead on her complaint, which con-
tradicted both defendant's answer and the 
affidavit accompanying his motion for sum-
mary judgment The district court granted 
Harvard's motion, apparently on the 
ground that no counter-affidavit had been 
filed. We hold that plaintiffs verified com-
plaint, which controverted the facts set 
forth in Harward's affidavit, created a ma-
terial issue of fact for resolution at trial. 
We further hold that even if plaintiffs 
complaint had not been verified, the allega-
tions of her complaint that were not ad-
dressed by Harward's affidavit were suffi-
cient to support claims against him on sev-
eral theories. We therefore reverse and 
remand for further proceedings. 
The complaint alleged that plaintiff "had 
leased" an apartment from defendant; that 
she resided there with her two children; 
that defendants, "without court order, 
forcefully and illegally evicted" plaintiff; 
that plaintiff tendered payment of rent, 
which defendants refused to accept; that 
defendants "unlawfully retained [plain-
tiffs personal property and refused . . . to 
return it to her"; that as a result of the 
eviction, her children "were exposed to rain 
and cold and subsequently became ill"; 
that defendant Harward was an agent for 
the owner of the premises; that the actions 
of defendant were intentional and mali-
cious; and that plaintiff was entitled to 
damages for conversion of her property 
and for expenses incurred as a result of the 
eviction and the detention of the property, 
as well as punitive damages.1 Plaintiff 
also sought return of personal property 
described in a two-page list attached to the 
complaint This list appears to include all 
property in the apartment at the time of 
eviction. Among the items listed are three 
rooms of furniture, dishes and kitchen 
utensils, a clothes dryer, toilet articles from 
the bathroom, clothing for plaintiff and her 
children, towels and washcloths, rugs, chil-
dren's toys, and a crib. The complaint was 
verified by plaintiff.* 
2. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do' not 
formally recognize a verified complaint, a crea-
ture well known to code pleading states. See, 
e.g., Cal.Code Civ.P. § 446 (West 1973 & Supp. 
IIONIIAM v 
(Mr «^ 788 P2<l 
Stanley H. HONIIAM and Anne M. lion-
ham, Boyd F. Summerhnys, and Arleen 
M. Summerhays, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
Robert L. MORGAN. Utah State Engi-
neer, Salt Lake County Water Conserv-
ancy District, a Political Subdivision of 
the State of Utah and a Body Corpo-
rate, and Draper Irrigation Company, a 
Utah Corporation, Defendants and Ap-
pellee. 
No. 880113. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Feb 23, 1989 
Rehearing Denied March ?A, 1990 
Action was brought challenging state 
engineer's decision on permanent change 
application. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, .1., entered 
summary judgment for engineer, and plain 
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that state engineer is required to under-
take same investigation in permanent 
change applications that statute mandates 
in applications for water appropriations. 
Vacated. 
Norman H. Jackson, Court of Appeals 
Judge, concurs. 
1. Appeal and Error 0=^863 
Inasmuch as challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions 
of law only, because, by definition, summa 
r
.V judgments do not resolve factual issues, 
Supreme Court reviews thosp conclusions 
for correctness, without according defer 
ence to trial court's legal conclusions 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>842<8) 
Same lack of deference which applies 
to review of trial court's conclusions of law 
on summary judgment motions applies to 
trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
which likewise poses question of law. 
1. Here, as well cis in the following, we confine 
oui nnnlvsis to the \ersions of the Mntutes in 
. MORGAN Utah 4 9 7 
497 {Vtnh 1989) 
3. Waters and Water Courses ^=145 
State engineer is required to undertake 
same investigation in permanent change 
applications that statute mandates in appli-
cations for water appropriations. U.C.A. 
1953, 73-3-3, 73-3-8. 
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
R Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy, 
John H. Mabey, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
Utah State Engineer. 
LeRoy S. Axland, Carl F Huefner, Ken-
drick J. Hafen. Salt Lake City, for Salt 
Lake Water Conservancy Dist. 
Lee Kapaloski, David L. Deisley, Salt 
Lake City, for Draper Irrigation Co. 
William J. Lockhart, Salt Lake City, for 
Nat Parks and Conservation Ass'n. 
Dallin W Jensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Weber and Davis Counties Canal Co. 
Edward W Clyde, Salt Lake City, for 
Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist. 
Joseph Novak, Salt Lake City, for Provo 
River Water Users Ass'n. 
Ray L. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for 
Salt Lake City. 
Thorpe A. Waddingham, Delta, for Delta 
('anal. 
PKR CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg-
ment which denied them standing to pursue 
count one of their complaint against the 
state1 engineer. The summary judgment 
was certified final under rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to vest this 
Court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(v) 
(Supp.1988). 
Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham, who is not a 
water user, protested against a permanent 
change application filed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-3 (1980)' in the office of the 
defendant state engineer (state engineer) in 
June of 1984 by defendants Salt Lake 
offer! on Deeember 26, 1985, the date of the 
state enpineoi's mrniotnndum derision. 
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County W a t e r Conservancy Uistriet ami 
Draper I r r igat ion Company (applicants). 
Applicants sought to change the point of 
diversion, place, anil nature of ime of cer 
tain w a t e r r ights in Moll Canyon. I h v 
( V e e k . Rocky Mouth Creek, and Hig Willow 
(•reek. At a suhseipient hear ing. Honham 
produced evidence of suhstant ial flooding 
and damage In pla int i f fs ' properties and 
adjacent public lands dur ing \W.\ and PW1 
Honham informed 1he sta le engineer that 
the f looding was (he result of applicants' 
construction of a screw gate , pipeline, and 
diversion works a f ter they obtained prel im 
inary approval of their change application 
According to Honham, the flooding had or 
curred and would recur on a yearly basis 
whenever the applicants closed (heir screw 
gate , a l lowing the waters to be diverted 
down (he hillside onto pla int i f fs ' properties 
and nearby property contemplated for use 
as a public park. Honham objected thai 
the proposed structures and improvements 
contemplated a f te r f inal approval would de 
t r imenta l ly impact the public we l fa re . 
T h e state engineer conducted on-site in 
spections but eventual ly issued his memo 
mur ium decision in which he concluded that 
he was without author i ty to address Hon 
ham's claims in r id ing on the permanent 
change application, as Honham was not a 
wa te r user, that (he s(a(e engineer's an 
(hor i iy was l imited to invest igat ing impair 
ments of vested water r ights , and that 
(here was no evidence before him (o inrii 
cate that (he implementat ion of the change 
application would impair those r ights. The 
state engineer then granted (he permanent 
change application. 
P la int i f fs sueri in the district court in 
compliance wi th U t a h Code Ann. § 73 3 14 
(1980), which provides in pertinent part: 
I n any case where a decision of the state 
engineer is involved nwi / prison npgrirv 
rd by such decision may within sixty 
days a f t e r notice thereof br ing a civil 
action in the district court for a plenary 
review thereof . . . . | N | o l i e c of the penri 
eney of such action . shall operate to 
stay all f u r t h e r proceedings pending the 
decision of the district court. 
(Kmphasis added ) In fount one of their 
complain! , they claimed that the state engi 
i f e r failed to review the plans anil spoeifi 
cations o( tin* improvements , failed to eon 
riuH an investigation as required by U tah 
Code Ann $ 73 3 * tl!»Mfi) to determine 
what damage (he change application would 
have on pr ivate and public p toper (y . ami 
failed to comply wi th seel ion 73 3 3 (IIISO) 
bv not fonsiriering the "dut ies" of the de 
fondant applicants Plaint i f fs al leged that 
the state engineer 's disclaimer of any an 
thori lv to consider, in connection wi th a 
permanent change application, any dam 
ages caused to plaint i f fs as a tesult of his 
approval of the application, was contrary to 
the clear mandate
 n f s««Hion 73 3 S, which 
requires ati evaluat ion of the factors there 
set out inchiding anv and all damage to 
public and pr ivate property and the impact 
the application wil l have on the public wel 
fare I ' l -ontiffs also al leged that they hnri 
owned and occupied their approximate ly 
ten acres of property for twenty years and 
that for the approximately one hunrireri 
years since Draper I r r igat ion first con 
structed open ditches, f lumes, pipelines, 
and other nfpioriucts to carry wa te r f rom 
Hell Canyon peservoir to it<- water treat 
ment plant in Draper . U tah , p la int i f fs ' 
properties had remained undisturbed. 
Since (he construction of the screw gates, 
in fur therance of the applied for change, 
that was no longer the case. V i r tua l wa 
terfa l ls eascaderi down the hillside imtnerii 
ately e;e t »*f p la int i f fs ' properties whenev 
ei applicants closed that ga le ami caused 
tremendous damage to pla int i f fs ' proper-
ties and the public area in the vicinity. 
Hefore any discovery was conducted, the 
district court granted (he state engineer's 
motion for s u m m a r y judgment a f te r con-
cluding that (he change application process 
unrier section 73 'I 3 riiri not contemplate a 
consideration of all (he factors listeri in 
section 73 3 N: that (he issues raised by 
plaint i f fs were* outside the l imited cri teria 
govern ing approval and rejection of change 
applications contained in section 7 8 - 3 - 3 ; 
and that plaint i f fs were , therefore , not "ag-
gr ieved persons" wi thin the meaning of 
section 7 3 - 3 - 1 4 and could not br ing an 
action to review the rieeisinn of the slate 
PAGE 11 
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engineer under section 1A A A The sum 
mary judgment lifted the stay imposed bv 
section 1A A I I on the appioval of the per 
inanent change application. The order was 
certif ied ;m final under rtile 51(1)) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Plaint i f fs appealed. This Court granted 
the request of the National Parks and Con 
servation Association (NPCA) to intervene 
as amicus curiae and granted w like re 
(piest by Weber Hasin Water Conservancy 
District, Weber River Water Users Associ 
at ion, Mavis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company. Mraper I rr igat ion Company. 
Sandy City. Central Utah Water Cnnsen 
ancy Mistrict. Salt Pake County Water Con 
servancy Mistrict. and Prove River Water 
Users Association (the water users). 
Plaintif fs a l i g n e d pnnp i in the tr ial 
court's r id ing that (1) summary judgment 
in favor* of the «;tafe engineer was proper; 
(2) plaint i f fs wore not "aggrieved persons" 
within the meaning of section ~A A 1 J; and 
(A) the state engineer's duties and responsi 
bilities out liner] in section 7.'{ 'A S did not 
apply to permanent change applications 
covered by section 1'A 'A A. At oral argu 
ment, the parties concecled that the ques 
tion of whether plaint i f fs are aggrieved 
persons within the meaning of section 1A 
A 14 turns on whether the scope of the 
considerations appropriate for the state en 
gineer under :\ section TA A A proceeding 
for a permanent change application is the 
same as that listed in section TA A S. I f it 
is, the state engineer concedes that plain 
t i f fs are aggrieved persons; if it is not. 
plaint i f fs concede that they are not ag 
grieved persons and that summary judg 
ment was proper. The issues before us 
may therefore be reduced to the question 
of whether in permanent change applica 
tions (section ?.'* A A) the state engineer 
has the same duties wi th respect to appro\ 
al or rejection of applications as he has 
when considering appropriation applica 
tions (section 1A A H). We hold that the 
state engineer's duties under the two stat 
utes are the same and that plaint i f fs there 
fore are aggrieved persons entit led to a 
2. This section was passr<| in l(U7 and has nn 
dergone slight changes twice sime 1(^Q, I 1Q86 
ck 40. § 1; I 1087 < h. IM, 5 >8<> hut mill 
;. MOIMMN Utah 4 9 9 
tr ial on the merits of count one of their 
complaint 
I I. 2 | Inasmuch as a challenge to sum 
mary judgment presents for review conclu-
sions of law only, because, by definition, 
summary judgments do not resolve factual 
issues, this Court reviews those conclusions 
for correctness, without according defer-
ence to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Madscu r. Borthick, 7(H) P.2d 245, (Utah 
1JWH). That same lack of deference applies 
to the trial court's interpretation of stat-
utes, which likewise poses a question of 
law Asm/ r Wat Inns, 751 p. 2d 1135 
(Utah M>SK). 
Utah Code Ann. § 1A A A (19S0),2 at the 
time the state engineer rendered his deci-
sion, read in pertinent part: 
Any person entitled to the use of water 
may change1 the place of diversion or use 
and may use the water for other pur-
poses than those for which it was origi-
nally appropriated, but no such change 
shall be made if it impairs any vested 
right without just compensation. Such 
changes may be permanent or tempo-
rary. Changes for an indefinite length 
of time with an intention to relinquish 
the original point of diversion, place or 
purpose of use are defined as perma-
nent changes Temporary changes in-
clude and are limited to all changes for 
definitely fixed periods of not exceeding 
one year. Hoth permanent and tempo-
rary changes of point of diversion, place 
or purpose of use of water including 
water involved in general adjudication or 
other suits, shall be made in the manner 
provided herein and not otherwise. 
No permanent change shall be made 
except on the approval of an application 
therefor by the state eng ineer . . . . The 
procedure in the state engineer's office 
and rights and duties of the applicants 
with respect to applications for perma-
nent changes of point of diversion, 
place or purpose of use shall be the 
same as provided in this title for appli-
tetains the same PH7 language that is determi-
nant to our decision in this case. 
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en 
ary duty in doing so. The assignment of 
the note does not vitiate Air Terminal's 
claim of indemnification against Gump & 
Ayers and Sunayers for funds expended to 
satisfy the Morse Shortfall. In summary, 
we do not find § 70A-3-304(2) defeats 
First Federal's status as a holder in due 
course. 
We hold that the Air Terminal note is a 
negotiable instrument and First Federal is 
a holder in due course. The judgment of 
the trial court is, therefore, reversed, and 
the case is remanded for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
GARFF and DAVIDSON, JJ., concur. 
MY NUMUR SYSTIM> 
Jack C. DANIELS, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
v. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, A-One Con-
struction, Inc., Miller Brick Sales, Eu-
gene E. Doms, and Michael R. McCoy, 
Respondents. 
CEN CORPORATION, Plaintiff, 
Jack C. DANIELS, Debra Estes, Scott 
Berry, Debra Ann Sitzberger, and 
Amy Stanton Eagleson, Defendants. 
No. 880135-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 5, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1989. 
er and contractor appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Davidson, J., held that: (1) lien 
was untimely filed, and (2) contractor's 
claim for profits was not within contempla-
tion of mechanic's lien statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=863 
Because a summary judgment is a 
matter of law, appellate court will give no 
particular deference to trial court's conclu-
sions, and will apply the same standard as 
that applied by the trial court. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Mechanics' Liens «= 132(7) 
"Completion of the contract," within 
100 days of which general contractor must 
file mechanic's lien, is marked by the end 
of a related series of tasks. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Mechanics' Liens «=»132(8) 
Day spent by general contractor in-
specting frozen water pipe damage and 
contacting subcontractors to make repair 
work did not substantially relate to per-
formance of the contract but rather was 
trivial, and could not be used to extend 
date of completion for purposes of filing 
notice of mechanic's lien. U.C.A.1953, 38-
1-7. 
4. Mechanics' Liens «=>35 
General contractor's claim for profit 
that he was entitled to as investor in condo-
minium project did not constitute an "im-
provement to realty," or "services" or "ma-
terials" contemplated by mechanic's lien 
statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
General contractor brought action 
against construction lender and others, to 
foreclose mechanic's lien. In another ac-
tion, current owner moved to declare lien 
void. The Third District Court, Summit 
County, Philip R. Fishier, J., granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of lender, and own-
Gordon A. Madsen, Murray, and Robert 
C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for third-par-
ty plaintiff and appellant 
David R. Olsen, Carl F. Huefner, and 
Charles P. Sampson, Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
DANIELS v. DESERET FEDERAL SAV. 
Cite M 771 PJd 1100 (UtmhApp. 1989) 
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Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, dismissing his 
notice to hold and claim a lien on property 
for which he was both a co-owner and the 
general contractor. Daniels' claim con-
cerned the timeliness of filing his notice 
and the profits owed to him as a limited 
partner in Park Avenue Development Com-
pany ("Park Avenue"). The trial court 
held that his lien was both untimely and 
invalid. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately 
$28,000 in the development of an eight-unit 
condominium project in Park City, Utah, 
thereby acquiring an interest through a 
limited partnership in Park Avenue. The 
agreement between Park Avenue and Dan-
iels provided that Daniels would receive 
approximately $80,000 for his share in the 
profits from the sale of the condominiums 
and for overhead. Park Avenue also hired 
Daniels to serve as the general contractor 
for the condominium project and agreed to 
pay him approximately $15,000 for his ser-
vices. 
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a 
construction loan to Park Avenue and con-
struction on the project commenced. By 
the end of July 1981, Daniels had complet-
ed all of the construction required pursuant 
to the construction contract and Park City 
issued certificates of final inspection and 
occupancy for the project. Daniels was 
paid $15,000 for services and labor, but was 
not paid his promised share of the profits 
from the sale of the condominiums. 
Apparently, Daniels intended to file a 
notice to hold and claim a lien on the 
project, for the $80,000 "profit," within the 
statutory period required for filing. How-
ever, the owners of the project were trying 
to obtain refinancing and they requested 
Daniels not to file his mechanic's lien for 
the profit and overhead. In return, the 
owners promised Daniels that they would 
allocate his share of the profits to him 
within two weeks. In reliance on this 
promise, Daniels did not file his mechanic's 
lien within the requisite 100 day period. 
However, the promised payment was not 
made. 
On December 1, 1981, several water 
pipes in the condominiums froze. The own-
ers called Daniels to inspect the pipes and 
to make repairs. Daniels inspected the 
pipes and made phone calls to subcontrac-
tors in order to facilitate repairs. On Feb-
ruary 3, 1982, Daniels filed a notice of lien 
against the project, claiming a lien for the 
$80,000 "profit." He listed December 1, 
1981, as the last day labor had been fur-
nished on the project. 
In October 1983, Daniels filed a com-
plaint against Deseret to foreclose his 
claimed lien on the property. Deseret's 
construction loan to Park Avenue was se-
cured by deeds of trust which Deseret exe-
cuted February 22, 1982, and recorded 
March 1, 1982. Deseret subsequently 
moved to dismiss Daniels' complaint on the 
basis that Daniels' lien was not filed in a 
timely fashion as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7 (1988) and therefore, Dan-
iels had no cause of action as a matter of 
law. CEN Corporation, subsequent owner 
of the real property, also moved to declare 
Daniels' lien void. The trial court agreed 
that Daniels had not timely filed a mechan-
ic's lien and therefore granted summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret and CEN 
Corporation. 
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did 
the trial court err when it found Daniels' 
work on December 1, 1981, did not extend 
the time limit for filing a notice to hold and 
claim a lien? Did the trial court err when 
it held Deseret is not estopped from raising 
the affirmative defense that the mechanic's 
lien was not timely filed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] A court may grant summary judg-
ment if the evidence shows "that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ. 
P. 56(c). Because a summary judgment is 
a matter of law, the appellate court gives 
1102 Utah 771 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
the trial court's conclusions no particular 
deference but rather applies the same stan-
dard as that applied by the trial court. 
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 
App.1987). However, "[o]n appeal from a 
summary judgment, we review the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the los-
ing party." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Ge-
neva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 
648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
TIME OF FILING—EXTENSION 
[2] A general contractor must record a 
mechanic's lien within 100 days after com-
pletion of the contract Utah Code Ann. 
§ 3&-1-7 (1988). Completion is marked by 
the end of a related series of tasks required 
for substantial completion of the contract. 
"Trivial or minor adjustments made casual-
ly or long after the main work is completed 
cannot be used to tie on to as the last labor 
done or materials furnished." Wilcox v. 
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-7 
(1936). 
[3] Well over 100 days after completion 
of the contract, Daniels spent a day in-
specting the damage from the frozen water 
"O pipes and calling subcontractors in order to 
JJ> make repairs. Daniels contends that this 
m extends the period for filing his mechanic's 
i__i lien. However, the trial court found: 
-£* The work the owners wanted done in 
December of 1981 was not a continuation 
of the earlier project, but merely repairs. 
If repairs to a completed project could be 
construed as extending the time in which 
a mechanic's lien could be filed, mechan-
ic's [sic] liens could be filed many years 
after a project had been completed. 
We agree with the trial court's findings. 
In order to extend the time for filing his 
mechanic's lien, the work Daniels did in 
December 1981 would have to substantially 
relate to the performance of the contract 
"The work done or material furnished must 
be something substantial in connection 
with the performance of the contract and 
this is not satisfied by trivialties which may 
be used as a pretext to extend the lien 
period." Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327 (1969). 
In Palombi the original contractor ar-
gued that the date of completion was the 
date on which the building permit was ob-
tained and some remaining building materi-
als were removed from the property own-
er's residence. The court held that these 
were trivial activities in light of the sub-
stantial completion of the contract, and 
they could not be used to extend the date 
of completion. Similarly, the inspection 
and repairs undertaken by Daniels in De-
cember 1981 were not services used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of 
the building, nor did the services add di-
rectly to the value of the property. There-
fore, the inspection cannot'extend the time 
period for filing notice of a mechanic's lien. 
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and 
subsequent owners are estopped from 
pleading untimely filing of the notice of the 
lien as an affirmative defense because he 
was induced by the project owners not to 
file a lien within the requisite 100 day filing 
period. Deseret contends that it had no 
knowledge of the agreement between Park 
Avenue and Daniels and that it was not in 
privity with Daniels. Therefore, Deseret 
argues, estoppel cannot be asserted against 
it 
SERVICES AND MATERIALS 
FURNISHED 
[4] We do not need to reach the merits 
of the estoppel argument Even if Daniels 
had filed a timely notice for the $80,000 
owing to him for "profit and overhead/' 
this amount was not owed to him for the 
value of the services he rendered or for 
materials furnished but from his ownership 
in Park Avenue as a limited partner. Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1988) provides that 
contractors, subcontractors, and laborers 
who furnish material, provide services, or 
bestow labor for the construction, altera-
tion, or improvement of a building or struc-
ture shall have a lien upon the property for 
the value of the services and material pro-
vided. The value of the services provided 
by Daniels in his performance as general 
contractor, was approximately $15,000, for 
REDDISH v. SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
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which he was compensated.1 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law 
"is to preclude landowners from having 
their lands improved by others, without 
becoming personally responsible for the 
reasonable value of materials and labor." 
Cox Rock Prod. v. Walker Pipeline 
Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App.1988). In 
order to ascertain when an improvement 
has been made upon the land, for purposes 
of determining whether notice of a mechan-
ic's lien can validly be filed, it is necessary 
that "there be an annexation to the land, or 
to some part of the realty; or a fixture 
appurtenant to it, and this must have been 
done with the intention of making it a 
permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc. 
v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254, 256 
(Utah 1962). 
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was 
entitled to as an investor and not for any 
services or materials that he provided as a 
contractor. The profits a person is entitled 
to as the result of an investment do not 
constitute improvements to the realty nor 
do they fall within the statutory meaning 
of services or materials as contemplated in 
the mechanic's lien law statutes. Accord-
ingly, Daniels' notice to hold and claim a 
lien, for the profits allegedly owing to him, 
is invalid. Therefore, the summary judg-
ment in favor of Deseret is affirmed. 
Utah H03 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur 
in the result. 
(o |KEY NUMKRSYSTEM) 
Sharon Kay REDDISH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS; 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
and Second Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 880272-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 6, 1989. 
Workers' compensation claimant ob-
tained writ of review appealing an order of 
the Industrial Commission denying claim 
for benefits. The Court of Appeals, Robert 
L. Newey, Senior Judge, sitting by special 
appointment, held that temporary disability 
benefits were properly terminated. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <*»854 
Critical point for termination of tempo-
rary disability benefits is "medical stabili-
zation," defined as time when period of 
healing has ended and condition of claimant 
will not materially improve. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation «=»854 
Medical stabilization, which is critical 
point for termination of temporary disabili-
ty benefits, is independent of ability of 
claimant to return to work. 
3. Workers' Compensation «=»854 
Temporary disability benefits were 
properly terminated upon finding of medi-
cal stabilization, even though worker's 
compensation claimant's attending physi-
cian continued to advise her not to return 
to work. 
1. It is undisputed that approximately $15,000 
was paid to Daniels for his services as contrac-
tor. What the "overhead" represented is un-
clear. In any case, failure to properly preserve 
the lien right precludes any claim that this over-
head should be the subject of a lien. 
John T. Caine, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
James Black and Wendy Moseley, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
Before DAVIDSON, NEWEY» and 
ORME, JJ. 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court 
Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-24<l)(j) (1987). 
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FMA ACCEPTANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
LEATHERBY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Globe General Agency, Carl A. Hulbert, 
and Carl F. Warnick, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Nos. I587I, 15914. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 17, 1979. 
Company which had contracted in writ-
ing with insurer to finance insurance premi-
ums brought suit against the insurer, its 
officers and directors and others, seeking to 
recover for alleged negligence and conver-
sion. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, David B. Dee, J., dismissed plain-
tiffs cause of action against the individual 
officers and directors for failure to state a 
claim and refused to grant plaintiffs mo-
tion to amend the complaint. Plaintiff ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that summary judgment was precluded 
by the existence of substantial issues of 
material fact relating to the conversion and 
negligence claims. 
Vacated and remanded. 
premiums sought to recover from directors 
and officers of the insurer for negligence 
and conversion, questions whether the di-
rectors and officers converted unearned 
premiums and whether they exercised ordi-
nary care, skill and diligence over the insur-
er's business affairs should have been re-
served for the finder of fact. 
3. Judgment «= 181(3) 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes as a matter of law award-
ing any relief to the losing party. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 56(c). 
4. Negligence «=» 136(8, 9, 14) 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present 
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact 
finder; it is only when the facts are undis-
puted and but one reasonable conclusion 
can be drawn therefrom, that such issues 
become questions of law. 
5. Judgment <t» 181(23) 
In suit wherein company which con-
tracted with insurer to finance insurance 
premiums sought to recover from the insur-
er and from its directors and officers for 
negligence and conversion, summary judg-
ment was precluded by the existence of 
substantial issues of material fact relating 
to the conversion and negligence claims. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56(c). 
1. Corporations «=» 310(2) 
Under the standard of care that is ap-
plicable to directors and officers of a corpo-
ration, directors must exercise ordinary 
care, skill and diligence and must give the 
business under their care such attention as 
an ordinarily discreet business person would 
give to his own concerns under similar cir-
cumstances. 
2. Insurance <*=»35 
In suit wherein company which con-
tracted with insurer to finance insurance 
Milo S. Marsden and David F. Klomp, of 
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Ray R Christensen, Donald J. Winder, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon-
dents. 
HALL, Justice: 
Plaintiff, FMA Acceptance Company, 
(hereinafter "FMA"), appeals from a sum-
mary judgment of dismissal of its cause of 
action against defendants, Carl F. Warnick, 
FMA ACCEPTANCE CO. v. LEATHERBY INS. CO. 
Cite as 5MP.2d 1332 
Utah 1333 
(hereinafter "Warnick"), and Carl A. Hul-
bert, (hereinafter "Hulbert"), for failure to 
state a claim for negligence and conversion. 
FMA also appeals the refusal of the trial 
court to grant its motion to amend the 
complaint and the granting of costs to Hul-
bert and Warnick. 
Defendant, Globe General Agency, (here-
inafter "Globe"), is the corporate agent of 
defendant, Leatherby Insurance Company, 
(hereinafter "Leatherby"), and Hulbert and 
Warnick each hold individual agent's certif-
icate of appointment from the State of 
Utah as agents of Leatherby. Hulbert 
founded Globe and is the sole shareholder 
(with the exception of qualifying shares). 
Warnick is president and Hulbert is secre-
tary-treasurer and director of Globe. 
FMA contracted in writing with Globe to 
finance insurance premiums. FMA would 
pay the insurance premiums of Globe's cus-
tomers desiring financing and take an as-
signment of the insured's interest in the 
insurance contract. The contractual agree-
ment, and the insurance policies as well, 
provided that Globe would pay over to FMA 
all unearned premiums resulting from poli-
cy cancellations. 
No unearned premiums were refunded. 
FMA made claim for $34,945.48 and negoti- , 
ated with Hulbert and Warnick for pay-
ment. This resulted in a referral to a certi-
fied public accountant for an audit which 
confirmed that the sum of $26,035.44 was 
owing but that the remaining sum of 
$8,909.64 required further analysis. 
Globe sold its business to Leatherby with-
out completing the accounting and without 
making any refunds and such prompted the 
filing of this action. 
As indicated by the trial court, its sum-
mary judgment resolved two issues: (1) 
that Hulbert and Warnick were not agents 
1. 19 Utah 289, 57 P 287 (1899) 
2. See URCP, Rule 52(a) which renders such 
unnecessary on decision on motions under Rule 
within the meaning of U.C.A., 1953, 31-17-
22(2) so as to place them in the capacity of 
fiduciaries requiring them to account for 
unearned premiums, and (2) that there was 
no actionable negligence on the part of 
Hulbert and Warnick in the management of 
the corporate affairs of Globe. In regard to 
the latter determination, the trial court re-
lied upon the case of Warren v. Robison,1 
stating in its memorandum decision "that 
Warnick and Hulbert meet the 
standards of Warren v. Robinson [Robison] 
and therefore they are dismissed 
under plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In addition to its memorandum decision, 
the trial court saw fit to formulate written 
findings of fact,2 and the following excerpts 
therefrom are further demonstrative of its 
ruling-
9. Defendants Warnick and Hulbert 
did not convert to their own use any 
unearned premium monies or credits. 
10. As officers and directors of de-
fendant Globe General Agency, defend-
ants Warnick and Hulbert exercised ordi-
nary care, skill and diligence over the 
business affairs of defendant Globe Gen-
eral Agency. 
The Warren2 case appears to be at the 
very nub of this appeal. Despite the fact 
that the trial court relied upon Warren in 
reaching its decision, Hulbert and Warnick 
urge this Court to expressly overrule it. 
They no doubt do so in recognition of the 
fact that said case is not supportive of 
summary judgment and, on the contrary, 
would appear to dictate that a trial be had 
on the merits. 
[1] In Warren, the plaintiffs therein 
sued the directors and officers of a bank for 
negligence in the management of a bank. 
12 or 56 or any other motion except as provid-
ed in Rule 41(b) 
3. Supra, footnote 1 
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The trial court granted a nonsuit, and plain-
tiffs appealed. This Court determined that 
directors and officers may be personally 
liabie for negligence in the management of 
corporate affairs, reversed the trial court, 
and remanded the matter for trial. In do-
ing so the following standard of care was 
established: 
The rule most in harmony with 
the character and well-being of such an 
institution appears to be that the di-
rectors, in administering its affairs, must 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and dili-
gence. Under this rule, it is necessary 
for them to give the business, under their 
care such attention as an ordinarily dis-
creet business man would give to his own 
concerns under similar circumstances, and 
it is therefore incumbent upon them to 
devote so much of their time to their 
trust as is necessary to familiarize them 
with the business of the institution, and 
to supervise and direct its operations. 
If, however, directors, acting in 
good faith, and with reasonable care, 
skill, and diligence, nevertheless fall into 
a mistake, either of law or fact, they will 
3> not be liable for the consequences of such 
CT> mistake. [Emphasis added.] 
*—» We are not convinced that the standard 
^ of care espoused in Warren should be dis-
turbed. Although there is some division of 
authority,4 the standard is well-supported 
by respected authority.* 
Turning now to the matter of the trial 
court's reliance upon Warren, it appears 
that such reliance was somewhat misplaced. 
This is so since, although Warren does es-
tablish the standard of care to be applied, it 
stands as no authority for the proposition 
4. See annotation in 29 A.L.R.3d 660 
5. Taylor v.'Alston, 79 N.M. 643. 447 P2d 523 
(1968); Ftxuitjcr Milling A Elevator Co. v. Roy 
White Cohp. Merc. Co.. 25 Idaho 478. 138 P. 
829 (1914); Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. 
Central Leasing Corp.. OkLApp.. 518 P2d 1125 
(1974); sfe also. 3A. W. Fletcher. Private Cor-
porations, Sec*. 1J35, 114L 
that factual issues such as are present here 
may be determined summarily. In fact, the 
result therein is to the contrary. 
[2] Inherent in the trial court's conclu-
sion "that Warnick and Hulbert 
meet the standards of Warren v. Robinson 
[Robison]" and that "Warnick and Hulbert 
did not convert any unearned 
premiums," and that they "exercised ordi-
nary care, skill and diligence over the busi-
ness affairs of Globe," is the determination 
of disputed issues of fact, viz., conversion 
and negligence. Said issues should have 
been reserved for the finder of fact. 
[3] A summary judgment is appropriate 
only where the favored party makes a 
showing which precludes, as a matter of 
law, the awarding of any relief to the losing 
party.1 
The case of Webb v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corporation1 stated the follow-
ing: 
It is the declared policy of this 
court to zealously protect the right of 
trial by jury and not to take issues from 
them and rule as a matter of law except 
in clear cases. 
The court therein cited Newton v. 0. S. L. 
R. Co.9 which stated the following: 
unless the question of negli-
gence is free from doubt, the court can-
not pass upon it as a question of law; 
if the court is in 
doubt whether reasonable men, . 
might arrive at different conclusions, 
then this very doubt determines the ques-
tion to be one of fact for the jury and not 
one of law for the court. 
6. U.R.C.P.. Rule 56(c); see Tanner v. Utah 
Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 
353. 359P.2d 18(1961). 
7. 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959). 
8. 43 Utah 219. 134 P. 567 (1913). 
FMA ACCEPTANCE CO. v. LEATHERBY INS. CO. 
Cite as 5t4P.2d 1332 
of negligence ordinarily 
Utah 1335 
[4] Issues 
present questions of fact to be resolved by 
the fact-finder. It is only when the facts 
are undisputed and where but one reasona-
ble conclusion can be drawn therefrom that 
such issues become questions of law.' 
[5] Applying the foregoing principles to 
the instant case, it would appear that sub-
stantial issues of material fact exist that 
preclude summary judgment. 
The propriety of the trial court's determi-
nation that U.C.A., 1953, 31-17-22(2) does 
not support a private action was not raised 
on appeal, yet Hulbert and Warnick ad-
dressed that issue in their brief. They con-
tend that the case of Milliner v. Elmer Fox 
and Co.1* is supportive of the ruling below. 
However, that case did not interpret the 
statute presently before us, but concerned 
an action brought under the Uniform Secu-
rities Actu which makes it unlawful to 
make an untrue statement of a material 
fact or employ any deceptive practice in the 
offer, sale or purchase of a security. In 
declining to overturn the dismissal for fail-
ure to state a claim on various grounds,12 
the Court observed that although the stat-
ute made certain practices unlawful, it 
made no provision for a private right of 
action for its violation, and the Court refus-
ed to invade the province of the legislature 
by fashioning a remedy from it. 
The holding in Milliner must necessarily 
be viewed in the light of the facts peculiar 
to that case and, when so viewed, it is not 
in conflict with the prior case of Citizens 
Casualty Company of New York v. Hack-
ett1* which did interpret the statute now 
before us. That case involved an action by 
an automobile insurer against its agent to 
recover unremitted insurance premiums. 
In affirming a judgment in favor of the 
insurer, the Court held as follows: 
In view of the fact that the plaintiff 
actually furnished this insurance cover-
age to Nielson at the request of the de-
fendant Hackett; and Hackett received 
payment therefor, we are entirely in ac-
cord with the findings and judgment of 
the trial court that he should remit the 
money he so received to the plaintiff. 
This is as required by Sec. 31-17-22(2), 
U.C.A.1953, which states that: 'All funds 
representing premiums re-
ceived by an agent, solicitor or broker, 
shall be held by him in his fiduciary ca-
pacity, and shall be promptly accounted 
for and paid to the insured, insurer, or 
agent as entitled thereto.' 
The facts in Hackett closely parallel those 
of the instant case and the holding therein 
appears to dictate a result contrary to that 
of the trial court. Irrespective thereof, we 
deem the matter to be moot because the 
trial court clearly recognized that the stat-
ute in no way infringed upon or limited the 
mode of exercising any and all causes of 
action otherwise available under the com-
mon law.14 This is evident from the find-
ings of fact, supra, which specifically refer 
to FMA's claims of conversion and negli-
gence, both of which were ruled upon, as a 
matter of law, independent of the statute. 
The foregoing observations on the ques-
tion of mootness of issues applies equally 
well to FMA's further claim of error on the 
part of the trial court in refusing to permit 
». Deshazer v. Tompkins, 89 Idaho 347. 404 P 2d 13. 17 Utah 2d 304. 410 P 2d 767 (1966). 
604 (1965). 
10. Utah. 529 P.2d 806 (1974) 
11. U.C.A.. 1953, 6I-1-I, et seq. 
12. (1) No privity of contract: (2) no showing of 
negligence; (3) failure to join an indispensable 
party; and (4) inapplicability of the statute. 
14. U C A , 1953. 68-3-1. adopting the Common 
law of England so far as not repugnant or in 
conflict with Constitution or laws. 
1336 Utah 594 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
an amendment of the complaint to include a 
claim for conversion. Said issue was ex-
pressly ruled upon by the court and without 
objection. Consequently, said issue remains 
before the court on remand. However, in 
the interest of orderly procedure, it may be 
advisable to again consider the matter of 
appropriate amendments to the pleadings. 
The summary judgment is vacated and 
set aside, including the award of costs. The 
case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs on 
appeal to FMA. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
( o IKEYNUMI W BCRSYSTEliS 
92 Wash.2d 134 
The STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Ernest L. OLSON, Petitioner. 
No. 45641. 
STATE v. OLSON Wash. 1337 
Cite as, WaslL, St4 PM 1337 
which is positive and directly contradictory 
to defendant's oath and another such direct 
witness or independent evidence of corrobo-
rating circumstances of such a character as 
clearly to turn the scale and overcome the 
oath of defendant and legal presumption of 
innocence. RCWA 9A.72.020. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Banc. 
May 10, 1979. 
At the close of State's case-in-chief in a 
first-degree perjury prosecution, the Supe-
rior Court, Snohomish County, Robert C. 
Bibb, J., entered an order of dismissal, and 
State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rin-
gold, J., 19 Wash.App. 885, 578 P.2d 866, 
reversed. On review, the Supreme Court, 
Rosellini, J., held that although defendant 
had delivered county property to "Spane 
Building," negative answer to grand jury 
interrogator's question as to whether he 
had delivered such property to "Spane Mill" 
could not form basis for perjury charge 
since question could literally and truthfully 
have been answered in the negative. 
Reversed. 
Dolliver, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <*=»752 
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence ad-
mits truth of opposing party's evidence and 
all inferences which reasonably may be 
drawn from such evidence, and requires 
that evidence be interpreted in light most 
favorable to that party. 
2. Perjury *=»33(1) 
Requirements of proof in a perjury 
case are the strictest known to the law, 
outside of treason charges. RCWA 9A.72.-
020. 
3. Perjury *»34(1) 
In a perjury case, State must present 
testimony of at least one credible witness 
4. Perjury «=»12 
Generally, a perjury charge cannot be 
maintained where testimony of accused was 
literally, technically, or legally true where 
answer given by accused is responsive to 
question asked him. RCWA 9A.72.020. 
5. Perjury «=»12 
Perjury statutes are not to be loosely 
construed, nor are they to be invoked sim-
ply because a wily witness succeeds in de-
railing questioner, so long as witness speaks 
the literal truth. RCWA 9A.72.020. 
6. Perjury <>==>12 
Precise questioning is imperative as a 
predicate for perjury and burden is on ques-
tioner to pin witness down to specific object 
of inquiry. RCWA 9A.72.020. 
7. Perjury *»12 
Although defendant had delivered 
county property to "Spane Building," nega-
tive answer to grand jury interrogator's 
question as to whether he had delivered 
such property to "Spane Mill" could not 
form basis for perjury charge since question 
could literally and truthfully have been an-
swered in the negative. RCWA 9A.72.020. 
8. Perjury <*=»12 
For purposes of perjury charge, it is 
not accused's knowledge of questioner's in-
tent which controls, but his knowledge of 
falsity of his answer; if answer is literally 
true, it cannot form basis of charge. 
RCWA 9A.72.020. 
Luvera & Mullen, G. E. Mullen, Mount 
Vernon, for petitioner. 
Robert E. Schillberg, Snohomish County 
Pros. Atty., Don J. Hale, Deputy Pros. 
Atty., Everett, for respondent. 
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prevent them from refusing to admit 
morally incompetent persons to practice, 
nor compel them to retain such upon the 
roll. If 3uch were the law, then the ver-
dicts of juries or the notions of prosecu-
tors or legislators, and not the deliberate 
judgment of the courts, would control in 
such matters. The courts, and not juries 
or legislators, must ultimately determine 
the qualifications and fitness of their of-
ficers." 
Is there any apparent conflict between a 
subsequent judicial integration with a prior 
legislative integration? There should not 
be if each department remains within the 
scope of its constitutional function. 
The court in the case of Re Opinion of the 
Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932), 
deemed legislative enactments concerning 
qualifications for admission to practice as 
an aid to the courts in performance of their 
duties. The court further acknowledged 
that some statutes have been enacted in the 
exercise of the police power to protect the 
public from those deficient in ability, learn-
ing, or moral qualities, and thus incapable 
12 °f maintaining the high standard of con-
O duct to be expected by members of the bar. 
rri
 However, the court emphasized that no 
F—» statute can control the judicial department 
^ ° in the performance of its duty to decide 
who shall enjoy the privilege of practicing 
law. 
The court explained that some statutes 
respecting admissions to the bar, which af-
ford appropriate instrumentalities for as-
certaining the qualifications of applicants, 
are not an encroachment on the judicial 
department. They are convenient to enable 
the judiciary to perform this duty. The 
court cited as an example the statute estab-
lishing the state board of bar examiners. 
Statutes of that nature are valid insofar as 
they do not infringe on the right of the 
judicial department to determine who shall 
exercise the privilege of practicing in the 
courts and under what circumstances and 
with what qualifications persons shall be 
admitted to that end. The court's point of 
delineation was that statutes specifying 
qualifications and accomplishments will be 
regarded as fixing the minimum and not as 
setting the bounds beyond which the judi-
cial department cannot go. The court stat-
ed it would regard such specifications as 
limitations, not upon the judicial depart-
ment, but upon the individuals seeking ad-
mission to the bar. The court emphasized 
there was no power in the legislative de-
partment to compel the judicial department 
to admit as attorneys those deemed to be 
unfit to perform the duties and exercise the 
prerogatives of an attorney at law. 
KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 5£> 
James R. HALL. Brenda Hall, and Brenda 
Hall, as Guardian ad Litem for Karla 
Hall, a minor. Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Harold WARREN, Raur Warren, Gary 
Warren and Newell Warren, Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 16735. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 30, 1981. 
Tenants brought action against land-
lord for personal injuries resulting from 
emission of gases from defective floor fur-
nace. The Fourth District Court, Uintah 
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of landlord, and 
tenant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that disputed issues of 
material facts existed on parties' knowledge 
of defect, precluding summary judgment 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Landlord and Tenant *»162 
Duty of landlord to use reasonable care 
to protect lessees may rest on common-law 
principles of negligence. 
2. Landlord and Tenant «=»162 
Pertinent safety standards established 
by building codes are considered as much 
part of lease as if expressed in contract. 
3. Landlord and Tenant «=> 164(1) 
To invoke rule incorporating existing 
law in lease, party must show existence of 
statute or ordinance, that statute or ordi-
nance was intended to protect class of per-
sons which includes party, that protection is 
directed toward harm which has in fact 
occurred as result of violation, and that 
violation of ordinance or statute was proxi-
mate cause of injury complained of. 
4. Negligence <*=»6 
As a general rule, a violation of stan-
dard of safety set by statute or ordinance is 
prima facie evidence of negligence. 
5. Negligence s=>6 
Violation of standard of safety set by 
statute or ordinance, which is prima facie 
evidence of negligence, may be subject to 
justification or excuse if defendant's con-
duct could nevertheless be reasonably said 
to fall within standard of reasonable care 
under the circumstances. 
6. Landlord and Tenant *=» 164(7) 
Even if tenant has actual knowledge of 
defect in leased premises, landlord may still 
have duty to provide protection regardless 
of knowledge of tenant. 
7. Landlord and Tenant «=» 168(1) 
If tenant knows of danger in leased 
premises and subsequently fails to exercise 
due care, defense of contributory negli-
gence is available to landlord in tenant's 
action for damages. 
8. Judgment <*=» 181(24) 
In tenants' action against landlord for 
personal injuries resulting from the emis-
sion of gases from defective floor furnace, 
disputed issues of material facts existed on 
parties' knowledge of defect, precluding 
summary judgment. 
HALL v. WARREN 
Cite as, Utah. 632 P-2d 848 
John C Beaslin, Vernal, 
and respondents. 
Utah 849 
for defendants 
Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of an adverse 
summary judgment in an action to recover 
damages against their landlords for person-
al injuries sustained as a result of a mal-
functioning floor furnace in a rental unit. 
Plaintiffs rented the residence on an oral 
month-to-month rental agreement com-
mencing in February of 1976. At the time 
of the accident plaintiffs had occupied the 
rental property for approximately three 
years. On January 2, 1979, the floor fur-
nace began to emit gases which resulted in 
the asphyxiation of plaintiffs. Emergency 
medical treatment was required and admin-
istered. 
Plaintiffs claim they were unaware of 
any defect in the floor furnace and as a 
result had contacted neither defendants nor 
the Utah Gas Service Company for the pur-
pose of having the furnace repaired. Be-
fore the accident plaintiffs had had little 
occasion to use the floor furnace, since al-
ternative heating units had been sufficient 
prior to the severe weather conditions 
which occurred at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiffs also claim that at the time of 
moving in, and possibly one time thereafter, 
they were informed by defendants that the 
defendants intended to repair the floor fur-
nace. 
Plaintiffs based their claim for damages 
on three theories: negligence, breach of 
implied warranty, and strict liability. The 
trial court treated defendants' motion to 
dismiss as one for summary judgment and 
entered a judgment against plaintiffs on 
the ground that as a matter of law plain-
tiffs were not entitled to relief. We re-
verse and remand for trial. 
On this appeal we view the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, Durham v. M&rgetts, Utah, 
571 P.2d 1332 (1977); Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 
(1964). 
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The duty imposed upon landlords by leg-
islative enactment and judicial decree clear-
ly create grounds upon which the allega-
tions in the complaint state a cause of ac-
tion. 
[1] The duty of the landlord to use rea-
sonable care to protect lessees may rest on 
common law principles of negligence. In 
Stephenson v. Warner, Utah, 581 P.2d 567 
(1978), the Court held that a landlord had a 
duty to use reasonable care to prevent the 
occurrence of dangerous conditions. The 
Court stated: 
It is not to be doubted that a landlord is 
bound by the usual standard of exercising 
ordinary prudence and care to see that 
premises he leases are reasonably safe 
and suitable for intended uses, nor that 
under appropriate circumstances he may 
be held liable for injuries caused by any 
defects or dangerous conditions which he 
created, or of which he was aware, and 
which he should reasonably foresee would 
expose others to an unreasonable risk of 
harm. [581 P.2d at 568.] 
[2] In addition, a landlord may be sub-
ject to a duty of care imposed by a statute 
or ordinance. The City of Vernal has 
adopted by ordinance the Uniform Building 
Code, 1976 Edition. Pertinent safety stan-
dards established by the Code are con-
sidered as much a part of a lease as if 
expressed in the contract. Javins v. First 
National Realty Corp., 42S F.2d 1071 (D.C. 
Cir.1970); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 
521 P.2d 304 (1974). 
The principle applies to oral leases, as 
well as written leases. In Steele plaintiff 
entered into a month-to-month oral lease. 
Notwithstanding the oral nature of the 
lease, the court read, by implication, the 
provisions of the City's housing code relat-
ing to minimum housing standards into the 
rental agreement between plaintiff and de-
fendant: 
1. This Court at an early date held that violation 
of a statute or ordinance whose purpose is to 
protect life, limb or property constituted negli-
gence per se. Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply 
Co., 32 Utah 21. 88 P. 683 (1907). 
But the rule has undergone an evolution. 
Subsequent to Smith, the per se rule was modi-
Under familiar legal principles the pro-
visions of the city's housing code relating 
to minimum housing standards were by 
implication read into and became a part 
of the rental agreement between Shirley 
Steele and Marvin E. Latimer. The per-
tinent rule of law is summarized in 17 
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 257, pp. 654-656: 
"It is a general rule that contracting 
parties are presumed to contract in ref-
erence to the existing law; indeed, 
they are presumed to have in mind all 
the existing laws relating to the con-
tact, or to the subject matter thereof. 
Thus, it is commonly said that all exist-
ing applicable or relevant and valid 
statutes, ordinances, regulations, and 
settled law of the land at the time a 
contract is made become a part of it 
and must be read into it just as if an 
express provision to the effect were 
inserted therein, except where the con-
tract discloses a contrary inten-
tion " [Id. at 309-10.] 
This obligation is in accord with the con-
temporary approach toward leased habita-
tions which emphasizes the contractual na-
ture of the relationship between the land-
lord and tenant instead of viewing a lease 
simply as demise of real estate. 
[3] To invoke the rule, a party must 
show (1) the existence of the statute or 
ordinance, (2) that the s tatute or ordinance 
was intended to protect the class of persons 
which includes the party, (3) that the pro-
tection is directed toward the type of harm 
which has in fact occurred as a result of the 
violation, and (4) that the violation of the 
ordinance or statute was a proximate cause 
of the injury complained of. 
[4,5] As a general rule, violation of a 
standard of safety set by a s tatute or ordi-
nance is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence.1 Such a violation may be subject to 
fied to apply only in cases involving dangerous 
instrumentalities. White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 
496. 160 P. 441 (1916). Since the case before 
us does not concern a dangerous instrumentali-
ty, the prima facie, rather than negligence per 
se. rule is applicable. 
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justification or excuse if the defendant's 
conduct could nevertheless be reasonably 
said to fall within "the standard of reasona-
ble care under the circumstances." Thomp-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 33-34, 
395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). Accord, Intermoun-
tain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, Utah, 574 
P.2d 1162 (1978). See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 2a, § 288A (1965), which 
enumerates the following defenses: 
(a) the violation is reasonable because 
of the actor's incapacity; 
(b) he neither knows nor should know 
of the occasion for compliance; 
(c) he is unable after reasonable dili-
gence or care to comply; 
(d) he is confronted by an emergency 
not due to his own misconduct; 
(e) compliance would involve a greater 
risk of harm to the actor or to others. 
[6,7] In the instant case defendants 
contend that they should have been notified 
by plaintiffs if they had a complaint re-
garding the furnace. The record at this 
point does not establish that plaintiff had 
actual knowledge of the defect which 
caused the accident.2 On the other hand, 
plaintiffs allege that defendants, on two 
occasions, expressly notified plaintiffs of 
their intent to repair the furnace. On both 
counts the issues are factual and must be 
tried. 
[8] The summary judgment in the in-
stant case cannot be sustained. The allega-
tions, if proven, may support a claim in 
We note, however, that some jurisdictions 
have held that a violation of a city building 
code constitutes negligence per se. Harbour-
Longmire Building Co. v Carson, 201 Okl. 580, 
208 P.2d 173 (1949). See also Lapp v. Rogers, 
265 Or. 586. 510 P.2d 551 (1973). Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 288B (1965). also recog-
nizes the per se rule: 
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative 
enactment or an administrative regulation 
which is adopted by the court as defining the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is 
negligence in itself. 
The unexcused violation of an enactment or 
regulation which is not so adopted may be 
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negligence. Moreover, the record reveals 
disputed issues of material facts. 
We deem it inappropriate in this case to 
address the issues of whether there is a 
duty on the landlord imposed by implied 
warranty of habitability or strict liability 
because of the abbreviated briefing of these 
issues. 
The judgment is reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
Costs to Appellants. 
HALL and CROCKETT/ JJ., and 
TUCKETT, Retired Justice, concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; TUCKETT, Retired Justice, sat. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
O I KEYNUM8ERSYSTEM SS> 
Stephen F. GRAHAM and Gerald L. 
Jackson, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The Honorable James S. SAWAYA, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, Defendant 
No. 17604. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 6, 1981. 
In original proceeding, plaintiff sought 
issuance of extraordinary writ compelling 
relevant evidence bearing on the issue of neg-
ligent conduct. 
2. Even if plaintiff has actual knowledge of the 
defect, the defendant may still have a duty to 
provide protection regardless of the knowledge 
of the plaintiff. Lapp v. Rogers, 265 Or. 586. 
510 P.2d 551 (1973). Of course, if plaintiff 
knows of the danger and subsequently fails to 
exercise due care, the defense of contributory 
negligence is available. See Jacobsen Con-
struction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc., Utah. 619 P.2d 306 (1980). 
* Crockett. Justice, concurred in this case before 
his retirement. 
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and remand this case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of Associate Chief Justice HOWE. 
o 
rO 
O |«VMUM81RSVST£M> 
Tom HANSEN, an individual; Douglas A. 
Hilton, an individual: Mike MacKin-
tosh. an individual; Bruce Silcox. an 
individual; and Russell Vickers. an in-
dividual. Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
MOUNTAIN F l EL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation: Roger Barrus, an 
individual: Roger Morse, an individual: 
and John Does I through XXV. Defen-
dants and Appellees. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY: 
Roger Barrus. an individual: and Rog-
er Morse, an individual. Third-Party 
Plaintiffs. 
CCI MECHANICAL, INC.. a Utah corpo-
ration (formerly known as Climate 
Control. Inc.). Third-Party Defendant. 
No. 900420. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 4, 1993. 
Renovation workers brought action 
against owner of office building asserting 
ciaims for personal injury, negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and cost of medi-
cal monitoring, arising from alleged expo-
sure to asbestos while performing renova-
tion work at building. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, 
J., entered order of summary judgment 
from which workers appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
evidence was insufficient to establish that 
alleged respiratory symptoms were caused 
by workers' exposure to asbestos at build-
ing, and (2) to recover medical monitoring 
damages, plaintiff must prove exposure to 
toxic substance, which exposure was 
caused by defendant's negligence, resulting 
in increased risk of serious disease, illness, 
or injury for which medical *-est for early 
detection exists and for which early detec-
tion is beneficial, meaning that treatment 
a
xists that can alter course of illness, and 
which test has been prescribed by qualified 
physician according to contemporary scien-
tific principles. 
Affirmed in part, reversed m part, and 
remanded. 
Zimmerman. J . tiled opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in result, in 
-vnich Hall. C.J.. and Howe. Associate C.J., 
and Stewart. J . joined. 
1. Appeal and Error ^=842(1) 
Because cnailenge ~o nummary judg-
ment presents only issues of ,aw, Supreme 
Court gives ao leterence :o trial court's 
conclusions, but instead reviews those con-
tusions for correctness. 
2. Negligence o= 134(11) 
Evidence in renovation workers suit 
against building owner to recover for expo-
sure to asbestos was insufficient to show 
that workers' alleged respiratory symp-
toms were caused bv exposure to asbestos 
at building; evidence included medical tes-
timony that workers exposure was limited 
and perhaps inconsequential, and that 
workers did not show signs of respiratory 
disorders that could be meaningfully relat-
ed to that specific exposure. 
3. Damages <3=>43 
To recover medical monitoring dam-
ages, plaintiff must prove exposure to toxic 
substance, which exposure was caused by 
defendant's negligence, resulting in in-
creased risk of serious disease, illness, or 
injury for which medical test for early de-
tection exists and for which early detection 
is beneficial, meaning that treatment exists 
that can alter course of illness, and which 
test has been prescribed by qualified physi-
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,'ian according to contemporary scientific 
principles. 
4. Damages <s=»43 
For purposes of component of test for 
determining whether to award medicai 
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to 
prove "exposure*' to toxic substance, 'ex-
posure" is defined as ingesting, inhaling, 
•meeting, or otherwise absorbing substance 
n question into body 
See publication Words and Phrases 
tor other judicial 
definitions. 
constructions and 
5. Damages @=43 
For purposes of component of test for 
determining whether to award medical 
monitoring costs, -equinng plaintiff ro 
orove exposure to "*oxic" substance, tox-
c ' is defined by reference *o "poison.' 
vnich in turn is defined as substance rhat 
-hrough its chemical action usuallv kills, 
njures, or impairs organism: substance 
must be *oxic to numans rather than *o 
other forms of life 
See oublication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions ana 
aehmtions. 
<5. Damages s=>13 
For purposes of component of le^t for 
determining whether to award medical 
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to 
prove that exposure to toxic substance re-
sulted m increased risk of serious disease, 
illness, or injury, plaintiff must prove that 
exposure was of sufficient intensity ano/or 
duration to mcrease risk of anticipated 
harm significantly over plaintiff's risk prior 
to exposure; no particular level of quantifi-
cation is necessary to satisfy this require-
ment of significantly increased risk, and 
plaintiff need not prove probability of actu-
ally experiencing toxic consequence of ex-
posure. 
7. Damages <3=>43 
For purposes of component of test for 
determining whether to award medical 
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to 
show that exposure to toxic substance re-
sulted in increased risk of serious illness, 
"serious illness" means illness that in its 
ordinary course may result in significant 
impairment or death. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
tor other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Damages <5=>43 
For purposes of components of test to 
determine whether to award medical moni-
toring costs, requiring plaintiff *o prove 
-hat exposure to toxic substance resulted in 
ncreased risk of serious disease and re-
quiring that medical rest m question must 
lave been prescribed bv qualified physician 
according to contemporary scientific princi-
ples, plaintiff must prove that by reason of 
exposure to toxic substance caused by de-
fendant's negligence, reasonable physician 
vould prescribe for her or him a monitor-
ing regime different rhan one that -vould 
nave been oresenbed m absence of that 
)articular exoosure 
9. Damages ^ 4 3 
Plaintiff may recover damages r'or 
nedical monitoring <*o*»ts oniv <f defen-
iant s wrongful acts ncreased nlaintiff s 
ncremental nsk of ncurnng narm oro-
luced bv :o\ic substance enougn *o -var-
iant cnange m medical monitoring 'hat oth-
erwise would oe oresenbed for rhat plain-
tiff, a change that .vould represent in-
Teased cost to plaintiff: tor example, if 
plaintiff is exposed to -oxic aUDStance in 
arge quantity or for ong duration and 
later is negligently exposed to
 3ame sub-
stance in small quantity or for snort dura-
tion by defendant, there should oe no re-
covery from one causing later exposure if 
it does not change monitoring regime that 
would have been appropriate to plaintiff 
before that exposure. 
10. Damages <3=43 
Under component of test for determin-
ing whether to award medical monitoring 
costs, requiring that advisable medical test-
ing for specific plaintiff must be shown to 
be consistent with contemporary scientific 
principles and reasonably necessary, test 
must be shown by expert testimony to be 
one that reasonable physician in area of 
specialty would order for patient similarly 
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situated, i.e., facing similar risk of same 
serious illness from same cause. 
11. Damages <3=»43 
Only medical monitoring costs found to 
be reasonable and necessary will be com-
pensable in action arising from exposure to 
toxic substance. 
12. Damages <3=>43 
In action arising from exposure to tox-
ic substance, medical monitoring costs are 
recoverable only for duration of latency 
period, if known, of illness in question. 
13. Damages <s=»43 
Remedy of plaintiff alleging need for 
medical monitoring resulting from expo-
sure to toxic substance shouid be limited to 
providing plaintiff with medicai monitoring 
that has been necessitated by the actions of 
-hat defendant; remedy shouid provide for 
cost of medicai monitoring actually re-
ceived by plaintiff, not for damages; trial 
:ourt should not order payment to plaintiff, 
n lump sum or otherwise, or damages rep-
resenting costs of future monitoring. 
14. Damages <3=>43 
Deposits in Court =£=>! 
To assure that plaintiff who establish-
es that exposure to toxic substance result-
ed in need for medical monitoring is provid-
ed only with cost of medical monitoring 
actually received, it is suggested that trial 
court consider court-supervised fund to ad-
minister medical surveillance payments, or, 
in the alternative, it is suggested that de-
fendant might be ordered to pay for insur-
ance to fund plaintiffs future medical mon-
itoring needs: if court establishes trust 
fund and all of it is not used to pay for 
medical monitoring actually incurred by 
plaintiff, remainder should be returned to 
defendant. 
James E. Morton, Ronald C. Wolthuis, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Spencer E. Austin, Gordon L. Roberts, 
William J. Evans, Ray G. Groussman, 
Charles E. Greenhawt, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants. 
DURHAM. Justice: 
Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos while 
performing renovation work for Mountain 
Fuel. They appeal from an order of sum-
man* judgment on their claims for personal 
injury, negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and the costs of medical monitoring 
granted on the ground that plaintiffs have 
not suffered bodily injury. We reverse the 
order regarding the claims for medical 
monitoring but affirm the rulings on per-
sonal injury and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. 
[11 In reviewing a summary- judgment, 
we consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. We af-
firm only when there is no material issue of 
disputed fact and the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. D & 
L Supply r. Saunm. 775 P.2d 420. 421 
•Utan 1989). Further, because a challenge 
to a summary jud^mtnt presents only is-
sues of law. we give no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions: -nstead. we re-
view those conclusions for correctness. 
Bonham >\ Morgan. 788 P.2d 497. 499 
(Utah 1990) (per curiam). 
Plaintiffs Hansen. Hilton, MacKintosh, 
Silcox. and Vickers were employees of CCI 
Mechanical. Inc. ("CCI"). CCI had con-
tracted with Mountain Fuel to do renova-
tion work in the basement of Mountain 
Fuel's downtown Salt Lake City office. 
The project included rerouting asbestos-in-
sulated piping and equipment. As part of 
the project, brick insulation was removed 
from a breach in the basement area and 
piled nearby: it was later moved and 
stacked in an adjacent walkway. Some-
time in August 1986, plaintiffs expressed 
concern about the composition of the insu-
lation. A Mountain Fuel representative 
told the CCI foreman that the insulation 
was not asbestos, that all the asbestos in 
the area had been removed seven years 
earlier, and that it was a harmless sub-
stance, calcium silicate. During plaintiffs' 
work, the insulation was crushed and 
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tracked through the work site.1 Because 
of some ventilation problems, the particles 
became airborne and the workers had to 
take periodic breaks to clean the dust from 
their noses and mouths. In November 
1986, Vickers agam expressed concern to 
defendant Roger Barrus, the safety di-
rector for Mountain Fuel, that the insula-
tion might be asbestos. Barrus had the 
material tested and learned that it was 60-
>)5 percent amosite asbestos and less than 1 
percent crysotile asDestos. Mountain Fuei 
subsequently had the asbestos removed 
from the project. 
Plaintiffs allege that they experienced 
coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, 
chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye 
irritation as a result of their exposure. 
They also claim that they suffered anxiety 
and sleeplessness stemming from their fear 
)i contracting serious diseases as a result 
)f their exposure to asbestos. None of 
them currently suffer from any asbestos-
related disease. Aside from initial exami-
nations that revealed no illness that could 
be traced to their exposure, plaintiffs have 
had no further medical examinations, nor 
have they incurred any medicai expenses or 
-:iaimea lost wages or income as a result of 
tneir exposure. 
I. CURRENT INJURY 
[2] Plaintiffs first contend that their ex-
posure to asbestos resulted in "severe 
coughing, respiratory distress, chest tight-
ness, headaches, severe eye irritations and 
nausea" and that they should be compen-
sated for those injuries.2 They have not 
presented sufficient evidence, however, to 
show that these symptoms were caused by 
their exposure at Mountain Fuel. In 1987, 
Hansen. Hilton. Silcox, and Vickers were 
examined by Dr. Battigelli at the Occupa-
tional Clinic for the Department of Family 
1. Apparently, none of the plaintiffs participated 
in the actual removal of the insulation. 
2. Although some courts have recognized that 
significant exposure, standing alone, is a suffi-
cient injury to maintain a claim for enhanced 
risk of future disease, see, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th 
Cir.1985), plaintiffs have specifically conceded 
that they are not pursuing a claim under this 
and Preventive Medicine at the University 
of Utah. After the examination, Dr. Batti-
gelli concluded that plaintiffs' exposure 
was "limited and perhaps inconsequential" 
and that "[n]one of these individuals pre-
sented at our examination evidence of res-
piratory disorders which could be meaning-
fully related to that specific exposure." 
We have found no other evidence in the 
record regarding any illness or symptoms 
suffered by MacKintosh. Thus we have 
nothing more than plaintiffs' bare allega-
tions to support their claims of narm. 
Such allegations are insufficient to with-
stand summary judgment. See Thornock 
". Cook. 604 P.2d 934. 936 (Utah 1979). 
Plaintiffs may, of course, bring another 
action if and when they do develop a seri-
ous disease as a result of their exposure. 
Defendants nave conceded that pursuant to 
the discovery rule, the statute of limita-
tions wouid not bar such a future claim. 
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS : 
)F 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs can-
not recover tor negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress ("NIED") because they have 
not demonstrated that their emotional dis-
tress resulted in illness or bodily harm. 
We have never squarelv considered wheth-
er a plaintiff seeking recovery for NIED 
must demonstrate that the emotional dis-
tress has manifested itself in physical 
symptoms. 
In Johnson r. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 
1988), we first recognized an action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In Johnson, the plaintiff and his eight-
year-old son were waiting at a crosswalk 
when a truck jumped the curb, injuring the 
plaintiff and killing his son. The plaintiff 
theory. But see Ayers v. Township of Jackson. 
106 NJ . 557, 525 A.2d 287, 304-08 (1987) (de-
clining to recognize cause of action for unquan-
tified enhanced risk of disease). Therefore, we 
do not address the merits of such an action. 
3. The discussion in this section does not repre-
sent the views of a majority of the court. See 
Justice Zimmerman's opinion concurring in 
part and concurring in the result. 
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claimed damages for the emotional distress 
suffered as a result of the incident This 
court sustained the plaintiff's cause of ac 
tion and adopted the approach set forth in 
section 313(2) of the Second Restatement of 
Torts (the "zone of danger" rule) for deter 
mining liability for the negligent infliction 
of emotional distress Johnson, 763 P 2d 
at 785 Section 313 provides 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes 
emotional distress to another he is sub 
ject to liability to the other for resulting 
illness or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his con 
duct involved an unreasonable risk of 
causing the distress otherwise than by 
knowledge of the harm or penl of a third 
person, and 
(b) from facts known to him should 
have realized that the distress if it were 
caused might result m illness or bodilv 
harm 
(2) The rule stated in subsection 1) 
has no application to illness or bodilv 
harm of another which is caused bv emo-
tional distress arising solel) from harm 
or peril to a third person, unless the 
negligence of the actor has otherwise 
created an unreasonable nsk of bodily 
harm to the other 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965) 
In Johnson, we were primarily concerned 
with the application of the rule outlined in 
subsection (2) In the instant case, plain-
tiffs are not seeking recoverv for trauma 
inflicted on them because of harm or peril 
to one nearby, plaintiffs allege that they 
themselves inhaled asbestos 4 See John-
son, 763 P2d at 781-82 (opinion of Dur 
ham, J ) (discussing distinction between by 
stander and direct victim NIED) Thus 
subsection (1), rather than subsection (2), 
applies to this case Subsection (1) pro-
vides liability only for "resulting illness or 
4. In some cases, a plaintiff may be eligible to 
recover for NIED although no one in the case 
was subject to bodily harm See Hanke v Glob 
al Van Lines, Inc, 533 F2d 396 400 (8th Cir 
1976) (moving company that delayed delivery of 
plaintiffs goods for 100 days after repeatedly 
assuring her that delivery was imminent could 
be subject to NIED action) In that event, a 
bodily harm" Defendants contend that 
plaintiffs do not meet this requirement 
Most courts require some sort of injury 
or physical manifestation of distress as a 
prerequisite to recovery for NIED See, 
eg, Keck v Jackson, 122 Ariz 114, 593 
P2d 668, 669 (1979), Brown v Cadillac 
Motor Car Div, 468 So 2d 903, 904 (Fla 
1985), Brown v Matthews Mortuary, Inc, 
801 P2d 37, 42 (Idaho 1990), Payton v 
Abbott Labs 386 Mass 540, 437 N E 2d 
171 178-80 (Mass 1982), Thorpe v De-
partment of Corrections, 133 N H 299, 
575 A 2d 351 353 (1990) Such a require-
ment provides a check on feigned distur-
bances, thereby ensuring the genuineness 
of claims Moreover, emotional distur-
bance that is not severe enough to result in 
illness or physical consequences is likely to 
be in the realm of the trivial Such a 
disturbance is likelv to be so temporary 
and subjective that to attempt to compen-
sate it would undulv burden detendants 
and the courts See Restatement (Second) 
ot Torts § 43bA cmt b (1965) Payton, 437 
\ E 2d at 178-79 (citing the Restatement) 
Although many courts agree that a plain-
tiff must establish some accompanying 
phvsical manifestation in order to recover 
for MED thev differ widel) regarding the 
nature of evidence sufficient to establish 
such harm See e g DeStorxes v City of 
Phoenix, 154 Ariz 604, 744 P 2d 705, 710 
(Ct App 1987) (defining standard for injury 
as 'physical harm or medically identifiable 
effect"), Cathcart v Keene Indus Insula-
tion, 324 Pa Super 123, 471 A 2d 493, 508 
(1984) (same), Laxton v Orkin Extermi-
nating Co, 639 SW2d 431, 434 (Tenn 
1982) (recognizing ingestion of frightening 
or noxious substance as sufficient physical 
injury) The language used in section 313 
of the Restatement provides some guid-
ance Subsection (1) allows recovery for 
'illness or bodily harm" Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 313(1) (1965) (emphasis 
foreseeabihty test as outlined in subsection (1) 
of section 313 would be appropriate to evaluate-
liability The plaintiffs in the instant case, how-
ever, were exposed to bodily injury I would 
leave to a future case the parameters of a pure 
foreseeabihty test but I note that such a test is 
appropriate under subsection (1) 
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added) The drafters' use of 'or' rather 
than 'and" shows an intention to allow a 
plaintiff to recover not only where bodily 
harm results from emotional trauma, but 
where "illness" results as well 'Illness" 
is 'an unhealthy condition of body or 
mind ' Webster's New Collegiate Dictio-
nary 566 (1981) From this we conclude 
that either physical or mental illness may 
support the NIED cause of action 
A rule allowing recovery for mental ill-
ness as well as physical injury serves a 
major purpose of the injury requirement-
ensuring genuineness of claims Given re-
cent medical advances in the fields of psy-
chiatry and psychology, it is now possible 
to establish emotional illness3 with some 
degree of certainty See Terry M Dwor 
km, Fear oj Disease and Delayed Manifes-
tation Injuries A Solution or a Pando-
ras Box? 53 Fordham L Rev 527, 532-33 
(1984) A plaintiff who can establish 
through appropriate expert testimony that 
he or she suffers from mental illness as a 
result of a defendants negligent conduct 
may maintain an action for MED 
We emphasize, however that the emo-
tional distress suffered must be severe it 
must be such that 'a reasonable [person ] 
normally constituted would be unable to 
adequatelv cope with the mental stress en 
gendered by the circumstances of the 
case ' Rodngues v State 52 Haw 156 
472 P 2d 509 520 (1970), see also Molten v 
Kaiser Found Hosp, 27 Cal 3d 916, 167 
Cal Rptr 831, 836-39 616 P 2d 813, 818-21 
(Cal 1980) Further, in cases such as this, 
which deal with emotional distress result 
ing from fear of developing a disease in the 
future, the fact finder should also consider 
the likelihood that the disease will actually 
occur in determining the reasonableness of 
the fear Potter v Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co, 15 Cal App 4th 490, 274 Cal Rptr 
885, 893 (Ct App 1990) The fact finder 
should further consider the duration and 
nature of the exposure to the toxic sub-
5 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the 
American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III), 
which catalogues mental illnesses, is the most 
authoritative reference on the subject It repre 
sents the current consensus of the professional 
community diagnosing mental illness 
stance Such requirements will ensure 
that defendants and the courts face only 
cases involving serious emotional distress 
Given that almost everyone is exposed 
from time to time to toxic substances in 
one form or another it is important that 
only those who have had significant expo-
sure leading to serious emotional distress 
recover for NIED 
The plaintiffs m the instant case fail to 
meet the above standards as a matter of 
law They allege only that thev suffered 
transitorv anxiety and sleeplessness as a 
result of their exposure to asbestos Such 
symptoms do not constitute illness or mju 
ry within the meaning of section 313(1) 
Everyone must deal with stress and an\i 
ety in daily life most of us experience 
occasional sleeplessness Transitory sleep-
lessness and anxietv do not amount to the 
type of emotional distress with which a 
reasonable person normally constituted 
would be unable to cope See Burns v 
Jaquays Mining Corp 156 Ariz 375 752 
P2d 28 32 (AnzCt App 1988) (headaches 
depression and insomnia are onlv transi 
tory physical phenomena' and are not the 
type of phvsical injurv that would sustain 
the NIED action) Plaintiffs have not prof 
fered any ev idence indicating that their dis 
tress is sufficiently severe to constitute 
mental illness nor do we have evidence 
that their distress has resulted in physical 
symptoms Plaintiffs mere unsubstantiat 
ed opinions that they have suffered severe 
anxiety as a result of their exposure do not 
create a triable issue of fact that would 
withstand summary judgment Conse 
quently, their claims for NIED fail 
III MEDICAL MONITORING 
A Introduction 
Plaintiffs also claim that they are enti-
tled to medical monitoring damages as a 
result of their exposure to asbestos 6 They 
6. To prevent confusion we wish to point out 
that the claim for medical monitoring damages 
is separate and distinct from recovery for the 
enhanced nsk of contracting a serious illness 
due to exposure See supra note 2 For a 
thoughtful comparison of the two claims see 
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contend that because they have been ex-
posed, they must undergo periodic medical 
tests to facilitate early diagnosis and treat-
ment of diseases stemming from their ex-
posure. They contend that but for their 
exposure to asbestos, they would not be 
obligated to incur these additional medical 
expenses and that defendants are obligated 
to compensate them. Defendants counter 
that plaintiffs have proffered no medical 
evidence showing that they require any-
thing more than routine health mainte-
nance. 
Plaintiffs' claim presents a question of 
first impression in Utah; however, many 
other jurisdictions have recognized the le-
gitimacy of medical surveillance damages 
for toxic-tort plaintiffs.7 Two common law 
principles underlie the theory of a plain-
tiffs right to recover medical monitoring 
expenses. Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical 
Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the 
Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort 
Victims, 63 Ind.LJ. 849, 863-64 (1988) 
[hereinafter Slagel]. First, the doctrine of 
"avoidable consequences" mandates that 
the plaintiff submit to medically advisable 
treatment. Failure to do so may destroy 
the plaintiffs right to recover for a condi-
tion that he or she could have thereby 
avoided or alleviated. See Hagerty v. L. & 
L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 
(5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 797 
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). Second, the rule 
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 
A.2d 287. 297-313 (1987). 
While judicial recognition of the enhanced-
nsk cause of action has been infrequent, at least 
one commentator advocates the need for a 
growing acceptance of the claim and suggests 
that the trend has begun. See generally Knsten 
Chapin, Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health 
Data, and the Evolving Common Law: Compen-
sation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. 
Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 129 (1993) 
[hereinafter Chapin]. 
7. For discussions of medical monitoring claims, 
see Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance 
Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compen-
sation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind.LJ. 849 
(1988) [hereinafter Slagel]; Leslie S. Gara, Com-
ment, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using 
Common Sense and the Common Law to Miti-
gate the Dangers Posed By Environmental Haz-
ards, 12 Harv.Entl.L.Rev. 265 (1988). 
allowing prospective medical damages sup-
ports a plaintiffs right to recover for rea-
sonably anticipated medical expenses, in-
cluding periodic diagnostic examinations: 
" 'A plaintiff ordinarily may recover rea-
sonable medical expenses, past and future, 
which he incurs as a result of a demon-
strated injury.'" Id. (quoting C. McCor-
mick, The Law of Damages § 90 (1935)); 
see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 
N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 310 (NJ.1987). 
Thus, medical surveillance damages pro-
mote early diagnosis and treatment of dis-
ease or illness resulting from exposure to 
toxic substances caused by a tort-feasor's 
negligence. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311. 
Allowing recovery for such expenses 
avoids the potential injustice of forcing an 
economically disadvantaged person to pay 
for expensive diagnostic examinations ne-
cessitated by another's negligence. In-
deed, in many cases a person will not be 
able to afford such tests, and refusing to 
allow medical monitoring damages would in 
effect deny him or her access to potentially 
life-saving treatment. It also affords toxic-
tort victims, for whom other sorts of recov-
ery may prove difficult/ immediate com-
pensation for medical monitoring needed as 
a result of exposure. Additionally, it fur-
thers the deterrent function of the tort 
system by compelling those who expose 
others to toxic substances to minimize risks 
and costs of exposure. Slagel at 869. Al-
8. Other forms of recovery are often unattaina-
ble for persons exposed to toxic substances, 
largely because the phvsical injury resulting 
from the exposure usually does not emerge for 
many years. If a plaintiff sues immediately 
after exposure, he or sne faces the nearly insur-
mountable task of proving the exact nature and 
extent of the injury suffered and the certainty of 
developing the feared disease in the distant fu-
ture. Conversely, a plaintiff who waits until the 
disease develops bears the burden of demon-
strating that exposure many years earlier caused 
the illness. Further, even tf the plaintiff can 
establish causation, the responsible parties may 
be difficult to locate or bankrupt by the time the, 
illness develops. The defendant may also claim 
that a statute of limitations or repose bars the* 
plaintiffs action. Consequently, toxic-tort 
plaintiffs face significant obstacles to recovery* 
See generally Slagel at 852-56; Chapin at 129-33 
(describing the barriers to recovery toxic-tort 
victims face under traditional tort rules). 
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lowing such recovery is also in harmony 
with "the important public health interest 
in fostering access to medical testing for 
individuals whose exposure to toxic chemi-
cals creates an enhanced risk of disease." 
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311. 
Despite these policy arguments, some 
contend that medical monitoring should be 
allowed only for those able to show actual, 
present, physical injury. Because of the 
latent nature of most diseases resulting 
from exposure to toxic substances, howev-
er, most toxic-tort plaintiffs cannot estab-
lish an immediate physical injury of the 
type contemplated in traditional tort ac-
tions. Slagel at 859-60: Kristen Chapin, 
Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health 
Data, and the Evolving Common Law: 
Compensation for Increased Risk of Fu-
ture Injury, 13 J. Energy Nat. Resources 
& Envtl. L. 129, 134 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chapin]. Instead, the physical injury re-
sulting from exposure to toxic substances 
usually manifests itself years after expo-
sure. Although the physical manifesta-
tions of an injury may not appear for 
years, the reality is that many of those 
exposed have suffered some legal detri-
ment; the exposure itself and the concomi-
tant need for medical testing constitute the 
injury. See, e.g., Friends For All Chil-
dren, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 
F.2d 816, 826 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("it is difficult 
to dispute that an individual has an interest 
in avoiding expensive diagnostic examina-
tions just as he or she has an interest in 
avoiding physical injury."); Slagel at 864-
65. This conclusion is consistent with the 
definition of "injury" in the Restatement of 
Torts. Friends, 746 F.2d at 826 (discuss-
ing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7). 
Courts have recognized that claims for 
medical monitoring implicate injuries or 
detriments warranting recovery. For ex-
ample, in Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 12 
Cal.App. 4th 28, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 574 
(Ct.App.1993),9 the California Court of Ap-
peal construed the term "detriment" in its 
9. The California Supreme Court has recently 
granted review of the Miranda decision. Mi-
randa v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 608. 847 
P.2d 574 (1993). Under California law, the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal is superseded by 
damages statute as including a "demon-
strated need to undergo future medical 
monitoring as a result of exposure to tox-
ins." The court analogized a toxic-tort vic-
tim to an automobile-accident victim who 
suffers no visible injury but undergoes 
medically necessary testing to diagnose po-
tential internal injuries. Just as that plain-
tiff is entitled to recover costs, so is the 
toxic-tort victim: "The outcome should be 
the same when the operative incident is 
toxic exposure rather than collision and the 
potential future harm is disease rather 
than physical impairment." Id. at 572 (ci-
tation omitted). 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia applied similar 
reasoning to a cause of action for medical 
monitoring in Friends. 746 F.2d at 816-38. 
Friends involved the crash of an airplane 
carrying orphans leaving Vietnam during 
the 1975 evacuation. The complaint al-
leged that the decompression and impact of 
the crash caused 149 surviving children to 
suffer minimal brain dysfunction, a neuro-
logical brain disorder. Because of delays 
in the trial, the court invited motions for 
summary judgment on the defendants' lia-
bility for diagnostic examinations and medi-
cal treatment. After considering the mo-
tions, the trial court ordered Lockheed to 
create a fund to pay for diagnostic exami-
nations. The court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that a reasonable need for medical 
examinations is compensable, even absent 
proof of other injury. The court stated: 
To aid our analysis of whether tort law 
should encompass a cause of action for 
diagnostic examinations without proof of 
actual injury, it is useful to step back 
from the complex, multi-party setting of 
the present case and hypothesize a sim-
ple, everyday accident involving two indi-
viduals, whom we shall identify simply as 
Smith and Jones: 
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike 
which Smith is riding through a red 
the grant of review and consequently has no 
precedential value in California. However, we 
remain persuaded by its reasoning and adopt it 
to the extent noted above. 
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light. Jones lands on his head with 
some force. Understandably shaken, 
Jones enters a hospital where doctors 
recommend that he undergo a battery 
of tests to determine whether he has 
suffered any internal head injuries. 
The tests prove negative, but Jones 
sues Smith solely for what turns out to 
be the substantial cost of the diagnos-
tic examinations. 
From our example, it is clear that even 
in the absence of physical injury Jones 
ought to be able to recover the cost for 
the various diagnostic examinations prox-
imately caused by Smith's negligent ac-
tion. A cause of action allowing recov-
ery for the expense of diagnostic exami-
nations recommended by competent phy-
sicians will, in theory, deter misconduct, 
whether it be negligent motorbike riding 
or negligent aircraft manufacture. The 
cause of action also accords with com-
,_i monly shared intuitions of normative jus-
•^ tice which underlie the common law of 
Q tort. The motorbike rider, through his 
W negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the 
^_ opinion of medical experts, to need spe-
(jl cific medical services—a cost that is nei-
ther inconsequential nor of a kind the 
community generally accepts as part of 
the wear and tear of daily life. Under 
these principles of tort law. the motorbik-
er should pay. 
Friends, 746 F.2d at 825. 
We agree with the analyses in Friends 
and Miranda and apply them to both initial 
diagnostic examinations and recurring med-
ical monitoring. A plaintiff forced to incur 
the cost of medical monitoring as a result 
of a defendant's negligent conduct should 
be entitled to compensation for those ex-
penses. Mere exposure to an allegedly 
harmful substance, however, is not enough 
for recovery. Courts have set forth sever-
al criteria for determining whether a plain-
tiff is entitled to recover the costs of medi-
cal monitoring. Such criteria prevent un-
necessary litigation and unwarranted re-
coveries. By imposing these requirements 
on plaintiffs, courts seek to ensure that 
only those plaintiffs who need monitoring 
above and beyond basic medical care will 
recover costs. Miranda, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d at 
574. We will examine some of the ap-
proaches used and then outline the criteria 
necessary to maintain a cause of action for 
medical monitoring in Utah. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
The New Jersey Supreme Court consid-
ered a medical monitoring claim in Ayers, 
where the plaintiffs' well water was con-
taminated by toxic pollutants. The plain-
tiffs were awarded medical surveillance 
damages in response to proof of increased 
risk of cancer and other diseases. 525 A.2d 
at 308-13. The court held that medical 
surveillance damages are appropriate when 
a plaintiff can establish that monitoring is 
reasonable and necessary, stating: 
[W]e hold that the cost of medical sur-
veillance is a compensable item of dam-
ages where the proofs demonstrate, 
through reliable expert testimony predi-
cated upon the significance and extent of 
exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the 
chemicals, the seriousness of the dis-
eases for which the individuals are at 
risk, the relative increase in the chance 
of onset of disease in those exposed, and 
the value of early diagnosis, that such 
surveillance to monitor the effect of ex-
posure to toxic chemicals is reasonable 
and necessary. 
Id. at 312; see also Miranda, 15 Cal. 
Rptr.2d at 572-73 (discussing same factors 
for recovery); Habitants Against Landfill 
Toxicants v. City of York, 15 Envtl.L.Rep. 
(Envtl.L.Inst.) 20937 (Pa.Ct.C.P. York Co. 
May 20, 1985) (upholding "necessary" med-
ical surveillance damages). 
A federal district court in Pennsylvania 
articulated similar criteria in Merry v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 684 F.Supp. 
847 (M.D.Pa.1988). Under the Merry test, 
a plaintiff must establish "(1) exposure to 
hazardous substances; (2) the potential for 
injury; and (3) the need for early detection 
and treatment" to recover medical monitor-
ing expenses. Id. at 850; see also In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 
852 (3d Cir.1990) (outlining medical moni-
toring criteria). 
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C. Utah Test for Recovery of Medical 
Monitoring Damages 
[3] The Ayers and Merry standards are 
instructive as we formulate our own stan-
dard. Building on the foundation they pro-
vide, we establish the following test for 
Utah courts to use in determining whether 
to award medical monitoring costs. To re-
cover medical monitoring damages under 
Utah law, a plaintiff must prove the follow-
ing: ,0 
(1) exposure 
(2) to a toxic substance, 
(3) which exposure was caused by the 
defendant's negligence, 
(4) resulting in an increased risk 
(5) of a serious disease, illness, or injury 
(6) for which a medical test for early 
detection exists 
(7) and for which early detection is bene-
ficial, meaning that a treatment exists 
that can alter the course of the illness, 
(8) and which test has been prescribed 
by a qualified physician according to 
contemporary scientific principles. 
[4,5] First, the plaintiff must prove ex-
posure, which we define as ingesting, inhal-
ing, injecting, or otherwise absorbing the 
substance in question into the body. Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must prove that the sub-
stance to which he or she was exposed is 
"toxic." We take our definition from the 
dictionary, which defines toxic by referring 
to "poison," a word that in turn is defined 
as "a substance that through its chemical 
action usually kills, injures, or impairs an 
organism." Webster's New Collegiate Dic-
tionary 881 (1981). We note that the sub-
stance must be toxic to humans rather than 
to other forms of life. Third, the plaintiff 
10. Proof of these elements will usually require 
expert testimony. See Slagel at 872. 
11. One commentator has suggested that govern-
ment data may provide toxic-tort plaintiffs with 
an inexpensive and convenient source of proof 
of increased risk. See Chapin at 148-57. 
12. Of course, if a test is later developed that will 
detect the disease, a plaintiff would retain the 
right to demonstrate at some later date the 
effectiveness of the test and be compensated for 
must prove that the exposure to the toxic 
substance was caused by the defendant's 
negligence, i.e., by the breach of a duty 
owed to the plaintiff. 
[6] Fourth, the plaintiff must prove 
that the exposure was of sufficient intensi-
ty and/or duration to increase his or her 
risk of the anticipated harm significantly 
over the plaintiffs risk prior to exposure. 
No particular level of quantification is nec-
essary to satisfy this requirement of signif-
icantly increased risk. We reemphasize 
what should be apparent from our earlier 
discussion: Because the injury in question 
is the increase in risk that requires one to 
incur the cost of monitoring, the plaintiff 
need not prove that he or she has a proba-
bility of actually experiencing the toxic con-
sequence of the exposure. It is sufficient 
that the plaintiff show the requisite in-
creased risk.11 
[7] Fifth, the plaintiff must prove that 
the illness, the risk of which has been in-
creased by exposure to the toxin, is a seri-
ous one. By this we mean an illness that 
in its ordinary course may result in signifi-
cant impairment or death. 
Sixth, the plaintiff must prove that a test 
exists for detecting the onset of the illness 
before it would be apparent to the layper-
son. If no such test exists, then periodic 
monitoring is pointless and no cause of 
action for monitoring exists.12 In such a 
situation, the potential plaintiff is not 
harmed until the onset of the actual illness. 
At that time, he or she can bring an action 
for actual injury.13 
Seventh, the plaintiff must prove that 
the periodic administration of the existing 
test would be beneficial to him or her, i.e., 
that a treatment exists that is more effec-
utilizing it, if all other elements of the cause of 
action are present. 
13. The statute of limitations certainly will not 
run on a cause of action when a critical element 
of that cause, actual injury, has yet to evidence 
itself. See Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868. 869 
(Utah 1990); cf. Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 
786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (striking down 
statute of repose barring workers' compensation 
for asbestosis victim as violative of open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution). 
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tive in curing or ameliorating the conse 
quences of the illness if administered be-
fore the onset of the illness becomes appar 
•mt to a layperson \gain unless a treat 
ment is available that would be more bene-
ficial to the plaintiff if administered before 
he illness becomes obvious then there is 
no cause of action because medical monitor 
ng cannot fulfill its purpose The plaintiff 
can await the onset ot the illness to ->ue 
Eighth it is not enough that early detec 
ion and treatment are shown to be theoret 
callv beneficial It also must be shown 
hat administration of the test to a specific 
olaintiff is medically advisable tor that 
olamtiff To illustrate a monitoring re 
gime might be of theoretical value in de 
ecting and treating a particular illness but 
f a reasonable phvsician would not ore-
scribe it for a particular plaintiff because 
he benefits of the monitoring would oe 
)utweighed b> the costs which ma\ n 
lude among )ther things the burdensome 
requencv A the monitoring procedure ts 
2 excessive price :>r ts risk or iarm to he 
^ jatient hen reco\er\ would not be al 
trj owed This conrorms with he fact hat 
he substantive injurv being remedied is 
^ he defendant s significantlv increasing rhe 
olamtiff N risk of harm so that the plaintiff 
must near medical monitoring expenses 
\bsent the advisabilit\ )f monitoring ^ r 
hat particular plaintiff the injury is not 
omplete ind no cause of action exists A.s 
s the case where a test or a treatment does 
not exist the plaintiff mav sue when and if 
the illness occurs 
[8,9] A. word about the interaction of 
he eighth and fourth elements is warrant 
ed The fourth element requires proof that 
he exposure caused by the defendants 
negligence significantly increased the plain 
iff s risk over whatever level of risk exist 
ed before that exposure The eighth ele 
ment requires a showing that monitoring is 
not only theoretically beneficial for earlv 
detection and treatment of the harm for 
which the plaintiff is more at risk, but that 
the monitoring is medically advisable for 
that plaintiff In operation these two ele 
ments require a particular plaintiff to 
prove that bv reason of the exposure to the 
toxic substance caused by the defendants 
negligence a reasonable physician would 
prescnbe tor her or him a monitoring re-
gime different than the one that would 
hav e been prescribed in the absence of that 
particular exposure George W C McCar 
er Medical Sue-Veillance A History 
ind Critique of the Medical Monitoring 
Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation 45 Rut 
gers L Rev 227 266-67 (1993) [hereinafter 
McCarter] This is because under this 
cause }f action a plaintiff may recover 
mlv if the defendant s ^rongtul acts in 
reased the Dlaintiff s incremental risk of 
ncurnng he harm produced bv the toxic 
substance enough to warrant a change in 
rhe medical monitoring that otherwise 
.vould be prescribed for that plaintiff a 
thange that would represent increased 
osts 'o the olamtiff For example if the 
plaintiff is exposed to i toxic substance in 
arge quantities or for a long duration and 
ater s neghgentlv exposed to the same 
instance in I mail quantitv )r ^or a short 
Juration b\ he lefendant there hould be 
10 rpco\en, mm he me causing the later 
x^DOsure it it ioes not oninge the monitor 
ng regime that would have been appropn 
ate ro the olamtiff before that exposure 
That oerson or entitv would not have 
aused the Dlaintiff to incur i monitoring 
->\Dense that he or she would not otherwise 
nave nad and the elements of the ause of 
action would not be complete 
[101 We emphasize that the advisable 
medical testing tor a specific plaintiff must 
be shown to be consistent with contempo-
rary scientific principles and reasonably 
necessar> Ayers 525 A 2d at 309 We 
theretore require not only that a doctor 
prescribe the test for this plaintiff but also 
that the test is shown by expert testimony 
to be one a reasonable physician in the area 
of specialty would order for a patient simi 
larly situated 1 e , facing a similar nsk of 
the same serious illness from the same 
cause Cf Slagel at 875 ("[Defendant 
should not be required to provide the plain 
tiff with untried tests of speculative val 
ue ') This dual requirement prevents re-
covery for costs of treatment not generally 
accepted by the medical community 
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[11,12] Guiding this entire inquirv ot 
course is the general requirement that 
compensation for medical expenses m a 
ort action be reasonable and necessary 
Lharles J McCormick Handbook on the 
Law of Damages § 90 at 323-27 (1935) 1 
Jacob \ Stem Stein on Personal Injury 
Damages §§ 5 1-5 3 (2d ed 1991) See 
generally 22 Am Jur 2d Damages §§ 197-
206 (1988) That is only medical monitor 
ing costs found to be reasonable and neces 
3arv will be compensable This require 
Tient adds vet another check to ensure rhat 
mlv meritorious claims are compensated 
and also demonstrates that this measure )t 
damages is entirelv consistent with basic 
tort principles Fmallv medical monitoring 
costs are recoverable onlv tor the duration 
ot the latency period if known ot the 
illness in question McCarter at 261 
D Application of the Medical 
Monitoring Test 
In granting letendants motion tor >um 
man udgment in this case the trial ourt 
based ts ruling m he ground that io 
bodilv njurv has been manifested n an\ 
plaintiff In so ruling the trial court lp 
plied what we now determine to be the 
wrong legal standard Having articulated 
the orrect legal standard ve vacate he 
aumman judgment and remand for turther 
proceedings consistent with this opinion 
In so doing we acknowledge that olain 
tiffs have not as yet protfered sutficient 
evidence to establish the criteria outlined 
above For example under our medical 
monitoring cause of action plaintiffs an 
recover only if medical monitoring is adus 
able as a result of their exposure Howev 
er the only evidence offered below by 
plaintiffs on this point was a letter trom 
Dr Battigelli who examined Hansen Hil 
ton Silcox and Vickers at the Occupational 
Clinic for the Department of Family and 
Preventive Medicine The letter states 
In summary we conclude that the expo 
sure experienced by these workers while 
working at the Mountain Fuel Supply 
building throughout the 6 months of 
their employment there, was limited and 
perhaps inconsequential This statement 
is based on the following grounds 
2 The duration of exposure albeit 
leplorable in its lack of warning and 
absence of personal protective equip-
ment was admittedly limited in intensit\ 
and duration 
3 The workers by and large denied 
acute bouts )t coughing chocking [sic] 
and related symptoms which would sug 
.jest overwhelming exposure—nor do the 
procedures [used bv the vorkers] sug 
.jest a large and intense generation n 
Just 
4 It is impossible for us to dismiss 
entirely the claim these workers present 
relating adverse etfects ot this exposure 
netting to heir health However the 
v.onsequences[ ] if anv will ippear n 
ears to come—tifteen and twentv vears 
n tact usuailv elapse between exposure 
o asbestos and significant adverse et 
ects There is no iay to eithu intui 
pate heir yccurrente )r o tismiss t 
utoatther it his ime 
) This examination may be followed 
n two or three vears with repeat hest <. 
"avs tor exclusion >l asbestos effect) 
Emphasis added i The suggestion in para 
^rapn h that plaintilfs mav ->eeK chest v 
ravs in wo or hree vears o exclude as 
otstos etfects is simplv not enough to with 
tand summarv judgment as o^ the medical 
advisabiht\ element Indeed is he em 
Dhasized portion ot he letter ndicates 
rather than stating that medical monitoring 
is advisable the tetter mav impiv that med 
ical monitoring is in tact unnecessary 
Having acknowledged that plaintiffs 
showing below was insufficient we think 
that in light ot the unsettled state of the 
law 3n medical monitoring in Ltah the 
only fair course is to remand this matter to 
permit plaintiffs to attempt to meet the 
newly articulated standard This is espe 
cially so since plaintiffs claimed in their 
final motion before the trial court that dis 
covery was incomplete and represented to 
the court that further medical consultation 
was anticipated If after a fair opportuni 
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ty, plaintiffs cannot satisfy the standard 
we articulate today, their claim should fail. 
E. Remedy 
[13,141 We add a final note on remedy. 
Should plaintiffs in this or any other medi-
cal monitoring case present a valid claim, 
the remedy should be limited to providing 
each plaintiff with the medical monitoring 
:hat has been necessitated by the actions of 
that defendant. This requires a word of 
explanation. 
Because the cause of action we craft 
today provides a remedy for a plaintiffs 
need to incur future costs for medically 
advisable monitoring—a need caused by 
the defendant's negligence—and because 
iDsent an actual need for monitoring, no 
recovery can be had, the remedy should 
provide for the cost of medical monitoring 
actually received by the plaintiff, not for 
lamages. For if monitoring is not actually 
provided to the plaintiff, rhen a significant 
theoretical element of his or her injury is 
missing, as our discussion ibove makes 
Diam. 
Although trial courts have ample equita-
ble powers to assure that this remedy is 
provided, we suggest consideration of a 
court-supervised fund to administer medi-
cal surveillance payments. In the alterna-
tive, a defendant might be ordered to pay 
for insurance to fund the plaintiff's future 
medical monitoring needs. See Ayers, 525 
A.2d at 313-14: Burns v. Jaquays Mining, 
156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28. 34 (Ct.App. 
1988). As the Ayers court observed: 
In our view, the use of a court-super-
vised fund to administer medical-surveil-
lance payments .. is a highly appropri-
ate use of the Court's equitable pow-
ers Such a mechanism offers signif-
icant advantages over a lump-sum ver-
dict 
. . . [A] fund would serve to limit the 
liability of defendants to the amount of 
expenses actually incurred. A lump-sum 
verdict attempts to estimate future ex-
penses but cannot predict the amounts 
that actually will be expended for medi-
cal purposes The public health in-
terest is served by a fund mechanism 
that encourages regular medical monitor-
ing for victims of toxic exposure. . 
Although there may be administrative 
and procedural questions in the establish-
ment and operation of such a fund, we 
encourage its use by trial courts.. . 
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314. 
We agree with the rationale of the Ayers 
court. Although we do not mandate a 
trust fund, leaving it to the trial court to 
fashion a suitable equitable remedy, we do 
hold that any award must provide for the 
defendant's payment of only the costs of 
the medical monitoring services that will 
actually be provided to the plaintiff. The 
trial court should not order payment to the 
plaintiff, in a lump sum or otherwise, of 
damages representing the costs of future 
monitoring. If the court establishes a 
trust fund and all of it is not used ro pay 
for medical monitoring actually mcurred by 
the plaintiff, the remainder should be re-
turned to the defendant. For useful 
thoughts on the crafting of a remedy, see 
McCarter at 253-b'4. 
IV. DISPOSITION 
We affirm the trial court s ruling on 
plaintiffs* negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim, but reverse the ruling re-
garding medical monitoring. We remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
ZIMMERMAN. Justice, concurring in 
part and concurring in the result: 
[ concur in parts I and III of Justice 
Durham's opinion. I join in the conclusion 
of part II and agree that plaintiffs' allega-
tions are insufficient as a matter of law to 
support an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. However, I do not join 
in part IPs wide-ranging dictum to the ef-
fect that mental illness, in the absence of 
physical manifestation, is sufficient to sup-
port a claim. There is no need to attempt 
to decide this question for the purposes of 
this appeal, since under any theory plain-
tiffs' allegations are insufficient. More-
over, Justice Durham's dictum conflicts not 
only implicitly with the approach of a ma-
MATTER OF ESTATE OF JONES 
Cite as 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993) 
jonty of this court in Johnson v. Rogers, of Appeals: and 
763 P.2d 771, 784 (Utah 1988) (opinion of 
Zimmerman, J., joined by Hall. C.J., Howe, 
Assoc. C.J., and Stewart, J.), but explicitly 
with what I think are the better-reasoned 
authorities she cites but does not follow. 
Utah 983 
(3) California judgment 
was "final" for full faith and credit pur-
poses, as it was not appealed. 
Reversed. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART. J., concur in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
9(R SYSTEM> 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Herbert Lee JONES, deceased. 
Linda Cameron Anglesey, Appellant. 
No. 900170. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 9. 1993. 
Testator's son objected to petition for 
formal probate of will, claiming to be pre-
termitted child. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson. J.. 
denied son's objections, and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals. 759 P.2d 345, vacat-
ed and remanded. On remand, the District 
Court. James S. Sawaya, J., held that Cali-
fornia judgment which was entered prior to 
Court of Appeals' decision and which dis-
tributed testator's California real property 
was invalid, and ordered real property dis-
tributed according to Utah law. Estate ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
J., held that: (1) even if California court 
applied California, rather than Utah, law, 
that fact did not invalidate its decision for 
purposes of determining whether to afford 
California judgment full faith and credit; 
(2) California judgment was not rendered 
invalid for full faith and credit purposes by 
estate's alleged failure to bring to Califor-
nia court's attention fact that appeal of 
Utah trial court's ruling on pretermitted 
child claim was pending before Utah Court 
1. Appeal and Error e=842(l) 
Supreme Court reviewed trial court's 
ruling that, as matter of law, California 
judgment regarding real property was in-
valid and not entitled to full faith and cred-
.t independently and without deference <"o 
'rial court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4. § i. 
2. Judgment 0=815 
Generally, only judgments that are 
both valid and final are entitled to full faith 
and credit. U.S.C.A. ^onst. Art. 4. § 1. 
J. Judgment 3=815 
Even if California >'ourt applied Cali-
fornia, rather than Utah, 'aw m distribut-
ing Utah testator's California reai 'jroper-
:v. that fact did not nvalida^jts lecision 
for purposes of determiningNjwhether to 
afford California judgment full faith and 
credit. U.S.C.A. Const. A r t . S § 1. 
1. Descent and Distribution9^3 
Status of heir is determined according 
to laws of state where person is domiciled. 
5. Judgment 3=819 
Foreign judgment :hat is both valid 
and final cannot be collaterally attacked 
even if grounded on errors of law or fact. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4. $ I. 
6. Judgment <3=815 
To be "valid" for purposes of full faith 
and credit, judgment must have been ren-
dered by court with competent jurisdiction 
and in compliance with constitutional re-
quirements of due process. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 4, § 1. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Judgment <s=»815 
Foreign judgment rendered without 
subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
over either parties or res is not entitled to 
268 Blont. 295 PACIFIC REPORTER 
thereto. Parsons r. Rice, 81 Mont 509, 264 P. 
396. 
(9-1 f] 4. It is next contended that the ver-
dict is against law, in that the jury did not 
follow the Instructions of the court that, "un-
less you believe, from a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant in this action re-
ceived 1100 from the plaintiff for which she 
agreed to rent to plaintiff the room on the 
west side of the Park Hotel, known as the 
dining room, together with the rear room on 
the east side thereof, and she refused to turn 
said room over to plaintiff, then your verdict 
should be for the defendant as to the plain-
tiff's cause of action." 
It will be noted that, while the instruction 
contains the Insert, "together with the rear 
room on the east side thereof in effect in 
parenthesis, the slngjlar is thereafter used, 
"and she refused to turn said room over to 
the plaintiff.'* The antecedent of "room" is 
the dining room, and the jury might well 
have understood that the instruction had 
reference only to the dining room, although 
mentioning the small room. However, where 
defendant does not stand upon his motion for 
nonsuit and introduces testimony, he does so 
at the risk of supplying any deficiency in 
plaintiff's case (Staff v. Montana Petroleum 
Co, 87 Mont , 291 P 1042), as did defend-
ant here when she testified to having ar-
ranged for the occupation by defendant of a 
small room on the west side of the basement, 
thus in a measure supporting plaintiff's alle-
gation relative to that room; it is true she 
testified that plaintiff agreed to pay her $10 
l>er week for the use of this room, but in this 
*he was contradicted by the plaintiff. The 
question of who told the truth was addressed 
to the jury. Under the circumstances, the 
use of the singular "room" for the plural 
"rooms'* to the latter portion of the instruc-
tion could not have prejudiced defendant. 
On the whole record, the verdict was Justified 
under the instruction above. 
5. Finally it is said that the premises de-
scribed were rented for an illegal purpose, to 
wit, the sale therein of intoxicating liquor in 
violation of the federal Prohibition Act 
The fallacy here is that, in order to hold 
that the contract was illegal, we must adopt 
defendant's definition of a "soft drink parlor" 
as "a term used to describe a place where in-
toxicating liquor Is sold in violation of law." 
The record discloses that, with the knowl-
edge of defendant, plaintiff had conducted a 
"soft drink parlor" In the former barroom of 
the hotel, and that, in December, 102$, that 
room was abated because of the violation of 
the Prohibition Law therein by plaintiff It 
is dedudble from the evidence that "plaintiff 
Intended td open1 a soft drink parlor in the" 
dining room, bul the term "soft drink'' Is used" 
in£c6ntfadMlnctibn*to {intoxicating liquor5'»r 
and there Is no suggestion tn the record thatf 
plaintiff intended, or that defendant thought 
he intended, to again violate the law, If ac-
corded possession of the dining room. She 
merely denied that she rented the dining 
room to him; while plaintiff testified that 
she did, but refused to give him possession 
because she said another party had offered 
her more money for it. 
No reversible error appearing in the rec-
ord, the judgment is affirmed, 
CALLAWAY, C. J., and GALEN, FORD, 
and ANGSTMAN, JJ., concur. 
TANNHAUSER v. SHEA. 
No. 6723. 
tkipreme Court of Montana. 
Dec 26, 1930. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1931. 
t. Novation «=»!. 
Essential requisites of novation are previ-
ous valid obligation, agreement of parties to 
new contract, extinguishment of old contract 
and validity of new one (Rev. Codes 1921, ft 
7460-7462). 
2. Novation £=»!. 
Novation constitutes new contractual re-
lation and is based upon new contract by all 
parties interested (Rev. Codes 1921, 55 7460-
7462). 
3. Novation 4=>5» 
Agreement that employer would pay 
judgment against employee who was to be re-
leased held a "novation" (Rev. Codes 1921, H 
7460-7462). 
Plaintiff had sued employer and em-
ployee for damages in automobile colli-
sion. Judgment had been taken against 
employee by default, and nonsuit had been 
rendered in favor of employer. Plaintiff 
regarded employee as insolvent, and em-
ployee was threatening to move to have 
judgment set aside. Plaintiff had right of 
appeal from the nonsuit or conld have 
brought new suit against the employer. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Novation," see Words and Phrases.] 
4. Frauds, statute of *=>32. 
Promise to pay another's antecedent ob-
ligation in consideration of Its cancellation la 
ordinal undertaking not required by statute* 
of frauds to be in writing; (Rev. Codes 1921, fl 
8175, subsec. 8).
 t 
B$R m ali S^-Nuttbewd Jtert^aadlladSM^ ,«, ^ 
TANNHAUSER v. SHEA 
ffSP. 
Mont. 269 
5. Novation £*«. 
Judgments are-as much the subject of 
novation as simple contract debts. 
6. Jury <8=»28(6). 
Plaintiff held to have waived jury trial 
by offer to stipulate and by failure to object 
to trial as in equity. 
Plaintiff moved to try cause to court, 
and, upon motion being resisted, announc-
ed that he would stipulate that court might 
submit case to jury on question of fact, 
and that verdict would be advisory. Case 
was then tried as one in equity, and special 
verdict submitted to jury without objec-
tion to it, or to instructions pertaining 
thereto, 
7. Trial <S=>370(2). 
Court may direct jury to find special ver-
dict upon any issues in case (Rev. Codes 1921. 
§ 9361). 
8. Novation <§=M3. 
Where evidence is conflicting, issue of 
novation Is one of fact for jury or court try-
ing case without jury. 
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow 
County; Frank L Riley, Judge. 
Action by Frank J Tannhauser against 
Dennis A. Shea. From a judgment for de-
fendant, plaintiff appeals. 
Aflirmed. 
Lowndes Maury and R. Lewis Brown, both 
of Butte, for appellant. 
* ta lker A Walker and C. S. Wagner, all of 
Butte, for respondent. 
GALEN, J. 
Plaintiff Instituted this action on December 
30, 1927, to recover from the defendant on a 
judgment rendered by the district court of 
Silver Bow county on December 2, 1918, for 
the sum of $1,000, together with Interest and 
costs. By answer the defendant admitted the 
entry of the Judgment, that the plaintiff was 
the owner and holder of It, and that nothing 
had been paid thereon; and by way of affirm-
ative defense and counterclaim alleged that 
the judgment was entered against him in a 
certain action for the recovery of damages 
because of an automobile collision, entitled 
Iftrank J. Tannhauser v. M. J. Walsh Com-
pany, a corporation, and Dennis Shea It is 
averred that Shea, at the time of the acci-
dent, was driving an automobile belonging to 
in that action, Walsb as the employer of Shea, 
for himself and the corporation, agreed to 
employ counsel to defend Shea, and Walsh 
did employ counsel, who for some reason ap-
peared only for the defendant corporation, 
and as a result default judgment was entered 
against the defendant Shea ex parte, without 
his knowledge; that subsequently the action 
came on for trial against the corporation and 
a nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff 
Tannhauser; that as a result of the attor-
neys' failure to appear in that action for the 
defendant Shea, he was prevented from avail-
ing himself of the defense interposed by the 
corporation, and that had he been permitted 
to defend, no judgment would have been en-
tered against him. The defendant further al-
leges that thereafter the plaintiff and himself 
met with M. J. Walsh, now deceased, the lat-
ter acting for himself and the Walsh corpo-
ration, and It was thereupon agreed. In con-
sideration of this answering defendant Shea 
agreeing to forbear from any effort to have 
his default in that action set aside, that Walsh 
or the Walsh Company would pay the judg-
ment, and the plaintiff thereupon promised 
and agreed to extinguish the debt and release 
Shea therefrom, and to look entirely and 
alone to Walsh and the Walsh corporation for 
payment; that Shea, believing he was re-
leased, kept his portion of the agreement; 
that Walsh died prior to the commencement of 
this action, leaving no estafiri that he 
plaintiff did not issue executiorFon the judg 
ment within six years, or attempt to col-
lect the same from the defendaraj; and that 
he was thereby lulled Into secuwfy 
It is further averred by the dp^ndant that 
the promise of the plaintiff was false, and 
untrue, and was discovered by the defendant 
to be false and untrue upon the filing of the 
plaintiff's complaint in this action (December 
27, 1927); by reason whereof he prayed dam-
ages in the sum ot $1,000. By reply the plain-
tiff admitted the entry of the judgment, that 
the suit was a joint one, and that on the trial 
a nonsuit was entered In favor of the corpora-
tion, which was owned and controlled by M 
J. Walsh, and that the acts and doings of 
Walsh were the acts and doings of the cor-
poration and bound it, that Walsh died leav-
ing no estate; and denied all of the ojther af-
firmative allegations of the answer. 
On April 24 and 25, 1929, the cause was 
tried to a jury and treated by the court and 
counsel as one in equity. The defendant un-
dertook the burden of proof. At the conclu-
sion of all of the evidence, the court submitted 
to the jury a form of special verdict read-
the 1 C J. Walsh Company; that the Walsh - ing as follows: "We, the jury In this action, 
Company »waa owned and controlled by M. J- find the following special verdict in said ac-
Wateh, and that the acts and doings of Walsh tion: Question: Did the plaintiff; Tann- f 
were the acts,of the Walsh .Company, and hauser, and the defendant, Shea, and.the late 
bound )t ; that after the service of summons M. J. Walsh, |n the month of January, 19J$, 
4s>For other ease* Me tome topic and KEY-NUMBER laldl Key-Ntnnberod DlgfcU and Indttes •sair: 
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enter into an oral agreement that Walsh 
would pay to Tannhauser the amount of his 
judgment against Shea; that Shea would not 
take any steps to have set aside said judgment 
or to open the default in connection there-
with, and that Tannhauser would accept the 
promise of Walsh to pay said judgment and 
would relieve said Shea therefrom?" The 
jury was instructed to make answer to the 
question submitted* either "yes" or "no," and 
it made answer in the affirmative. 
Thereafter the plaintiff moved the court to 
reject the finding of the jury and to find in 
his favor, and the defendant asked that the 
finding of the jury be adopted by the court. 
The court made its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law adopting the finding of the jury, 
and on November 6, 1929, entered judgment 
on the merits, dismissing the plaintiff's com-
plaint The plaintiff moved for a new trial, 
which was denied, and the cause Is now be-
fore us on appeal from the judgment 
Of the several specifications of error by the 
plaintiff assigned, there is but one question 
meriting serious consideration in disposition 
of this appeal, viz.: Was the court In error in 
Its conclusion that a novation existed which 
relieved the defendant from the obligation of 
the judgment? 
The court found* "That the plaintiff here-
in, the defendant herein, and said Walsh, in 
the month of January, 1919, entered into an 
oral agreement that Walsh, in consideration 
of the release of the defendant Shea from 
said Judgment would pay, and did agree to 
pay, to plaintiff the amount of his judgment 
against defendant Shea; that Shea, in consid-
eration of his release from said judgment 
would not take, and agreed not to take, any 
steps to have set aside said judgment or to 
open the default in connection therewith; 
and that plainuif, in consideration of the said 
promise of Walsh to pay said judgment and of 
the forbearance of said Shea to take steps to 
have set aside said judgment or to open the 
default in connection therewith, would ac-
cept ai*d <*W agree to accept, and did accept 
the promise of Walsh to pay said judgment 
and would relieve, and did relieve, said Shea 
therefrom; that the defendant executed his 
part of said agreement by forbearing to take 
any steps or action in court to open said de-
fault or set aside said judgment within the 
time allowed by law, or at all; that defend-
ant at all times after the rendition of said 
judgment against him, was solvent and able 
to pay the same, but that plaintiff did not is-
sue execution on said judgment, within the 
time allowed by( law, or at all." 
And
 vas va conclusion of law it was found i 
that $bere was a novation resulting in Shea's 
release, from (he obligation of the judgment" 
il/2J<Althdugh ihe evidence is^ln direct* 
conflict ther£ fe lestbnbriy In support of such 
n^dinganof ?*Ct^ ^ ovat ion & th$ aubstitu-~ 
tion of a new obligation for an existing oiiSl 
Section 7460, Rev. Codes. 1921. It Is accojn 
plished in three ways: "l. By the substttjl 
tion of a new obligation between the sanfl 
parties, with intent o extinguish the old Jflg 
ligation; 2. By the substitution of a nefl 
debtor in place of the old one, with intent 9 
release the latter; or, 3. By the substitutes} 
of a new creditor in place of the old one, witB 
intent to transfer the rights of the latterJB 
the former" Id. S 7461. It is affected 1 3 
contract, "and is subject to all the rules COM 
cerning contracts in general." Id. 5 74621 
"In every novation there are four essential 
prerequisites: (1) A previous valid obligal 
tion; (2) the agreement of all the parties tfl 
the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of] 
the old contract; and (4) the validity of thg 
new one. It constitutes a new contractual rej 
lation and is based upon a new contract bn 
all parties Interested/' Kirkup v. Anacondaj 
Amusement Co., 59 Mont 469, 197 P. 1005J 
1011, 17 A. L. R. 441. * |j 
[3] Admittedly M. J. Walsh and the MJ 
J. Walsh Company were one and the samel 
and it appears that Shea owed Tannhauser al 
liquidated sum of money, evidenced by a] 
judgment entered by default; that Shea was' 
threatening within his rights to move the! 
court to set aside the judgment because ofj 
fraud or excusable neglect; and that Tann? 
hauser considered Shea to be insolvent andy 
knew that there was a possibility of Shew 
having the judgment set aside. Walsh knew] 
or should have known, that Tannhauser hadj 
a right of appeal or could institute a new easel 
upon the same cause of action because thej 
nonsuit entered as to Walsh and his company*] 
did not constitute a trial on the merits. Hej 
wished to rid himself of the litigation. She* 
was Walsh's employee and Walsh apparently] 
felt morally bound to relieve Shea from the] 
burden of the judgment A legal duty rested/ 
upon the defendant Shea at the time of enjj 
tering into the agreement with Walsh andj 
Tannhauser to pay the judgment and by reaj 
son of such agreement Shea was released o i 
such obligation, Tannhauser agreeing to ac$j 
cept Walsh in substitution of Shea, m 
amounted to an agreement to substitute a nevfi 
debtor (Walsh) in place of the old one (Shea» 
with intent to release the latter—a "novafl 
tion" as defined by our statute. cM 
(4, 5] And the rule Is that where the prom? 
ise is made to pay the antecedent obligation <8 
another upon the consideration that the paHg 
receiving it will cancel such antecedent obtfj 
gatlon, accepting the new promise in substg 
tution therefor, it is an original undertaking 
tor agreement and not a mere promise to a]S 
swer'for the debt of another within the meall 
tag of the statute of frauds and need noj: beja 
writing; and judgments are as'mdeh the sura 
JeciB of novation as simple contract de$g | 
46 O. J. 583, 584,
 :J. But It is contended ^ S j 
HENDERSON * 
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I n^e consideration was unlawful, in that it *as based upon an agreement as to the char-acter of testimony Shea would give in the ac-tion against Walsh. There is nothing in the l? record to indicate that Shea was to testify 
falsely or to in any manner deviate from the 
| facts in the case. 
LAND Wyo. 271 
| [6] Many of the plaintiff's assignments of 
f error are based upon the fact that the cause 
I was tried as one in equity rather than at law, 
t and that the plaintiff was in consequence de-
Inied his constitutional tight of a trial by 
jLjury. Counsel now concede,, as they must 
I that the action is one at law rather than in 
lequity; however, the plaintiff entirely over-
flooks the fact that by his consent appearing 
fjn the minutes of the court a trial by jury 
boras expressly waived. At the trial the plain-
£tiff made motion to dismiss the jury and to 
'try the cause to the court upon five specific 
grounds, among which It was contended that 
|the defendant is "estopped to deny the case 
pis in equity"; that the equitable powers of 
[ tbe court having once taken jurisdiction, "the 
tase remains within the jurisdiction of equity 
^throughout the entire proceedings"; and that 
I t is perfectly proper for an equitable case 
, to be tried to the court with no jury." This 
•, motion was resisted bf the defendant, and 
'plaintiff's counsel thereupon announced that 
* he would "stipulate that the court may submit 
r the case to the jury on the question of fact 
f and that the verdict of the jury will be advis-
fjory to the court" Consequently, the case 
|fwas tried as one In equity and a special ver 
f'dict submitted to the jury without objection 
| to it, or to the court's instructions pertaining 
ttthereto. We hold that the plaintiff waived 
Phis right to a jury trial, and that his objection 
Incomes too late. 
E [7,1] The judgment was properly predi-
g c^ated upon the jury's special verdict, as the 
p court is authorized in all cases to direct "the 
TJury t0 And a special verdict in writing upon 
gal! or any of the issues" presented In a case. 
Pfiection 9361, Rev. Codes 1921. The rule is 
jfthat: "Whether it was the intention of the 
Frparties to a particular transaction to effect a 
pnovation or not Is ordinarily a question of 
T^act for the jury, if the terms of the agree-
ment are equivocal or uncertain. Upon simi-
Pl&r principles, where the evidence is conflict-
i n g , the Issue of novation Is one of fact for 
K&e Jury or for the court, where the case Is 
juried without a jury-* 40 C. J. p. 630. In the 
Ktlgfat of the evidence, it was proper in this 
gc&se to submit the question to the jury for de-
Rrermlnatlon. 
KuTor the reasons stated, the judgment is af-
pJAArmed. 
I^OALLAWAY, C. J.,r and MATTHEWS, 
SpRJ>, kndANGSTMAN, JJ.t concur. 
HENDERSON V. LAND. 
No. 1603. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
Jan. 14, 1931. 
t. Appeal and error <&=>l 078(1). 
Where several errors were assigned In 
specification, but only one argued in brief, 
only It could be considered. 
2. Negligence $=>I2. 
Before sudden emergency rule applies, it 
must be clear emergency existed through 
no negligence of person in peril, and that re-
sultant injury could not be prevented after 
peril had passed. 
3. Automobiles <8=>246(2I). 
Refusing instruction, under sudden 
emergency doctrine, negativing Inference of 
negligence arising from motorist's being on 
wrong side of street when striking pedestrian 
at intersection, held proper, injury occurring 
after passing of emergency and being pre-
ventable by motorist 
Appeal from District Court, Laramie Coun-
ty ; Cyrus O. Brown, Judge. 
Action by Elizabeth J. Henderson against 
Edwin Land. From a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
George P. Guy, of Cheyenne, for appellant 
Lee A Lee, of Cheyenne, for respondent 
RINER, J. 
This case, here by direct appeal, arose In 
consequence of injuries inflicted by an auto-
mobile driven by Edwin J. Land, the de-
fendant below and appellant here, against 
the plaintiff and respondent Elizabeth J-. 
Henderson, as she was crossing O'Neil street 
on her* way along the north side of Twenty-
Fifth street at the intersection of the two 
streets in the city of Cheyenne. 
Plaintiff's amended petition charged that 
the accident happened because the defendant 
negligently drove his car on the wrong side 
of the street and at an excessive rate of 
speed. The defense Interposed was a gen-
eral denial, with the assertion of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
A jury trial resulted in a verdict and Judg-
ment In her favor, in a sum not so very 
greatly In excess of the amount claimed by 
her for medical and hospital expenses in-
curred In consequence of the injuries suf-
fered. 
[1] While a number of errors were assign-
ed in the specification of errors filed, ^nty 
one has been argued 'In appellant's brief, 
H *>=>FQr other c»«e.«ee tome topic and KEY-NUMBER In ell Key-Numbered Dlgeete and Indexes 
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2) Judgment by default. A judgment Oy default 
shail not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount. 
:hat specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment, 
d) Costs. 
1) l b whom awarded. Except when express provi-
sion therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
these rules, costs shail be allowed as of course to che 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs: pro-
dded, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. 
Costs against the state of Utan. its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
2) How assessed. The partv who claims his costs 
-nust within five days after the entry of judgment serve 
upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action, and tile with the 
court a like memorandum thereof duiy verified stating 
:hat to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, rile a motion to have the bill of 
costs taxed by the court in which 'he judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and riled after the 
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and 
filing of the findings of fact and inclusions or law. but 
before the entry of judgment, snail nevertheless be con-
sidered as served and iled on -he late ucgment s 
entered. 
3), 4) LDeieted.j 
') Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. 
cierk must include in any judgment signed oy him any 
rest on :he verdict or lecision from :he time t was 
lereo. and the costs, f the same nave oeen taxed T 
Ttainea. The cierk must, within two days after the costs 
? oeen taxed jr ascertained. :n any case where not m-
ed :n the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a olank 
in the judgment for 'hat purpose, and make a simiiar 
tion thereof in the register of actions ana in the judgment 
;et. 
ended effective January 1. 1985.. 
j 55. Default. 
Default. 
1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
iefend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
ippear the clerk shall enter his default. 
2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the 
lefault of any party, as provided in Subdivision <a)(l) of 
his rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in 
lefault any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
ny notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to 
e served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as 
rovided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that 
; is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with 
jgard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting 
arty. 
Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
s: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plain tiff's claim against a 
sfendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by 
mputation be made certain, and the defendant has been 
srsonally served otherwise than by publication or by 
trsonal service outside of this state, the clerk upon 
quest of the plaintiff 3hall enter judgment for the 
imount aue and costs against 'he defendant, if he has 
)een iefauited for failure co appear and if he is not an 
nfant or incompetent person. 
2' 3y the court. In all other cases the oarty entitled 
*o a judgment by default shail apply to the court therefor. 
if. ;n order *o enanie -.he court *o enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
letermine the amount )f damages or to establish the 
ruth of any averment oy evidence or *o make an investi-
gation of anv other matter, 'he court may conduct such 
searings or order such references as it deems necessary 
md proper. 
c Setting aside default. 7or ^ood cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default ana. .fa judgment by default 
nas oeen entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
?.uie o0(b;. 
d) Plaintiffs, counterciaimants. oross-claimants. The 
provisions of this rule apply whether -he party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a 
party who nas pieaded a cross-ciaim or counterclaim. In all 
:ases a judgment by default :s subject to the limitations of 
Rule o4ic\ 
e) Judgment against the *tate or officer or agency 
thereof. No judgment by default snail be entered against the 
state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establisnes his claim or -:gnt :o reiief by evidence 
satisfactory fo the court. 
Amended effective Sevt. ;. 1985. 
Ruie ,56. Summary judgment. 
a i For claimant. A oarty seeding to recover upon a ciaira. 
;ountemaim >r :ross-eiaim T 'O jotain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at anv time after the expiration of 20 aays from the 
commencement of the action :r liter iervice of a motion for 
summary judgment oy the adverse oarty, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for i -ummary judgment in nis favor 
ipon iii >r any pan thereof. 
b» For defending party. .* oarty igainst whom a ciaim. 
:ounterc:aim. or cross-ciaim :s asserted >r a declaratory judg-
ment s sought, ciay, it my time, move with or without 
supporting iifidavits for a summary judgment n nis favor as 
:o ail jr any oart thereof. 
a Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at ieast 10 davs before the rime fixed for the heanng. 
The idverse oarty prior 'o "he iav ::' heanng may serve 
opposing iffidavits. The .'udgment sought shail be rendered 
forthwith if the oieaoings. leoositions. answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on rile, together wich the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party s entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in charac-
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for ail the relief asked and 3 trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specify-
ing the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceed-
ings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense re-
quired. Supporting and opposing affidavits shail be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
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idmissible in evidence, and shail show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
:o in an affidavit shail be attacned thereto or served therewith. 
rhe court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or op-
posed oy depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this ruie. an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
ruie, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
udgment. if appropriate, shall be entered against mm. 
f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
-'rom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
:annot for reasons stated present bv affidavit facts essential to 
astify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
udgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to oe 
)Otained or depositions to oe taken or discovery to oe had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
oresented pursuant to this ruie are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court snail forthwith order 
:he party emplovmg them :o oay to me other oarty the 
imount of the -easonable expenses wnich the filing of the 
iffidavits caused him to incur, including reasonaole attorneys 
ees. and any offending oarty or attorney may oe adjudged 
,-uilty of contemDt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The oroceoure for obtaining a declarator.' judgment oursu-
int to Chapter o3 n Title ~S. U.C.A. '..953. snail oe n 
accordance with these rules, and the right to tnai by jurv mav 
:e demanded 'inder the circumstances ind :n the manner 
orovnded in Rules ;8 ind -39. The existence of mother au-
eauate remedy ioes not preclude a judgment for leciaratorv 
-eiief in cases where it :s aoproDnate. "he court may oroer I 
iDeedy neanng of an iction 'br a declarator/ judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar 
Ruie 58A. Entry. 
a) Judgment upon the verdict of a ju ry Uniess he 
:ourt otherwise directs and suoject to the orovisions of Ruie 
54(bj, judgment UDon the verdict of a jury snail be forthwith 
signed by the cierk ana riled. If there is a special veroict or a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories 
-eturned by a jury pursuant to Ruie 49, the court snail direct 
the appropriate judgment which snail be forthwith signed bv 
the cierK and tiled. 
b) Judgment in other cases. Sxcept as provided n 
tjuodivision <a) hereof and Subdivision bxl) of Ruie 55, aii 
judgments shail be signed by :ne judge and riled -vith the 
Merk. 
c) When judgment entered: notation in register of 
actions and judgment docket, A judgment is complete and 
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of 
a lien on real property, when the same is signed and filed as 
herein above provided. The cierk shail immediately make a 
notation of the judgment m the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
;d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevail-
ing party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of 
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service of 
such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for 
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after 
a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before 
judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon. 
f Judgment by confession. Whenever a /aagmer 
lonfession 13 authorized oy -uatute. :ne oartv ieeKimj 
same must hie with the cleric of the court :n which 
judgment is to oe entered a statement, enfied by the di 
iant. to the following effect: 
1) If the judgment to oe confessed is for money ai 
to oecome aue. it snail conciseiv state the ciaim and 
:ne sum confessed therefor is justiy aue or to cecome 
2) if the judgment to be confessed :s for tne ouroo 
securing the piaintiff igainst l :ontingent iaoiiit 
must state concisely the ciaim and that the sum confe 
therefor does not exceed the same; 
3) It must luthonze -he entrv yf judgment :•: 
specified sum. 
"he cierK snail •hereupon endorse anon tne statement, 
mter n the judgment iocKet. i augment of the court rbr 
imount confessed, vith :osts of entry. ;f my. 
Amended effective SeDt. -4. 1985: Jan. ... 1987. 
Ruie 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
-i< Satisfaction by owner or attorney, A judgment ; 
•)e satisfied, in wnoieor in oart. as to any or ail of the juagrr 
debtors, oy the owner thereof, or -w the attorney ~>f recor 
the .udgment creditor wnere no issignment of 'he judgrr 
has oeen ilea and men. attorney executes sucn satisfac 
vithm eight --ears ifter the entry of -he ;udgment. n 
:biiowing manner: 1 y^ wntten nstrurnent. iuiy acxnc 
edged bv >ucn owner or attorney: or ' _: bv ocxnowieo^men 
sue.n satisfaction signed bv tne owner or attorney and ente 
.n :ne :ocket if :he udgment n :he :ountv vrier*1 ' 
locKetec. vun he late iffixeo ino vntnesseo v.- tne :u 
I very satisfaction f a cart u tne judgment, or as to mt 
more f the ^uagment :eotors. snaii state -he imount o 
tnereon or for -he -eiease -jfsuch lebtors. -aming -.-.em. 
b Satisfaction by >rder of court. Vhen i udgm 
snail have oeen fuiiy oaio and not satisfied of recorc. r^ wi 
"he satisfaction of-'uegment shail have been ost. -.ne couri 
vn:ch .ucn judgment vas "^covered may, :Don motion 
-atisfactor/ orooi. luthonze ne ittomey :f tne idgmi 
jreoitor -.o satisn' -he same. :r may enter in order leciar 
he same satisfied and direct satisfaction -.o oe entered ;t 
:he aocxet. 
c Zntry by cierk. Loon recemt of i satisfaction of ;ui 
ment. auiv executed and acxnowieogeo. the cierk snail hie ' 
;ame -vitn the oaDers in :he case, ind enter :t on tne regis 
n' ictions. ^e nail nso enter i )nef statement if ' 
iUDStance thereof, nciuoing the amount caia. in he man 
jf the .udgment aocKet. vuh the aate of hiing of rucn sat 
•'action. 
d' Sffect of satisfaction. When i uogment -nail ha 
oeen satisfied, n vnoie ir in part, or is to anv udgmc 
aeotor, and such satisfaction entered icon .he docket bv : 
:ierK. sucn judgment snail, to tne extent of such satisfactu 
oe aiscnarged and :ease to oe I lien. In :ase n oart 
satisfaction. :f any execution shall thereafter oe issued on t 
.udgment. such execution snail be endorsed with a memora 
ium of such partial satisfaction and shail direct the officer 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect oniy -'rom t 
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
e> Filing transcript of satisfaction in other countU 
When any satisfaction of a judgment shail have been enter 
on the judgment docket c: the county where sucn judgme 
was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or 
certificate by the cierk showing sucn satisfaction, may oe fil< 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county whe 
the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a simil; 
entry in the judgment docket shail be made by the cierk 
such court: and such entry shail have the same effect as in tl 
county where the same was originally entered. 
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Case : 940008147 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
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MONDAY JULY 10, 1995 
11:18 AM 
Filing Date: 06/30/94 
Judge: Sheila K. McCleve 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON 
Cause of Action: 
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES 
Amount of Suit.: $12637.10 
Return Date....: 
Judgment : 
Disposition....: 
D a t e : 
D a t e : 
:! !! l I .* <[< 
)! ' I V 
M/rifii 
!!:r-'iii"«"j'(99fi"1j 
t n , I j 
' ' «! i i / } • , ( 
Amt: . 
1/ 
$ • 0 0 
No Court Settings 
Tracking.: Return Date 11/27/95 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Transaction: 
Civil File Fee 
Date: Cash-in Check-in Check-out Total 
06/30/94 .00 100.00 .00 100.00 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPA 
NY 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
MATTINSON, RON 
Party..: DBA Doing Business As 
Name...: 
R&R SERVICES 
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D O C K E T Page ; 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC MONDAY JULY 10, 199! 
11:18 AT 
Case : 940008147 CV Civil Filing Date: 06/30/9-* 
Case Title: Judge: Sheila K. McCleve 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON 
Party..: ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name...: 
LEE, SCOTT W 
06/30/94 Began tracking Return Date Review on 12/27/94 VLC 
Case filed on 06/30/94. VLC 
941270177 Civil complaint fee 100.00 VLC 
07/11/94 FILED AMENDED COMPLAINT DEC 
07/29/94 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED RON MATTINSON DBA R&R SERVICES, ALS 
BY SERVING DEBBIE MATTINSON (WIFE) ALS 
08/02/94 FILED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT ALS 
12/29/94 Return Date Review date changed to 03/27/95 ASB 
03/09/95 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT ASB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF CRAE BAKER ASB 
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
FILED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ASB 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
03/21/95 FILED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
03/22/95 FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RESISTING ASB 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY ASB 
JUDGMENT ASB 
03/28/95 Return Date Review date changed to 11/27/95 ASB 
05/23/95 FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ASB, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
05/26/95 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ASB 
05/30/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE ASB 
06/01/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE SUSTAINED PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ENLARGEMENT OF ASB 
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO ASB 
RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM (SIGNED) ENTRY ASB 
OF ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION, COURT WILL RULE ON SUMMARY ASBl 
JUDGMENT WITH PLEADINGS AS NOW STAND. ASB 
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER ASB 
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY ASB 
06/07/95 FILED ORDER ASB 
** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE ASB 
06/08/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE ENTERED ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION ASB. 
07/05/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE ASB 
07/10/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER ASB 
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY ASB 
End of the docket report for this case, 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Case : 940008147 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
Page 1 
THURSDAY JUNE 1, 1995 
2:24 PM 
— Filing Date: 06/30/94 
Judge!-Sheila K. McCleve 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VG MATTINSON, RON 
Cause of Action: 
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES 
Amount of Suit.: $12637.10 
Return Date....: 
Judgment : 
Disposition....: 
Imli'irMW 
Date: 
Date: 
]ti ~.iW~o vpnr 
Amt 
• 1 \ M ' »« 
$.00 
No Court Settings. 
Tracking.: Return Date 11/27/95 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Transaction: 
Civil File Fee 
Date: Cash-in Check-in Check-out Total 
06/30/94 .00 100.00 .00 100.00 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPA 
NY 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
MATTINSON, RON 
Party..: DBA Doing Business As 
Name...: 
R&R SERVICES PAGE 33 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC THURSDAY JUNE 1, 1995 
2:24 PM 
Case : 940008147 CV Civil Filing Date: 06/30/94 
Case Title: Judge: Sheila K. McCleve 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON 
Party..: ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name...: 
LEE, SCOTT W 
06/30/94 Began tracking Return Date Review on 12/27/94 VLC 
Case filed on 06/30/94. VLC 
941270177 Civil complaint fee 100.00 VLC 
07/11/94 FILED AMENDED COMPLAINT DEC 
07/29/94 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED RON MATTINSON DBA R&R SERVICES, ALS 
BY SERVING DEBBIE MATTINSON (WIFE) ALS 
08/02/94 FILED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT ALS 
12/29/94 Return Date Review date changed to 03/27/95 ASB 
03/09/95 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT ASB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF CRAE BAKER ASB 
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
FILED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ASB 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
03/21/95 FILED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
03/22/95 FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RESISTING ASB 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY ASB 
JUDGMENT ASB 
03/28/95 Return Date Review date changed to 11/27/95 ASB 
05/23/95 FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ASB 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME ASB 
05/26/95 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION ASB 
35/30/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE ASB 
36/01/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE SUSTAINED PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ENLARGEMENT OF ASB 
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO ASB 
RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM (SIGNED) ENTRY ASB 
OF ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION, COURT WILL RULE ON SUMMARY ASB 
JUDGMENT WITH PLEADINGS AS NOW STAND. ASB 
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER ASB 
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY ASB 
End of the docket report for this case. 
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A. W. LAURITZEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 171 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
(801) 753-3391 
May 25,1995 
Scott W. Lee 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169 
RE: Rocky Mountain Machinery Company vs. Ron Mattison 
dba R&R Services 
Dear Mr. Lee, 
Apologies are now in order and I extend mine to you. When 
prepared the response to your Motion for Summary Judgement we 
were on a deadline and my client living in Salt Lake had to 
obtain a notary on his signature so I faxed the items to him. 
Mr. Mattison assures me that he executed the Affidavit before a 
notary and filed the Response together with the Affidavit with 
the court but advises me that he took no steps to file copies 
with you. In examining my file I likewise find no indication 
that I mailed copies of the documents to you which was a grave 
oversight. 
Enclosed find the documents which I timely filed with the 
court and now belatedly file with you and ask your forgiveness 
for this oversight. 
Ver 
( 
A. x ^ J ^ u r i t z e n 
Attorney at Law 
AWL/vj 
bsmattlee.ltr(3) 
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SCOTT W. LEE - NO. 4750 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
| f l l ) l !7p^ , :»y^ 
MAR 
1
 M l l t 
i () jtirji; 
"X". 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT 
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 940008147-CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this Ji 7 day of February, 1995, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, 
Lynn Holt, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is employed by Plaintiff as a repair person and is familiar with the 
transaction that forms the basis of the above-referenced litigation. 
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2. The statements made herein by Affiant are made of Affiant's own knowledge 
and are such statements as Affiant would or could make under oath in court if called upon to 
do so. 
3. On or about April 22, 1993, Affiant was dispatched to Oceda, Nevada (near Ely, 
Nevada) from Salt Lake City, Utah to repair a dozer owned by Defendant. 
4. Affiant traveled to Oceda, Nevada where Affiant located and inspected 
Defendant's equipment. The examination revealed the problem was not a convertor problem 
as Defendant had suspected. 
5. Affiant discussed the problem with Defendant's on-site representative, noted that 
there was transmission oil in the radiator and received permission to complete the repairs 
actually needed to restore Defendant's equipment to operating condition. 
6. Affiant thereupon returned to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate parts, have 
appropriate work done and assemble the equipment as necessary whereafter Affiant returned 
to Oceda, Nevada and completed the repairs. 
7. Upon completion of the repairs, Affiant tested Defendant's equipment for proper 
function and found it to perform within the manufacturer's specifications. 
8. At no time did Defendant, Defendant's on-site representative or Defendant's 
agents request that Affiant use remanufactured or rebuilt parts in performing the repairs or 
otherwise make any indication that the costs of the repairs might cause Defendant to consider 
purchasing a new machine rather than repair the existing machine. 
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DATED this ^ 7 day of February, 1995. 
L/n^dC^?fiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me. 
Notary Public • 
DEBBIE SCHIAPPA 1 
2320 West 1500 South I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 J 
My Commission Expires I 
March 27.1996 I 
State of Utah J 
NOTARY PUBLIC V 7 ' 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
LYNN HOLT, this JW day of 
A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney for Defendant 
610 North Main 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan UT 84321 
, 1995, postage prepaid, to the following: 
* r - \ 
\L 
^ 
uio ClU'lYLilh 
2sw!.!92 
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SCOTT W. LEE - NO. 4750 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
: Civil No. 940008147-CV 
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES 
: Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing and doing business as R & R Services in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Venue is proper because the transactions that form the basis of this action 
occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. The amount that is the subject of this action is less than $20,000, exclusive of 
costs. 
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5. During May, 1993, Defendant requested that Plaintiff provide certain products 
and services to repair machinery owned or used by Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff provided said products and supplies during said period, as requested, 
and has performed all acts to be performed herein by Plaintiff. 
7. Defendant has refused and failed to pay Plaintiff, after proper demand has been 
made, and currently owes to Plaintiff the sum of $12,637.10, together with interest as specified 
by U.C.A. § 15-1-1, et seq. from June 1, 1993 until collected in full, plus costs incurred 
herein. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. Judgment in the principal sum of $12,637.10, together with interest as specified 
by U.C.A. § 15-1-1, et seq.. from June 1, 1993 until collected in full, plus costs incurred 
herein; and 
2. For such further relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this ^ L day of July, 1994. 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
^-Scott W. Lee 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
2320 West 1500 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84126 
27sbswl.314l 
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SHIPPED JW 2 3 m 
A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney at Law 
ftttdmey for Defendant 
610 North Main 
P?0?rBox 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY 
COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON MATTINSON dba R&R SERVICES 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 940008147-CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
COMES NOW the Defendant with this his answer to Plaintiff's 
Complaint and alleges: 
1. Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
2. Admits paragraphs one and two. 
3. Denies or is without sufficient knowledge to admit and 
therefore denies paragraph three. 
4. Admits paragraph four, and five. 
5. Denies paragraph six and affirmatively alleges that in 
fact Plaintiff did not perform requested repairs or provide 
requested products. 
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6. Denies paragraph seven nonetheless admitting that the 
Defendant has refused and failed to pay Plaintiff but denies the 
balance of the paragraph. 
7. As an affirmative defense alleges failure of 
consideration. 
8. As an affirmative defense alleges no consideration. 
9. As an affirmative defense alleges breach of warranty. 
10. Reserves the right to assert additional affirmative 
defenses after discovery is complete. 
WHEREFORE: Defendant prays judgement against the Plaintiff no 
cause of action with his costs 
is £f?& day of Q(itL DATED th  dP)(3L\   V///// , 1994. 
b:»attrckj.ans(2) 
2 
PAGE 42 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT postage prepaid, to the 
f,o 1,1 owing listed below on thi s ^ / ^ a y of \II4CU^ ,1994. 
Sqo'tt W. Lee 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169 
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h%: WL - Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant 
610 North Main 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY 
COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES 
Defendant. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE} 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT 
Case No. 940008147-CV 
Judae Sheila K. McCleve 
}ss 
STATE OF UTAH } 
Ron Mattinson being first duly sworn does depose and say: 
1. That I have done business in the past as R6.R Equipment 
Sales and I did indeed contact Rocky Mountain Machinery Company and 
specified that certain repairs be done on a Komatsu dozer. At the 
time of my callf I specified that they check the torque converter 
and replace the torque converter as needed and check the glow plugs 
because the engine was hard starting. After talking to the service 
manager, he gave me an estimate over the phone of $3500.00 which 
would be the cost of removing the old torque converter and 
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replacing it with a rebuilt unit. T limited the nasi of repairs 
specifying that he spend no more than that amount. 
2. I was involved in some work in Salt Lake and the dozer was 
located in a remote location and I heard nothing further from the 
Plaintiff until I received a bill which, oddly enough, specified my 
order at the top and then went on to list a whol^ bunch of parts 
that had nothing to do with the order I had made. I called and 
complained about the bill to no avail and this litigation followed, 
3. I specifically had not wanted the repairman to deal with 
theuoil cooler and the radiator because if that turned out to be 
the difficulty with the machine, I already had those parts 
available to me at a very nominal cost i.e. $1500.00. 
4. I have no idea who the person that Plaintiff's 
representative spoke to in Oceola Nevada was but I suspect it was 
one of the employees of a gold mine which was operating in that 
area. When I went back to the area and retrieved my dozer and my 
other machinery from the site, the mine had been closed down and 
there was no one at the site at all. 
Interestingly enough I only paid $15,000.00 for the dozer to 
start with and the repairs accomplished by Plaintiff were very near 
that amount; with that value situation in mind, it strikes me as 
very peculiar that Plaintiff would not have taken it upon himself 
2 
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to check before expending that amount of money particularly when I 
was available in the Salt Lake area either by railing my home or by 
calling my cellular phone which is always with me rather than going 
out on that much of a limb without confirmation of the order. 
5. Under no circumstances would I have assented to a repair 
of that magnitude on a machine of that value, particularly when I 
had the parts available to me and I could have accomplished the 
repair myself for less than a third of what the charges for the job 
as made the Plaintiff. The torque converter px^hange on the other 
hand, was beyond my expertise and T did not have a serviceable one 
at hand. 
DATED this day of , 1995. 
^ K o n "Mattinson 
Personally did appear before me Ron Mattinson and did 
acknowledge to me that he has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT and knows the 
contents thereof to be true and correct on this _ day of 
, 1995. 
SEAL: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
b:nattison.aff(3) 
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